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A.

I.

ADMINISTRATION OF THE ACT

A.

Jurisdiction

1. Definitions-employer/employee
The protections of the National Labor Relations Act (Act or
NLRA) are conferred upon "employees" but not "supervisors." 2 The
1. Section 2(3) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976) provides:
(3) The term "employee" shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to
the employees of a particular employer, unless this subchapter explicitly states
otherwise, and shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any other regular and substantially
equivalent employment, but shall not include any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or person at his home, or
any individual employed by his parent or spouse, or any individual having the
status of an independent contractor, or any individual employed as a supervisor, or
any individual employed by an employer subject to the Railway Labor Act, as
amended from time to time, or by any person who is not an employer as herein
defined.
2. Section 2(11) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1976) provides:
(11) The term "supervisor" means any individual having authority, in the interest
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Ninth Circuit has taken the view that an individual is a supervisor
under the meaning of section 2(11) of the Act if he exercises at least one
of the powers enumerated in that section and uses independent judgment in its exercise.
During the survey period, in NLRB v. Big Three Industries,Inc.,'
the Ninth Circuit sustained the National Labor Relations Board's
(Board or NLRB) finding that a certain employee was a supervisor.'
The court noted that the employee in question directed his unit of employees on a daily basis, administered sick leave and overtime, and assisted in the hiring, discipline, and merit review of other employees.
These activities were sufficient to categorize the employee as a supervisor. His part-time performance of the same type of work done by other
employees in his unit did not alter the conclusion.6
The court's conclusion that the employee in question was a supervisor is consistent with the established rule for making such a determination.7 The conjunctive test of performing at least one of the
supervisorial activities enumerated in section 2(11)8 and using inof the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to
adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection
with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment.
E.g., L.A. Young Spring & Wire Corp. v. NLRB, 163 F.2d 905, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1947) (privileges and benefits of Act limited to "employees" and not "supervisors"), cert. denied, 333
U.S. 837 (1948).
3. Laborers & Hod Carriers Local 341 v. NLRB, 564 F.2d 834 (9th Cir. 1977); accord
Sweeney & Co. v. NLRB, 437 F.2d 1127 (5th Cir. 1971); Federal Compress & Warehouse
Co. v. NLRB, 398 F.2d 631 (6th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Roselon S., Inc., 382 F.2d 245 (6th Cir.
1967).
4. 602 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1979).
5. Id. at 901-02. The Board has the authority and duty to determine the application of
the term "supervisor" in the first instance, and the court will generally defer to its interpretation if it has a reasonable basis in law. Eg., International Ass'n of Bridgeworkers Local 207
v. Perko, 373 U.S. 701, 706 (1963); Laborers & Hod Carriers Local 341 v. NLRB, 564 F.2d
834, 837 (9th Cir. 1977). This rule arises from the general rule that the Board's findings of
fact and conclusions therefrom will be sustained if supported by substantial evidence. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474,488 (1951); e.g., NLRB v. Heath Tec Div., 566
F.2d 1367, 1369 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 832 (1978); see also the survey cases: Clear
Pine Mouldings, Inc. v. NLRB, 632 F.2d 721, 724 (9th Cir. 1980); NLRB v. Adams Delivery
Serv., Inc., 623 F.2d 96, 98 (9th Cir. 1980); NLRB v. J.C. Penney Co., Store No. 29-9, 620
F.2d 718, 719 (9th Cir. 1980); NLRB v. Best Prods. Co., 618 F.2d 70, 73 (9th Cir. 1980);
NLRB v. Tischler, 615 F.2d 509, 511 (9th Cir. 1980); In re Bel Air Chateau Hosp., Inc., 611
F.2d 1248, 1252 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam); NLRB v. Albert Van Luit & Co., 597 F.2d 681,
686 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
6. 602 F.2d at 902.
7. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
8. See supra note 2 for the text of § 2(11).
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dependent judgment in its performance was met because the activities
described fell within the section 2(11) list and could not have been performed without the use of independent judgment.
Section 2(3) of the Act9 defines "employee" broadly with specific
exceptions. Illegal aliens are not among those exceptions."0 Partly because of that fact, the Ninth Circuit held in the 1979 case of NLRB v.
Apollo Tire Co.," that alien employees, regardless of whether they

have12working papers, are "employees" as defined in section 2(3) of the
Act.

The employer in Apollo unsuccessfully argued that the Board's
policy of not distinguishing between citizens and properly documented
aliens on the one hand, and illegal aliens on the other, conflicted with
the restrictive immigration policy of the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952 (INA). 13 The court joined the Seventh Circuit, the
only other circuit to have addressed this question, 14 in rejecting this
argument, basing its decision on several factors: (1) that federal immigration statutes neither prohibit employers from hiring illegal aliens
nor prohibit illegal aliens from working and exercising rights protected
by the Act;' 5 (2) that the INA, which makes it a felony to harbor an
illegal alien, provides that employment shall not constitute harboring; 6
and (3) that the Supreme Court has implied that Congress can extend
privileges to illegal aliens if it so desires. 1 7 Because illegal aliens could
be covered by the Act, the court concluded that they should be; otherwise employers would be encouraged to hire illegal aliens to circumvent the protective provisions of the Act.'" Thus, the court reasoned,
the restrictive provisions and spirit of the INA are strengthened, not
weakened, by including illegal alien employees in the definition of
"employees" in section 2(3). 19
9. See supra note 1 for the text of § 2(3).
10. NLRB v. Apollo Tire Co., 604 F.2d 1180, 1182 (9th Cir. 1979).
11. 604 F.2d 1180 (9th Cir. 1979). This case arose from the employer's outlandish unfair
labor practices against his illegal alien employees, including death threats against'the mother
of one for her assistance in filing complaints with the Board. The Board issued various cease
and desist orders and ordered reinstatement of certain employees. Id. at 1181-82.
12. Id. at 1182-83.
13. Id. at 1182. The INA is codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1557 (1979). See § 1182(a)(14),
which restricts the entry of alien workers into the United States.
14. See NLRB v. Sure-Tan, Inc., 583 F.2d 355 (7th Cir. 1978).
15. 604 F.2d at 1183.
16. Id; see 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (1978).
17. Id. (citing Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1975)).
18. 604 F.2d at 1183.
19. Id; see supra note I for the text of § 2(3). The decision to include illegal aliens
under the Act was consonant with the design of the Act "to include all employees not specifi-
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The employer in Apollo argued further that the Board's order to
reinstate illegal aliens who were victims of unfair labor practices required it to violate California Labor Code section 2805(a), which prohibits the employment of illegal aliens.2" The court skirted the issue by
noting that the statute potentially conflicted with federal immigration
laws.21 The court's conclusion is at best unsettling: the company may
petition for modification of the reinstatement order if section 2805(a) is
found to be constitutional and if the state authorities subsequently
attempt to enforce the section against reinstated alien employees.
Apparently the court would then modify the Board's order not to
include reinstatement. This modification would establish two classes of
"employees" in California under section 2(3) of the Act. One class,
United States citizens and legally documented aliens, would be fully
protected by the Act. The other class, illegal alien employees, would be
without the remedy of reinstatement provided by the Act. 3 Consequently, illegal aliens would derive little protection from the Act, since
any complaining alien could be fired with impunity.
The United States is not an employer according to section 2(2) of
the Act 24 and is therefore exempt from the Act's requirements. The
cally excepted." NLRB v. Monterey County Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 335 F.2d 927,
930 n.4 (9th Cir. 1964), cer. denied, 380 U.S. 913 (1965). The court did not address the
argument raised in NLRB v. Sure-Tan, Inc., 583 F.2d 355, 362 (7th Cir. 1978), that if illegal
alien workers were included in § 2(3), they might be able to control the working conditions
of those legally employed. The counter to this reasoning is the same as was expressed by the
court in response to the restrictive immigration arguments: by excluding illegal aliens from
the protections of the Act, unscrupulous employers will be encouraged to hire them to circumvent the Act. See 604 F.2d at 1183.
20. Id. at 1183. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2805(a) (West Supp. 1980) provides that: "No employer shall knowingly employ an alien who is not entitled to lawful residence in the United
States if such employment would have an adverse effect on lawful resident workers."
21. 604 F.2d at 1184. The statute would unconstitutionally conflict with federal law if
the California courts interpret the statute to prevent employment of aliens who are not entitled to lawful residence but who are permitted to work in the United States under the INA.
Id.
22. Id. Section 2805(a) is constitutional and enforceable if the California courts decide
that employment of aliens who are permitted to work but not reside in the United States
under federal law does not violate the statute. 604 F.2d at 1184; see DeCanas v. Bica, 424
U.S. 351 (1976) (§ 2805(a) not unconstitutional as a regulation of immigration and not preempted under supremacy clause by INA). So far, the California courts have not construed
§ 2805(a) in a manner conflicting with federal law. 424 U.S. at 365.
23. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976) provides in pertinent part: "If. . . the Board shall be of
the opiuiion that any person. . . has engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair labor
practice, then the Board shall.. . issue. . . an order requiring such person .., to take
such affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay
24. Section 2(2) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1976) defines employer
(2) The term "employer" includes any person acting as an agent of an employer,
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Supreme Court in NLRB v. E.G. Atkins Co.25 determined that a private
employer, who is otherwise subject to the NLRA, shares the governmental exemption if in performance of a government contract the employer retains so little control over terms and conditions of employment
that its employees could be fairly described as working for the government rather than for the employer.2 6
In Zapex Corp. v. NLAB, 27 the employer claimed a shared exemption because it subcontracted to work for the Army. The Ninth Circuit
in Zapex applied a test for shared exemption similar to the "control
over employees" test applied by the Supreme Court in Atkins, where
the Court considered whether the employer or the government exercised "substantial control" over the employees.2" In Zapex, the Army
exercised control over Zapex employees' dress; work facilities were
shared with the Army; the Army wielded influence over wages, promotion, and discharge; and employees' positions mirrored Army ranks.29
The court, however, supported the Board's conclusion that the Army
did not exercise the requisite "substantial contror' over the employees.
The employer retained substantial control over such bargaining subjects as wages and hours; negotiation of a collective bargaining agreement was not precluded; and there were no significant limitations on
the employer in such collective bargaining areas as seniority, grievance
procedures, retirement plans, profit sharing, and health insurance.3 °
The court also rejected the employer's alternative theories of exemption: the Army and employer were joint employers, and the Board
abused its discretion by exercising jurisdiction because the "intimate
relationship" between the employer and the Army made application of
labor laws inappropriate. 3 The court responded that Board opinions
resolving shared exemption issues on the basis of joint employer status
directly or indirectly, but shall not include the United States or any wholly owned
Government corporation, or any Federal Reserve Bank, or any State or political
subdivision thereof, or any person subject to the Railway Labor Act, as amended
from time to time, or any labor organization (other than when acting as an employer), or anyone acting in the capacity of officer or agent of such labor
organization.
25. 331 U.S. 398 (1947).
26. Id. at 412-13. The Court noted that the Board's determination in such matters must
be accepted by reviewing courts if it is reasonably based on the evidence and is consistent
with the law. Id. at 403; see supra note 5.
27. 621 F.2d 328 (9th Cir. 1980).
28. Id. at 333; see NLRB v. Atkins, 331 U.S. 398, 412-13 (1947).
29. 621 F.2d at 331.
30. Id. at 333.
31. Id.
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have implicitly applied the "substantial control" test,32 and therefore

the employer's argument failed. Similarly, the court held that the "intimate relationship"
question was also a question of "substantial
'33
control.
2. NLRB preemption of state and federal court jurisdiction
Generally, neither state nor federal courts have jurisdiction over
suits involving activity which is arguably subject to section 7 or 8 of the
NLRA because such claims come under the exclusive jurisdiction of
the NLRB.34 Jurisdictional conflicts between the Board and federal
district courts arise, however, when unfair labor practice charges or defenses are involved in suits for violation of a contract between an employer and a labor organization.35 These conflicts derive from section
301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), which provides
that breach of contract suits between an employer and a labor organization may be brought in any federal district court having jurisdiction
over the parties.36 This federal jurisdiction to decide contract issues is
not preempted by the Board simply because the contract breach is either caused or defended by allegations of unfair labor practices.37 The
Ninth Circuit has recognized this principle in past decisions: district
court jurisdiction to enforce a collective bargaining agreement is not
preempted
by the Board when the breach involves an unfair labor
38
practice.
32. Id. (citing Toledo Dist. Nurse Ass'n, 216 N.L.R.B. 743 (1975); Massachusetts Soc'y
for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 203 N.L.R.B. 98 (1973)).
33. 621 F.2d at 333. Other circuits have also equated a shared exemption claim based
on an "intimate relationship" with "substantial control." Those cases dealing in terms of
"intimate relationships" invariably turn on who exercises what controls over employees.
See, eg., NLRB v. Pope Maintenance Corp., 573 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1978) (corporate contractor engaged in maintenance and repair of ground equipment for Air Force had no
shared exemption); Herbert Harvey, Inc. v. NLRB, 424 F.2d 770 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (joint
employer with exempt World Bank not exempt); NLRB v. Howard Johnson Co., 317 F.2d I
(3d Cir.) (operator of restaurant on New Jersey Turnpike did not share exemption of New
Jersey Turnpike Authority), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 920 (1963).
34. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976) (rights of employees); 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1976) (unfair
labor practices); see also Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters San Diego County Dist., 436
U.S. 180, 191-93 (1978); Association of St. Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274,287 (1971);
San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 242-43 (1959); Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. 485, 490-91 (1953).
35. Bartenders and Culinary Workers Union Local 340 v. Howard Johnson Co., 535
F.2d 1160, 1162 (9th Cir. 1976).
36. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976).
37. Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
38. 535 F.2d at 1162; Lodge 1327, International Ass'n of Machinists v. Fraser & John-
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In the 1979 case of Waggoner v. A McGray, Inc.,39 the employer
defended against a section 301 action for enforcement of a collective
bargaining agreement on the basis that the agreement was an unfair
labor practice. The district court4° entertained the unfair labor practice
defense and granted summary judgment to the employer, but the Ninth
Circuit reversed. The Ninth Circuit held that federal courts may not
entertain unfair labor practice defenses to section 301 actions to enforce
collective bargaining agreements before the Board has exercised primary jurisdiction over the unfair labor practice charge.41 The court
reasoned that when, as in this case, there exists an unfair labor practice
defense to an action to enforce a collective bargaining agreement, the
party complaining of the unfair practice can bring that charge before
the Board.42 The preemption doctrine applied so that the congressionally established scheme for resolution of unfair labor practice disputes before the Board would be preserved.43
The rule in Waggoner is of particular significance because the statute of limitations for filing unfair labor practice charges before the
Board is six months." A party who wishes to challenge an agreement
which condones the commission of an unfair labor practice and who
asserts the unfair labor practice as a defense to its performance must
complain to the Board within six months of the performance of the
illegal part of the agreement or lose the unfair labor practice defense.45
That party must be careful not to let the statutory period lapse while
sparring with its adversary in a section 301 action in district court.
ston Co., 454 F.2d 88, 90 (9th Cir. 1971) (citing Association of St. Employees v. Lockridge,
403 U.S. 274, 297-301 (1971)), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 920 (1972).
39. 607 F.2d 1229 (9th Cir. 1979).
40. Waggoner v. R. McGray, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 580 (C.D. Cal. 1977), rev'd, 607 F.2d
1229 (9th Cir. 1979).
41. 607 F.2d at 1235. Other circuits are divided on the question of district court entertainment of unfair labor practice defenses to contract actions. Accord Huge v. Long's
Hauling Co., 590 F.2d 457, 461 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 918 (1979); Mullins v.
Kaiser Steel Corp., 466 F. Supp. 911, 916 (D.D.C. 1979), aft'd, 642 F.2d 1302 (D.C. Cir.
1980), cert.granted,451 U.S. 969 (1981). Contra,Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Industrial Union
of Marine Workers Local 39, 344 F.2d 107, 109 (2d Cir. 1965).
42. 607 F.2d at 1236.
43. Id. The court distinguished Waggoner from Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters,
436 U.S. 180, 202-03 (1978) because in Sears, the party whose claim would be preempted
could not have presented the unfair labor practice issue to the NLRB, whereas in Waggoner,
the party facing preemption could have done so. 607 F.2d at 1236.
44. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1976).
45. Id.
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3. Stipulation to board jurisdiction
In the 1980 case of Stephens Institute v. NLRB, 46 the employer entered into a stipulation of facts and a settlement agreement with the
Board arising out of charges of unfair labor practices made by its employees. The stipulation of facts recognized Board jurisdiction over the
employer and the settlement contained the caveat that should the
agreement be breached, the General Counsel could reinstitute
charges. 4 7 The employer committed a breach, charges were reinstituted, and the employer lost.48 The employer also lost on new charges
in a second proceeding.49
The employer challenged the Board's jurisdiction in the first proceeding, arguing that, on the basis of contract and equity, and because
the agreement was no longer in effect, the stipulation of facts should
also be no longer in effect, including the stipulation to jurisdiction.5 °
The Ninth Circuit disagreed because (1) it was the plaintiff who
breached the agreement in the first place; (2) reopening of the charges
could not affect those facts already in evidence in the case (including
jurisdiction), no matter how they were obtained; and (3) the plaintiff
did not argue about the stipulation at the hearing but argued the
merits.5 l
B. NLB Procedure

1. Amendments to complaints
It is well settled in the Ninth Circuit that the Board may find an
unfair labor practice not specifically pleaded in the complaint where
the issue has been fully litigated. The Board may properly render a
decision based on the issues actually tried, or it can order an amendment to conform to proof.5 2 Due process is not thereby denied. 3
46. 620 F.2d 720 (9th Cir.), cer. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980).
47. Id. at 723.
48. Id. at 723-24.
49. Id. at 724-25.
50. Id. at 725.
51. Id. at 725-26.
52. E.g., NLRB v. International Ass'n of Bridge Workers Local 433, 600 F.2d 770, 77576 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 915 (1980); Alexander Dawson, Inc. v. NLRB, 586
F.2d 1300, 1304 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam); NLRB v. Klaue, 523 F.2d 410, 415 (9th Cir.
1975); Frito Co., W. Div. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 458,465 (9th Cir. 1964); see NLRB v. Mackay
Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 349-51 (1938).
53. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. at 349-51; NLRB v. International
Ass'n of Bridge Workers Local 433, 600 F.2d at 775-76; Alexander Dawson, Inc. v. NLRB,
586 F.2d at 1304.

19811

LABOR LAW SUR VEY

This well-settled law was followed during the survey period in
NLRB v. Bighorn Beverage 54 in which the court held that the administrative law judge (ALJ) properly allowed the General Counsel to
amend the complaint after the omitted unfair labor practice allegation
had been fully litigated." Similarly, in NLRB v. Olympic Medical
Corp. ,56 the employer contended that it had been denied due process
because it was found to have committed unfair labor practices not specified in the complaint and the complaint was not subsequently
amended to conform to the issues litigated. The court rejected the defendant's contention because the issues in question had been fully
litigated. 7
In ClearPine Mouldings, Inc. v. NLRB,5 8 the Ninth Circuit disagreed with the employer's contention that the ALJ had erred when he
allowed the General Counsel to amend the complaint to include new
allegations of violations of the Act. The court so ruled because the ALJ
had adjourned the hearings for six weeks to enable the employer to
defend against the new allegation, the employer had the opportunity to
prepare its defense, and the issue had been fully litigated. The court
also reiterated the rule that the Board may render a decision on the
issues actually tried or order an amendment to conform to proof.59
2.

Untimely answers

In contrast to the "extraordinary circumstances" requirement for
appellate review of defenses to unfair labor practice charges not raised
before the Board,6" failure to file a timely answer to a Board complaint
will be excused for merely "good cause."'"
In NLRB v. Zeno Table Co. ,62 the General Counsel filed unfair
labor practice charges against the defendant employer. Due to various
mixups, some of which were arguably attributable to either the em54. 614 F.2d 1238 (9th Cir. 1980).
55. .d. at 1241.
56. 608 F.2d 762 (9th Cir. 1979).
57. Id. at 763.
58. 632 F.2d 721 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 984 (1981).
59. Id. at 728.
60. See infra notes 246-55 and accompanying text for a discussion of judicial review of
defenses to unfair labor practice charges not raised before the Board.
61. Board rule § 102.20, 29 C.F.R. § 102.20 (1980) provides in pertinent part:
The respondent shall, within 10 days from the service of the complaint, file an
answer thereto.... All allegations in the complaint, if no answer is filed...
shall be deemed to be admitted to be true and shall be so found by the Board,
unless good cause to the contrary is shown. (emphasis added).
62. 610 F.2d 567 (9th Cir. 1979).
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ployer or the General Counsel, the employer's counsel did not become
aware of the complaint until ten days after the answer was due. He
answered two days later with an explanation, but the Board granted the
General Counsel's motion for summary judgment because the failure
to answer did not arise from an "extraordinary circumstance" and
63
hence the Board "deemed" the allegations of the complaint admitted.
The Ninth Circuit reversed the Board's order of summary judgment and remanded for reconsideration of whether the employer's answer should be received, and if so, whether a hearing on the merits
should be held because the Board based its refusal to receive the defendant's answer on the "extraordinary circumstances" standard of section 10(e) and not on the "good cause" standard of Board Rule section
102.20. The court said that the "good cause" standard is not defined,
but appears to be less stringent than the "extraordinary circumstances"
standard of section 10(e). While the purpose of section 10(e) is to get
the issues tried before the Board first, the purpose of the "good cause"
standard is to ensure that the Board makes decisions on the merits despite technical and inadvertent noncompliance with procedural rules.64
Also important to the court was the fact that neither the untimely answer nor consideration of the answer would cause apparent prejudice
to either party.65
3. Six month limitation period on evidence
Section 10(b) of the Act 66 sets a six month period for the filing of
unfair labor practice charges from the time the unfair labor practice
occurred. A complaint may be amended, however, to add charges of
practices occurring earlier so long as they are closely related to the original charges, occurred within six months of the filing of the original
charges, and their addition does not prejudice the defendant.6 7 Be63. Id. at 568. The complaint was deemed admitted pursuant to Board rule § 102.20.
See supra note 61 for the text of § 102.20.
64. 610 F.2d at 569.
65. Id.
66. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1976) provides in pertinent part: "[N]o complaint shall issue
based upon any unfair labor practice occurring more than six months prior to the filing of
the charge with the Board and the service of a copy thereof upon the person against whom
such charge is made. . ....
67. Radio Officers v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17,34 n.30 (1954); Exber, Inc. v. NLRB, 390 F.2d
127, 129-30 (9th Cir. 1968); see also NLRB v. Dinion Coil Co., 201 F.2d 484, 491 (2d Cir.
1952); cf NLRB v. LB.S. Mfg. Co., 210 F.2d 634, 637 (5th Cir. 1954) (untimely amended
charges did not relate back to the original charge since they contained entirely new and
different unfair labor practices); accord Joanna Cotton Mills Co. v. NLRB, 176 F.2d 749,
754 (4th Cir. 1949).
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cause the purpose of the charge is to set an inquiry in motion, specifics
in the complaint can be drawn out later so long as the defendant has
notice that its alleged unfair labor practices are under scrutiny. 68
In the 1979 case of NLRB v. InlandEmpire Meat Co. ,69 a former
employee filed an unfair labor practice charge, alleging that he had
been unlawfully fired because of his union activities. 70 He further
had violated section 771 of the NLRA by
charged that the employer
"other acts and conduct."'7 2 The Board filed a complaint charging that
the employer had violated the Act by firing the employee. More than
six months after the original charge had been filed, the Board amended
the complaint to include charges of specific unfair labor practices committed against other employees. 73 The employer attempted to have the
amended complaint dismissed, relying on cases which dismissed new
charges brought after the six months had run because they were not
closely related to the old charges.74 The court upheld the amendment
which added specific charges covered by the general allegation, however, and adopted the position of the Fifth Circuit, in NLRB v. Central
Power & Light Co. ,75 that "the relationship between the charge's specific allegations 'need be close enough only to negate the possibility
that the Board is proceeding on its own initiative rather than pursuant
to a charge.' "76 The practical effect of this view is that unfair labor
practices which come to light more than six months after their occurrence can be remedied by inclusion of general allegations of violations
of the various sections of the Act in original, timely filed charges.
4. Revocation of subpoenas
According to section 11(1) of the Act,7 7 the Board, upon request,
must revoke within five days any subpoena which requires production
68. NLRB v. Fant Milling Co., 360 U.S. 301, 308 (1959); National Licorice Co. v.
NLRB, 309 U.S. 350, 369 (1940); see also NLRB v. Central Power & Light Co., 425 F.2d
1318, 1320-21 (5th Cir. 1970); NLRB v. Stafford Trucking, Inc., 371 F.2d 244, 249-50 (7th
Cir. 1966); Texas Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 336 F.2d 128, 132 (5th Cir. 1964).
69. 611 F.2d 1235 (9th Cir. 1979).
70. Id. at 1236-37.
71. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1978).
72. 611 F.2d at 1237.
73. Id.
74. Id. The employer cited NLRB v. I.B.S. Mfg. Co., 210 F.2d 634 (5th Cir. 1954) and
Joanna Cotton Mills Co. v. NLRB, 176 F.2d 749 (4th Cir. 1949).
75. 425 F.2d 1318 (5th Cir. 1970).
76. 611 F.2d at 1238 (citing NLRB v. Central Power & Light Co., 425 F.2d 1318, 1321
n.3 (5th Cir. 1970)).
77. 29 U.S.C. § 161(1) (1978).
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of evidence if,
in the Board's opinion, the evidence does not relate to
any matter under investigation or if the subpoena does not describe
with sufficient particularity the evidence subpoenaed. The Ninth Circuit has interpreted this provision broadly to mean that if the specified
circumstances in section 11(1) exist, the Board must grant a revocation
petition. The Board may also revoke a subpoena on any other ground
which is consistent with the overall powers and duties of the Board
78
under the Act considered as a whole.
In NLRB v. Joseph Macaluso,Inc.,79 a mediator who had personal
knowledge of facts crucial to the resolution of a labor dispute was subpoenaed to testify at an unfair labor practice hearing. Upon the mediator's motion, the Board revoked the subpoena. 80 The revocation was
upheld by the Ninth Circuit, which concluded that "the complete exclusion of mediator testimony is necessary to the preservation of an
effective system of labor mediation," and that "labor mediation is essential to continued industrial stability, a public interest sufficiently
great to outweigh the interest in obtaining every person's evidence.'"
The effect of this language is that although the Board is not required by
statute to revoke a mediator's subpoena upon request, the Ninth Circuit will require such a revocation due to the underlying policy
involved.82
5. Investigation of election petitions
Section 9(c)(l)(A) of the Act83 provides that the Board shall investigate a petition and may order an election "[w]henever a petition shall
have been filed. . . alleging that a substantial number of employees
wish to be represented for collective bargaining [by the union]." The
Board, as a general rule, will normally investigate and order a hearing
on only those petitions which show union support by at least thirty
78. General Eng'g, Inc. v. NLRB, 341 F.2d 367, 372-73 (9th Cir. 1965); accord North
Am. Rockwell Corp. v. NLRB, 389 F.2d 866, 873 (10th Cir. 1968) (Board's discretionary
revocation of subpoenas upheld). This broad interpretation is consonant with the Board
regulation which provides that a subpoena shall be revoked for the specific reasons in
§ 11(1) "or if for any other reason sufficient in law the subpoena is otherwise invalid." 29
C.F.R. § 102.31(b) (1979).
79. 618 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1980).
80. Id. at 53.
81. Id. at 56.
82. See supra note 78 and accompanying text for the text of § 11(1) regarding
revocation.
83. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(I)(A) (1976).
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percent of a company's employees.8 4 This requirement is designed to

save expense and effort by screening out frivolous claims.8 5 The
Supreme Court and circuit courts have held that the sufficiency of a

showing of employee interest is a matter for Board determination and
cannot be litigated by the parties.8 6
In NLJB v. Metro-Truck Body, Inc.,87 the employer challenged

the sufficiency of employee interest shown for a Board-ordered union
election because many of the employees who had signed authorization

cards, used to show the thirty percent interest required to investigate,
were subsequently discharged by the defendant as illegal aliens; after

subtracting their cards, the union showed less than thirty percent support."8 The court ruled against the defendant because it held that the

section 9(c)(1)(A) substantial interest requirement is not a jurisdictional
prerequisite to Board action but rather is an administrative expedient
designed to enable the Board to avoid investigation of frivolous

petitions.8 9
84. NLRB v. Metro-Truck Body, Inc., 613 F.2d 746, 749 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447
U.S. 905 (1980).
85. NLRB v. J.I. Case Co., 201 F.2d 597, 599 n.3 (9th Cir. 1953) (citing In re O.D.
Jennings & Co., 68 N.L.R.B. 516, 517-18 (1946)); eg., NLRB v. Louisville Chair Co., 385
F.2d 922, 926 (6th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1013 (1968).
86. Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301, 309 (1974) (citing
NLRB v. Savair Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 270,287 n.6 (1973) (White, J., dissenting)); NLRB v. JI.
Case Co., 201 F.2d 597, 599 (9th Cir. 1953) (citing Brad Foote Gear Works, Inc., 60
N.L.R.B. 97, 99 n.4 (1945)); see also, ag., Committee on Masonic Homes v. NLRB, 566 F.2d
214, 217 (3d Cir. 1977); Intertype Co. v. NLRB, 401 F.2d 41, 43 (4th Cir. 1968), cert.denied,
393 U.S. 1049 (1969); NLRB v. Louisville Chair Co., 385 F.2d 922, 926-27 (6th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1013 (1968); NLRB v. National Truck Rental Co., 239 F.2d 422, 42425 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1016 (1957); Kearny & Trecker Corp. v. NLRB,
209 F.2d 782,787-88 (7th Cir. 1953); NLRB v. White Constr. & Eng'g Co., 204 F.2d 950, 953
(5th Cir. 1953).
87. 613 F.2d 746 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 905 (1980).
88. Id. at 749.
89. Id.
The section 9(c)(1)(A) substantial interest requirement is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to NLRB action... [but it] is an administrative expedient only, adopted
to enable the NLRB to determine for itself whether or not further proceedings are
warranted, and to avoid needless dissipation of the Government's time, effort, and
funds through investigation of frivolous petitions.
Id. Compare the statement of the rule by the Ninth Circuit and other circuits in earlier
opinions cited supra note 86 to the Supreme Court's statement in Linden Lumber Div.,
Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301, 309 (1974) (citing NLRB v. Savair Mfg. Co., 414
U.S. 270, 287 n.6 (1973) (White, J., dissenting)) ("A union petition to be sure must be backed
by a 30% showing of employee interest. But the sufficiency of such a showing is not litigable
by the parties." (emphasis added)). Unlike the circuit opinions, the Supreme Court's use of
"must" points to a 30% showing as a jurisdictional prerequisite for Board action in ordering
an election. However, the result of the Supreme Court and circuit opinions is the same:
since the substantial interest (30%) issue is non-litigable, the Board's decision will stand.
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The court's decision is consistent with its decision in NLiB v.
Apollo Tire Co. ,9 in which the court recognized that illegal aliens are
employees under the meaning of section 2(3) of the Act and therefore
are subject to the Act's protections. 91 The Metro-Truck decision provided protection for illegal alien employees and unions, because a contrary ruling would have given employers the ability to fire illegal alien
employees who demonstrate union interest in order to defeat the substantial interest requirement.
6.

Representation election procedure

The Board has wide discretion in conducting and supervising
union representation elections. Board certification of a union without
hearing objections to the election may be disturbed only when the
Board abuses its discretion. 92 A party must make a prima facie showing of facts that present "substantial and material factual issues" which,
if true, would constitute grounds to set aside the election.9 3
In In reBelAir ChateauHospital,Inc.,94 the employer, FDI, in one

of two consolidated cases, sought to challenge the certification of a
union which had won a representation election among its employees on
the basis of union discrimination.9 5 The employer contended that the

Regional Director and hearing officer committed prejudicial error by
failing to enforce its requests for subpoenas of documents concerning
possible discrimination by the union. 96 FDI, however, neither made
specific allegations of discrimination nor otherwise provided any basis
for showing that the union had engaged in discrimination. 97 The court
90. 604 F.2d 1180 (9th Cir. 1979). For a full discussion of tpollo, see supra notes 11-23
and accompanying text.
91. Id. at 1182-83; see supra note 1 for the text of § 2(3).
92. Eg., NLRB v. Miramar, Inc., 601 F.2d 422,425 (9th Cir. 1979); Heavenly Valley Ski
Area v. NLRB, 552 F.2d 269, 271 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam); Home Town Foods, Inc. v.
NLRB, 416 F.2d 392, 394 (5th Cir. 1969). For the general rule on judicial review of Board
orders, see supra note 5 and cases cited therein.
93. 29 C.F.R. § 102.69(d) (1979); e.g., Valley Rock Prods., Inc. v. NLRB, 590 F.2d 300,
302 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam); Natter Mfg. Corp. v. NLRB, 580 F.2d 948, 951 (9th Cir.
1978), cerl. denied, 439 U.S. 1128 (1979); NLRB v. L.D. McFarland Co., 572 F.2d 256, 261
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 911 (1978); Alson Mfg. Aerospace Div. of Alson Indus. v.
NLRB, 523 F.2d 470,472 (9th Cir. 1975) (per curiam); NLRB v. Sauk Valley Mfg. Co., 486
F.2d 1127, 1133 (9th Cir. 1973); NLRB v. Singleton Packing Corp., 418 F.2d 275, 280 (5th
Cir. 1969), cert.denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970); NLRB v. Bata Shoe Co., 377 F.2d 821, 825-26
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 917 (1967).
94. 611 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
95. Id. at 1252.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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held that the refusal to enforce the requests for subpoenas was proper
because "the Board could properly refuse to conduct a hearing on allegations that the union engaged in discriminatory practices and, therefore, the opportunity to subpoena witnesses, where the objecting party
fails to proffer specific evidence that would constitute a prima facie
showing of discrimination."9 8 The Board also refused to grant an administrative hearing for failure to proffer specific evidence presenting
factual and material issues which would warrant setting aside an election in NLRB v. Metro-Truck Body, Inc.9 In Metro-Truck, the election was challenged on the unsubstantiated basis that ballots were
improperly marked"° and that the union created a racially inflammatory environment. 10 '
By contrast, in NLRB v. Masonic Homes of California,Inc.,102 the
Board sought enforcement of its order that the employer bargain with
the union certified by the Board in a representation election.10 3 The
Board had previously refused the employer an evidentiary hearing on
The court
its allegations of union misconduct during the election."
denied enforcement and remanded because it found that the employer
had presented prima facie allegations of union misconduct during the
election which, if true, would warrant setting aside the election. The
Board therefore had abused its discretion in refusing to hear evidence
on these prima facie allegations. 10 5
Section 554(d)(2) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) provides that a hearing officer need not be responsible to the prosecuting
agency."°6 Section 159(c)(1) of the NLRA provides that hearings conceming questions of representation may be conducted by an employee
of the regional office "who shall not make any recommendations with
respect thereto."'0 7
98. Id. (citing Natter Mfg. Corp. v. NLRB, 580 F.2d 948, 951-52 n.4 (9th Cir. 1978), cer.
denied, 439 U.S. 1128 (1979)).
99. 613 F.2d 746 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 905 (1980).
100. Id. at 749.
101. Id. at 750-51.
102. 624 F.2d 88 (9th Cir. 1980).
103. Id. at 89.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 91.
106. 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(2) (1976) provides in pertinent part: "The [administrative] agency
employee who presides at the reception of evidence [at an administrative agency hearing]
.. . may not (2) be responsible to or subject to the supervision or direction of an employee
or agent engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting functions for an
agency."
107. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1976) provides in pertinent part:
Whenever a petition shall have been filed. . . by [employee(s) or an individual or
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In In re BelAir ChateauHospital,Inc. ,10o the employer, FDI, challenged the Board's certification of a union after an election on procedural grounds. After the election, the Regional Director assigned an
attorney from his own office to act as a hearing officer, who subsequently made recommendations. The employer alleged that this action
violated section 554(d)(2) of the APA and section 9(c)(1) of the
NLRA.10 9 The court tersely rejected these arguments on statutory
grounds. Section 554(a)(6) of the APA specifically exempts worker certification proceedings from its requirements.1 0 Because section 9(c)(1)
of the NLRA applies only to pre-election certification proceedings,"'
of a post election hearing officer
the Regional Director's appointment
1 12
did not conflict with the Act.
7. Board deferral to arbitration awards
The Supreme Court in Gateway Coal Co. v. U.M.W. " recognized

the federal policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes. Accordingly,
the Court and the Ninth Circuit have sanctioned the Board policy of
deferring to arbitration proceedings which covered the same ground as
unfair labor practice complaints, unless the proceedings were unfair or
irregular, the parties had not agreed to be bound, or the arbitration
award was "clearly repugnant to the purposes and policies of the
Act."' 1 14 A Board deferral decision will not be overturned unless the
union acting on] their behalf alleging that a substantial number of employees...
wish to be represented/orcollective bargainingand that their employer declines to
recognize their representative. . if [the Board] has reasonable cause to believe
that a question of representation affecting commerce exists [it] shall provide for an
appropriate hearing. . . Such hearingmay be conductedby an officer or employee
ofthe regional office, who shallnot make any recommendations with respect thereto.
(emphasis added).
108. 611 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
109. Id. at 1252-53.
110. 5 U.S.C. § 554(a)(6) (Supp. If1978) provides in pertinent part: "This section ap(6) the certification of worker
plies. . . .except to the extent there is involved- ...
representatives."
111. See emphasized language of 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1), supra note 107.
112. 611 F.2d at 1253.
113. 414 U.S. 368, 377 (1974); see also § 203(d) of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1976)
("Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is declared to be the desirable
method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application or interpretation of
an existing collective-bargaining agreement."); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior &
Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg.
Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
114. Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 270 n.7 (1964); Douglas Aircraft
Co. v. NLRB, 609 F.2d 352, 353 (9th Cir. 1979) (quoting International Harvester Co,, 138
N.L.R.B. 923, 927 (1962), af'd sub nom. Ramsey v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 784 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 1003 (1964)); Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1082 (1955).
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its wide discretion115 by departing from its own
Board abused
6
standards."1
In NLRB v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,I" the Ninth Circuit upheld the
decision of the Board not to defer to arbitration and enforced a Board
order to an employer for the production of information relevant to the
merits of a dispute."' The issue was whether the dispute itself was
subject to the collective bargaining agreement and therefore to arbitration.1 9 The Board proceeded to hear the case before the arbitrator
reached a decision, and ordered the employer to produce the requested
information. After the Board order, the arbitrator ruled the dispute
was nonarbitrable.- 0 The Board at all times refused to defer to the
arbitration.' 2'
The court applied the Board's own standards, enumerated in Collyer Insulated Wire, 122 and held that the Board did not abuse its discretion in failing to defer to arbitration. 23 The Board should defer when
the issue before it is one of contract interpretation entrusted by the parties to arbitration in the first instance or when resort to arbitration will
be likely to dispose of the matter in a manner that does not contravene
the purposes of the Act. 124 The dispute before the Board in Safeway
Stores was whether the employer had committed an unfair labor practice by refusing to produce the requested documents; however, the dispute before the arbitrator was whether the dispute was subject to
binding arbitration under the collective bargaining contract. The court
held that the unfair labor practice charge was for the Board to decide,
and not entrusted to the arbitrator."'5 The court also found that the
Board did not abuse its discretion in failing to defer based on the likelihood that arbitration would dispose of the dispute. The court reasoned
that though Board postponement of action until after the arbitrator's
award would have rendered the production question moot because of
the finding of nonarbitrability, the likelihood of this result was not ob115. Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 272 (1964); e.g., Alfred M. Lewis,
Inc. v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 1978).
116. See, e.g, Hawaiian Hauling Serv., Ltd. v. NLRB, 545 F.2d 674, 676 (9th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 965 (1977).
117. 622 F.2d 425 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 913 (1981).
118. Id. at 427.
119. Id. at 427-28.
120. Id. at 428.
121. Id.
122. 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971).
123. 622 F.2d at 428-29.
124. Id. at 428.
125. Id.
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In DouglasAircraft Co. v. NLRB," 7 a dispute between Douglas
Aircraft and a fired employee went to arbitration. The arbitrator ordered the employee reinstated but denied him back pay because of his
misconduct and his refusal to abide by an agreement worked out by his
union and his employer. The agreement had called for reinstatement
and arbitration over the back pay issue in exchange for the employee's
withdrawal of unfair labor practice charges he had filed with the
Board. 128 The Board refused to defer to the arbitration award and ordered back pay because the arbitrator's conditioning of a back pay
award on surrender of an unfair labor practice charge was repugnant to
the purposes and policies of the Act, which favors freely bringing all
such charges to light.' 29 The court agreed that such an agreement is
repugnant to the purposes of the Act.' 30 However, the court held that
the Board's refusal to defer was an abuse of discretion because the arbitrator, at the request of the employer and the union, had clarified his
decision by indicating that each of the two reasons for refusing back
pay was alone sufficient (employee misconduct is a legitimate reason to
refuse backpay). 3 ' The court also noted that the arbitrator's decision,
each reason was alone
if unclarified, could have been read to mean that 32
sufficient, and should have been read that way.'
The court adopted the Supreme Court's reasoning in UnitedSteelworkers v. Enterprise*heel & Car Corp. , and held that it is bad policy to infer that an arbitrator has overstepped his bounds merely
because there is an ambiguity in his opinion. Overzealous dissection of
opinions by the Board and courts would deter arbitrators from writing
full opinions, 4and it should not be assumed that the arbitrator has acted
3
improperly.1
The court thus narrowly interpreted "repugnant to the Act" as it
relates to deferral and gave the Board little discretion in deferring to
arbitrators' decisions. The Board, under its own rules as interpreted by
the court, may refuse to defer only when the arbitrator's reasoning is
126. Id.
127. 609 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1979).
128. Id. at 353.
129. Id.
.130. Id. at 353 (citing NLRB v. Industrial Union of Marine Shipbldg. Workers, 391 U.S.
418, 424 (1968)).
131. Id. at 354.
132. Id. at 354-55.
133. 363 U.S. 593, 598 (1960).
134. 609 F.2d at 355.
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unambiguously repugnant to the Act." 5 The Board may not refuse to
of an arbitration decidefer if there exists any possible interpretation
1 36
sion which is not repugnant to the ACt.
C. NLRB Ordersand Remedies
1. Effect of board orders on arbitration awards

The Supreme Court in Carey v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. 137 articulated in dictum the rule, sometimes referred to as the "supremacy
doctrine," that Board decisions override arbitrator1 38decisions. The cirdoctrine to heart.

cuits have taken the supremacy

In the 1980 case of Cannery Warehousemen v. Haig Berberian,

Inc. ,131 there were conflicting decisions by the Board and by an arbitrator regarding employee representation." 4 The propriety of the Board's
decision could not be reviewed because it was not a reviewable final
order under section 10(f) of the Act1 ' and did not fall into the narrow
exception to non-reviewability where the Board has violated statutory
guidelines.' 4 2 The court held that the Board's order must control be135. Id.
136. It is important to remember that nothing precludes the Board "from adjudicating
unfair labor practice charges even though they might have been the subject of an arbitration
proceeding and award. Section 10(a) of the Act expressly makes this plain, and the courts
have uniformly so held." Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 271 (1964). The
Ninth Circuit's holding in Douglas Aircraft Co. v. NLRB, 609 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1979),
regarding Board deference to an ambiguous arbitrator's decision, was based on its interpretation and application of Board law as enumerated in International Harvester Co., 138
N.L.R.B. 923, 927 (1962), affd sub nom Ramsey v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 784 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 1003 (1964). 609 F.2d at 354-55. The Board's refusal to defer in this case
was an improper departure from its own standards. The Board has wide discretion in setting
the standards of whether to defer, but the standard the Board has set for itself, as interpreted
by the court, is very narrow. But cf.Stephenson v. NLRB, 550 F.2d 535, 537 (9th Cir. 1977)
("But the Board should not defer when the issue presented involves primarily a statutory
rather than a contractual or factual issue."). DouglasAircraft involved factual issues. See
609 F.2d at 352 (claim by employee that he was fired because of his union activities and
claim by employer that firing was based on employee's misconduct).
137. 375 U.S. 261, 272 (1964); see also Alexander v. Gardener-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36,
50 n.13 (1974) (quoting Carey, at 375 U.S. at 272).
138. E.g., Boire v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 479 F.2d 778, 801-02 (5th Cir. 1973);
Local 7-210, Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers v. Union Tank Car Co., 475 F.2d 194, 197-99
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 875 (1973); Smith Steel Workers v. A.O. Smith Corp., 420
F.2d 1, 7 (7th Cir. 1969). Recall that federal and Board policy favors arbitration of labor
disputes. See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
139. 623 F.2d 77 (9th Cir. 1980).
140. Id. at 78-79.
141. Id. at 79 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1976)). Section 160(f) provides for review in the
courts of appeals offinal Board orders. See infra notes 235-45 and accompanying text.
142. 623 F.2d at 80 (interpreting Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958)).
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cause "'once the Board has acted, either before or after the arbitrator's
award, the Board's decision overrides the arbitrator's decision ....
[Valid Board representation decisions take precedence over conflicting
arbitration decisions."'"

2. Reinstatement with backpay
The award of backpay is one device in the Board's arsenal to accomplish the purposes of the Act. 145 When the Board establishes the
existence of an unfair labor practice and a gross amount of backpay
due, the burden shifts to the employer to prove circumstances which
would limit its liability."
The Board's conclusions concerning
whether circumstances limiting liability have been proven will be up-

held if substantial evidence supports them.' 47 The Board may make
discretionary adjustments when applying this remedy,'48 including the
reduction of a backpay award to a discharged employee who does not
use reasonable efforts to secure employment elsewhere,1 49 since one of
the purposes of the Act is promoting production and employment.'5 A
discharged worker is not held to the highest standard of diligence in his

efforts to secure comparable employment; "reasonable" efforts are
sufficient.' 5'
In the 1980 case of M. Restaurants,Inc. v. NLAB,'

52

a wrongfully

discharged employee moved temporarily from the United States to Tai143. Id. at 81 (quoting Local 7-210, Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers v. Union Tank Car
Co., 475 F.2d 194, 199 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 875 (1973)).
144. 623 F.2d at 82.
145. Section 10(c) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976), provides in pertinent part that the
Board may "take such affirmative action, including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of [the Act]."
146. NLRB v. Mercy Peninsula Ambulance Serv., Inc., 589 F.2d 1014, 1017 (9th Cir.
1979); NLRB v. United Bhd. of Carpenters Local 1913, 531 F.2d 424, 426 (9th Cir. 1976);
NRLB v. Superior Roofing Co., 460 F.2d 1240, 1241 (9th Cir. 1972) (per curiam); NLRB v.
Brown & Root, Inc., 311 F.2d 447, 454 (8th Cir. 1963).
147. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487-88 (1951) (general rule);
NLRB v. United Bhd. of Carpenters Local 1913, 531 F.2d 424, 426 (9th Cir. 1976).
148. NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 346 (1953); Phelps Dodge Corp. v.
NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 198-200 (1941); NLRB v. Mercy Peninsula Ambulance Serv., Inc., 589
F.2d 1014, 1017 (9th Cir. 1979).
149. NLRB v. Mercy Peninsula Ambulance Serv., Inc., 589 F.2d 1014, 1017 (9th Cir.
1979).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1018; see also Heinrich Motors, Inc. v. NLRB, 403 F.2d 145, 149 (2d Cir.
1968); NLRB v. Ardvini Mfg. Corp., 394 F.2d 420, 423 (1st Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Miami
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 360 F.2d 569, 575 (5th Cir. 1966); NLRB v. Brown & Root, Inc.,
311 F.2d 447, 452 (8th Cir. 1963).
152. 621 F.2d 336 (9th Cir. 1980).
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wan to work at a lower paying job after unsuccessfully searching for
work for eighteen months in the geographical area of his former employment. After returning to the United States, he won an order of
reinstatement and backpay, less the earnings received in Taiwan, from
the Board. The employer alleged that the employee had wilfully incurred a loss of wages, that his move to Taiwan constituted a voluntary
departure from the labor market, and contended that backpay liability
should be reduced on these grounds. 53 The court affirmed the Board's
award, however, because the Board found substantial evidence that the
employee had in fact made reasonable efforts to secure comparable employment and had acted reasonably in moving to Taiwan.154
The M. Restaurants court thus adopted the rule of the Sixth Circuit in NLRB v. Robert Haws Co. ," that a discharged employee is not
confined to the geographical area of former employment; "he or she
remains in the labor market by seeking work in any area with comparable employment opportunities."' 56 In Robert Haws, a discharged employee left his state in search of work. 5 7 The Ninth Circuit's expansion
of this principle to employees leaving the country in search of employment is consonant with the purposes of the Act of promoting production and employment. Although a formerly unemployed individual
who finds work in a foreign country no longer contributes directly to
the national economy, his absence from the welfare and unemployment
rolls ameliorates the economic drain on those programs. The net effect
is an improvement of the national economy and brighter work prospects for United States workers.
3. Production of evidence
The failure of either an employer or a union to comply with the
other's request for information necessary intelligently to evaluate filed
grievances violates section 8(a)(5) of the Act.1 58 However, it is not an
unfair labor practice to refuse to produce information which is irrelevant to any legitimate union collective bargaining need.159
153. Id. at 337.
154. Id. at 338.
155. 403 F.2d 979, 981 (6th Cir. 1968).
156. 621 F.2d at 338 (citations omitted).
157. 403 F.2d at 981.
158. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976); see NLR.B v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 435-36
(1967); NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 152-53 (1956); see also, eg., San Diego
Newspaper Guild Local 95 v. NLRB, 548 F.2d 863, 866-67 (9th Cir. 1977).
159. San Diego Newspaper Guild Local 95 v. NLRB, 548 F.2d 863, 867 (9th Cir. 1977);
Emeryville Research Center, Shell Dev. Co. v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 880, 883 (9th Cir. 1971); see
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[Certain types of information, such as wage date [sic] pertaining to employees in the unit, are so intrinsic to the core of the
employer-employee relationship that such information is considered presumptively relevant.11 601 In those cases, the employer has the burden to prove a lack of relevance 1611 or to
provide adequate reasons as to why he cannot, in good faith,
supply such information ...
162
In NLRB v. Acme IndustrialCo.,163 the Supreme Court held that
the Board may order production of information relevant to a dispute if
there is some probability that it would be of use to the union in carrying out its statutory duties and responsibilities.' In Acme, the Court
enforced the Board's order to the employer to produce information regarding an employee grievance which was subject to a compulsory and
binding grievance arbitration provision in the collective bargaining
agreement. 16 The Seventh Circuit 166 had held that the Board's assertion of jurisdiction improperly preempted the arbitration proceeding
and was contrary to the national policy favoring arbitration of labor
disputes. 67 The Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that the Board's
exercise of jurisdiction to compel production of evidence aided the arbitral process rather than intruded upon it.168 The Court noted that
one of the union's responsibilities is to sift out unmeritorious claims
and that the production of information which bears on the merits of a
claim serves that end. 169 The union should not be put to70the expense of
arbitration only to learn the claim was without merit.1
In the 1980 case of NLRB v. Safeway Stores, Inc. ,'7' the Ninth
NLRB v. Pearl Bookbinding Co., Inc., 517 F.2d 1108, 1113 (1st Cir. 1975); United Aircraft
Corp. v. NLRB, 434 F.2d 1198, 1204-05 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 993 (1971).
160. San Diego Newspaper Guild Local 95 v. NLRB, 548 F.2d 863, 867 (9th Cir. 1977)
(citing Emeryville Research Center, Shell Dev. Co. v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 880, 887 (9th Cir.
1971); Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. NLRB, 347 F.2d 61, 69 (3d Cir. 1965)).
161. San Diego Newspaper Guild Local 95 v. NLRB, 548 F.2d 863, 867 (9th Cir. 1977)
(citing Prudential Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 412 F.2d 77, 84 (2d Cir.), cer. denied, 396 U.S. 928
(1969)).
162. San Diego Newspaper Guild Local 95 v. NLRB, 548 F.2d at 867 (citations'omitted).
163. 385 U.S. 432 (1967).
164. Id. at 437.
165. Id. at 439.
166. Acme Indus. Co. v. NLRB, 351 F.2d 258 (7th Cir. 1965), rev'd, 385 U.S. 432 (1967).
167. 385 U.S. at 432. Federal policy favors arbitration of labor disputes. See supra notes
113-14 and accompanying text.
168. Id. at 438.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 438-39.
171. 622 F.2d 425 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 913 (1981).
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Circuit enforced a Board order to an employer for the production of

information relevant to the merits of a dispute. 172 The issue was
whether the dispute was subject to the collective bargaining agreement
and therefore arbitrable. After the Board order to produce, the arbitrator ruled the dispute was nonarbitrable. 73 The Board refused to defer
to the arbitrator and was upheld by the court. 174

The Ninth Circuit, in enforcing the Board order for production,
held the rationale in Acme controlling. Because the desired information addressed the merits of the grievance and could possibly show the

claim unmeritorious and induce the union to withdraw the grievance
without incurring the expense of arbitrating whether the dispute was

subject to the collective bargaining contract, the Board acted properly
in ordering its disclosure. 175 The court also rejected the employer's ar-

gument that it was required to produce only information relevant to
disputes subject to the collective bargaining contract because there is no
such requirement in federal labor law. 176

4. Staying of NLRB orders by bankruptcy court
Old Bankruptcy Rule 11-44 provided that the filing of a Chapter
XI (bankruptcy) petition "shall operate as a stay of the commencement
or the continuation of any court or other proceeding against the

debtor."1 77 This rule was the counterpart to former section 314 of the
Bankruptcy Act 77 and made automatic the stays that the bankruptcy
court was authorized to impose under section 314 upon application of
the debtor.

79

The purpose of rule 11-44 was to protect the assets of the

debtor from independent attachment by creditors during the bank172. The dispute arose from the retransfer of employees to their original departments
based on their failure to meet new production standards. The union requested the production records which it could possibly use to determine whether the employer's allegations of
the employees' failures were correct and whether the new standards could fairly be used.
The court considered this information presumptively relevant and held that the employer
did not rebut the presumption. Id. at 430.
173. .Id. at 427-28.
174. Id; see supra notes 117-26 and accompanying text for discussion of the case and its
relation to the Board policy favoring deferral to arbitration.
175. Id. at 430.
176. Id.
177. 11 U.S.C. app., Rule 11-44 (1976). Congress overhauled the bankruptcy law in 1978
by enacting a new version of Title 11 of the United States Code, effective October 1, 1979.
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (Supp. II 1979).
178. 11 U.S.C. § 714 (1976).
179. Former § 314 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 714 (1976), provided in pertinent
part, "[t]he court may... enjoin or stay until final decree in the bankruptcy proceedings the
commencement or continuation of suits .... ." (emphasis added).
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ruptcy arrangement. 80
With regard to labor proceedings, the Supreme Court held in Nathanson v. NLRB' 8 ' that the Board, not the bankruptcy court, should
liquidate the amount of the backpay award owed by the bankrupt to its
employees under a Board order. The Court reasoned that where Congress had entrusted the matter and appropriate remedies to an administrative agency such as the Board, the bankruptcy court should normally
stay its hand pending the agency's decision.182
During the survey period, in In re Bel Air Chateau Hospital,
Inc. ,183 the Ninth Circuit overturned the district court's stay of unfair
labor practices under rule 11-44 in two consolidated cases. In one case,
BelAir, the Board filed a complaint alleging illegal termination of employees against Bel Air and subsequently against its receiver as its alter
ego after Bel Air filed a bankruptcy petition. Its receiver applied for
and received a stay of the Board proceedings from the district court
after arguing that the provisions of rule 11-44 automatically stayed the
Board's proceedings and that the receiver could not be compelled to
reinstate employees because it was a different entity from the one that
committed the unfair labor practice.18 4 In the other case, the facts and
charges were similar but the debtor was still operating the business.
Thus, there was no "alter ego" issue.18 5
It was not clear to the court whether the district court had issued
the stay on the basis of the automatic provisions of rule 11-44 or as an
exercise of discretion. The court held that if the stay in Bel Air was
issued on a discretionary basis it must be overturned. 8 6 The court reasoned that such an exercise of discretion must have been based on a
district court finding that the receiver was not the "alter ego" of either
the pre-bankruptcy debtor or the debtor in possession, but was instead
a new and distinct juridical entity against whom the prior unfair labor
practices could not be remedied.8 7 The court held that issuance of the
stay was in error because "[w]hether a new employer is an 'alter ego' or
a 'successor' to an earlier employer is a question of substantive federal
labor law, the resolution of which is committed to the Board and the
180. In re Bel Air Chateau Hosp., Inc., 611 F.2d 1248, 1250 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam)
(citing Colonial Tavern, Inc. v. Byrne, 420 F. Supp. 44, 45 (D. Mass. 1976)).
181. 344 U.S. 25 (1952).
182. Id. at 30.
183. 611 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
184. Id. at 1250.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 1251.
187. Id.
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courts that review its determinations.""18 Additionally,
[i]t [was] by no means clear in the event that the Board should

determine that Bel Air committed unfair labor practices that
it [could] not enforce a remedial order against the Receiver
. 11891
[. especially in light of established policy against allowing employers to change their legal form as a means of
evading their responsibility under the Act.19 0

The Ninth Circuit court also held that if the stay was issued automatically pursuant to old rule 11-44, it was issued in error.1 9 1 The
court relied on the Supreme Court case of Nathanson v. NLRB 192 in
holding that the Board could not be subject to the automatic stay provi-

sions of rule 11-44.'1 The court noted that if regulatory proceedings
threaten the assets of an estate, a stay may be issued on a discretionary
basis. 194

The Ninth Circuit court's interpretation of bankruptcy law is significant because the court in dictum stated that its interpretation "ap-

pears harmonious with the new bankruptcy law that recently became
effective."' 195 Specifically, section 362(a)(1) of the revised Bankruptcy

Act 1 96 provides for a general automatic stay of judicial or administrative proceedings when a bankruptcy petition is filed. Exceptions to the
generality of the stay are enumerated in section 362(b), 197 including
section 362(b)(4), 198 which prevents the bankruptcy petition from staying "the commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding by
a governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit's police or regulatory power."'

99

188. Id. (citing Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168 (1973); Southport Petroleum Co. v. NLRB, 315 U.S. 100 (1942)). "Alter ego" means that the old power structure
still exists despite a change in name or apparent control. The Board's order to the "old
employer," who is in reality also the "new employer," stays in force. When there is a bona
fide discontinuance and a true change of ownership, the new employer is a "successor." The
Board's order does not then apply to the new employer. 315 U.S. at 106.
189. 611 F.2d at 1251 (citing NLRB v. Coal Creek Coal Co., 204 F.2d 579 (10th Cir.
1953)); see also Johnson v. England, 356 F.2d 44, 49, 51 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S 961
(1966).
190. 611 F.2d at 1251 (citing Southport Petroleum Co. v. NLRB, 315 U.S. 100, 106
(1942)); see also Regal Knitwear Co. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 9, 14 (1945).
191. 611 F.2d at 1250-51.
192. 344 U.S. 25, 30 (1952).
193. See supra notes 177-80 and accompanying text.
194. 611 F.2d at 1251.
195. Id. at 1251.
196. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (Supp. HI 1979).
197. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b) (Supp. HI 1979).
198. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) (Supp. HI 1979).
199. Id.
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The Ninth Circuit's statement that new Bankruptcy section 362
appears harmonious with old rule 11-44, as far as stays and administrative proceedings (such as Board proceedings) are concerned, appears
correct from the face of the statutes. Old rule 11-44(a) provided for the
automatic stay in bankruptcy proceedings, but a party subject to a stay
could apply for its discontinuance under old rule 11-44(d). 200 The burden was on the party seeking continuation of the stay to establish that
he was entitled to continued injunctive relief.201 The automatic stay
provision in new section 362(a), which takes effect when bankruptcy
papers are filed, is congruent to old rule 11-44(a). Additionally, the
section 362(b)(4) exception to automatic stays of actions or proceedings
by a governmental unit where the enforcement of that unit's police or
regulatory power is involved is congruent to old rule 11-44(d). As was
the case under old rule 11-44(d), when a section 362(b)(4) exception or
objection to the automatic stay provision is alleged, the court will have
to determine whether the court proceedings will threaten the assets of
the prospective bankrupt, necessitating a stay, or whether there is no
such threat, in which case the governmental agency, such as the Board,
can proceed against the prospective bankrupt. 0 2
5. Bargaining orders
a. unfair laborpractice basis
An order to an employer to bargain with a union is an appropriate
Board remedy when the employer's unfair labor practices between the
time of a union's attainment of an authorization card majority and a
representation election have tainted the results of the election.20 3 The
expression of employees' wishes in a fair election is, however, 2 more
4
desirable than a bargaining order based on authorization cards. 0
In NLRB v. GisselPacking Co. ,2 5 the Supreme Court categorized
degrees of employer unfair labor practices affecting union representation elections which might or might not warrant a bargaining order
based on a union card majority. The Court identified three categories
of unfair labor practices: (1) outrageous and pervasive practices,
200. Former rule 11-44, 11 U.S.C. app. at 1484 (1976), provided in pertinent part, "[T]he
court may, for cause shown, terminate, annul, modify or condition such stay."
201. In re White Birch Park, Inc., 443 F. Supp. 1342, 1345 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (discussion
of old rule 11-44).
202. 611 F.2d at 1251.
203. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 597, 613-15 (1969).
204. Id. at 603.
205. 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
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which might warrant a bargaining order even though the union never
attained majority status; (2) less pervasive practices, which nonetheless
still have the tendency to undermine majority strength and impede the
election process if the union has at some point secured authorization
cards signed by a majority of the employees; and (3) less extensive unfair labor practices, which, because of their minimal impact on the election machinery, could not sustain a bargaining order.20 6
In NLRB v. Chaofeld-Anderson Co., Inc. ,2o7 a majority of the em-

loyees signed union authorization cards.2 "8 The employer refused to
recognize the union, and the union obtained a Board order for an election.209 Before the election, the employer committed various unfair labor practices to coerce employees to vote against the union. The
employer used a carrot and stick approach, promising better conditions
if the union lost; and threatening plant closure, raise and bonus withholding, and stricter work rules if the union won.210 The union lost the
election, but the Board issued a bargaining order because it concluded
that the total effect of the employer's unfair labor practices destroyed
the possibility of holding a fair election in a reasonable amount of
time. 21 The Ninth Circuit reversed the bargaining order and ordered a
new election in its place because the unfair labor practices were not
extreme enough to fit into either of the first two Gissel categories which
might warrant a bargaining order.212
b. changedcircumstances
Early Supreme Court cases held that the Board could properly ignore events subsequent to the employer's refusal to bargain when deciding to issue a bargaining order.21 3 Since the Supreme Court's more
recent decision in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co. ,2"4 in which the Court

held that the Board can properly take into consideration the extensiveness of an employer's unfair practices in terms of their past effect on
election conditions and the likelihood of their recurrence in the fu206. Id. at 613-15.
207. 606 F.2d 266 (9th Cir. 1979).
208. Id. at 267.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 268; cf NLRB v. Ultra-Sonic De-Burring, Inc., 593 F.2d 123 (9th Cir. 1979)
(per curiam); Hambre Hombre Enters., Inc. v. NLRB, 581 F.2d 204 (9th Cir. 1978) (cases in
which unfair labor practices pervasive enough to warrant bargaining orders).
213. E.g., NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 748 n.16 (1962); Franks Bros. v. NLRB, 321 U.S.
702, 703-06 (1944).
214. 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
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ture,215 the circuits have not agreed on the question of whether and
when the Board must consider subsequent events in examining a bargaining order.21 6 In determining whether a bargaining order is appropriate, the Board has consistently refused to consider subsequent
events, 217 even where the law of the circuit was to the contrary. 218 The
desirable features of this rule are that there will be an endpoint to litigation 219 and that a premium will not be put on continued litigation by
employers in the hope that circumstances may change to render a bargaining order inappropriate." In the past, the Ninth Circuit has indicated that the Board should consider events up to the time it decides
whether to issue a bargaining order.221
Prior to the 1980 case of L'Eggs Products,Inc. v. NLRB, 222 there
were no Ninth Circuit cases remanded to the Board that required consideration of events occurring after an original Board bargaining order.
215. Id. at 614; see also Note, BargainingOrdersSince Gissel Packing: Time to Blow the
Whistle on Gissel? 1972 Wis. L. REv. 1170, 1179 (1972).
216. LEggs Prods., Inc. v. NLRB, 619 F.2d 1337, 1352 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing Hedstrom
Co. v. NLRB, 558 F.2d 1137 (3d Cir. 1977) (remand because, among other things, Board did
not consider effect of passage of three years' time), reh'g en banc, 629 F.2d 305 (1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 996 (1981); NLRB v. Ship Shape Maint. Co., 474 F.2d 434, 443,(D.C. Cir.
1972) (enforcement of bargaining order denied because of events occurring after Board proceedings); NLRB v. American Cable Sys., Inc., 427 F.2d 446 (5th Cir.) (Board must consider
changed circumstances), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 957 (1970); NLRB v. Gibson Prod. Co., 494
F.2d 762, 766 n.4 (5th Cir. 1974) (American Cable Systems rule inapplicable unless remand
is necessary on independent ground)).
217. E.g., Bandag, Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. 1045, 1045 n.1 (1977), modMedsub nom. Bandag,
Inc. v. NLRB, 583 F.2d 765 (5th Cir. 1978); Gibson Prod. Co., 185 N.L.R.B. 362, 364 (1970).
218. E.g., Bandag, Inc. v. NLRB, 583 F.2d 765, 773-75 (5th Cir. 1978) (Clark, J., concurring and dissenting).
219. Franks Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702, 705 (1944).
220. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 610 (1969); Franks Bros. Co. v, NLRB,
321 U.S. 702, 705 (1944); NLRB v. Pacific Southwest Airlines, 550 F.2d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir.
1977); NLRB v. L.B. Foster Co., 418 F.2d 1, 4 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 990
(1970); see also J.P. Stevens & Co., Gulistan Div. v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 514,525 n.16 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 830 (1971).
221. NLRB v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 472 F.2d 140, 141 (9th Cir. 1972) (per curiam).
The court held that "the relevant period for determining the appropriateness of the bargaining is as of when it was before the NLRB." Id. at 141. From the face of this statement, it is
unclear whether the endpoint in time for subsequent events is at the beginning of the
Board's proceedings or when it renders a decision. However, the court later stated: "That
there is a rapid turnover of employees does not militate against the appropriateness of the
bargaining order. This does not mean that the NLRB cannot or should not reexamine the
present circumstances to see whether a fair election could now be held. .. ." Id. at 141
(citations omitted; emphasis added). "Reexamination of present circumstances" by the
Board after a bargaining order indicates that the time of final decision is the temporal
endpoint. The Ninth Circuit, in L'Eggs Prods., Inc. v. NLRB, 619 F.2d 1337, 1353 (9th Cir.
1980), read it that way.
222. 619 F.2d 1337 (9th Cir. 1980).
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In L'Eggs, the court remanded a bargaining order to the Board for
reconsideration. The employer moved for leave to adduce additional
evidence showing changed circumstances since the original Board or-

der.2'

The court granted leave because the remand of the bargaining

order was for a reason independent of the changed circumstances,2 2 4

and stated that it would not remand bargaining orders to the Board for
consideration of events subsequent to the Board's decision when it upheld the Board's order in toto.2 5

The court further held that when it remands a bargaining order on
an independent ground, it may either "require" the Board to consider
new evidence or "allow" the Board to do so (i.e., leaving it to the
Board's discretion).2 26 As the Board's policy stands, the Board will

never take advantage of such an opportunity on its own, since the
Board consistently refuses to consider subsequent events upon
remand.227
D. JudicialReview andEnforcement

1. Institution of unfair labor practice charges
Section 3(d) of the Act 228 gives the General Counsel of the Board
final authority with respect to the investigation of charges and issuance
229
and prosecution of complaints. The Supreme Court in Vaca v. S#'peS
has stated that "the Board's General Counsel has unreviewable discretion to refuse to institute an unfair labor practice complaint. 230

Circuit courts, including the Ninth Circuit, have adhered to the

view that the General Counsel's decision not to issue a complaint is not
reviewable by the Board or courts of appeals. 1 Review is available in
223. Id. at 1351. The alleged changed circumstances were (1) a large employee turnover
and (2) a more pro-union labor policy by a new parent company. Id.
224. Id. at 1353.
225. Id.
226. Id. The court adopted the rationale of the Supreme Court in Franks Bros. Co. v.
NLRB, 321 U.S. 702, 705 (1944) and the earlier Ninth Circuit case of NLRB v. Foster Co.,
418 F.2d 1,4 (9th Cir. 1969), cert.denied, 397 U.S. 990 (1970), against placing a premium on
continued litigation by the employer.
227. See supra note 154 for Board precedents against consideration of subsequent events
upon remand.
228. 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1976) provides in pertinent part: "[The General Counsel of the
Board] shall have final authority, on behalf of the Board, in respect of the investigation of
charges and issuance of complaints under section 160 of this title, and in respect of the
prosecution of such complaints before the Board ..
229. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
230. Id. at 182 (dictum); accord Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301, 316 (1979)
(dictum); NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 155 (1975) (dictum).
231. E.g., Bays v. Miller, 524 F.2d 631,634 (9th Cir. 1975); Henderson v. ILWU Local 50,

LOYOL4 OF LOS ANGELES L4W REVIEW

[Vol. 14

the district court in limited cases where the Board has acted outside of
the Act or unconstitutionally. 2 The Ninth Circuit followed these well
established principles in the 1980 case of Pacfc Southwest Airlines v.
NLRB,233 in which the court refused to overturn the General Counsel's
decision not to issue an unfair labor practice complaint. 3
2. Final order requirement
Section 10(f) of the Act" 5 provides for appellate court review of
final Board orders. Normally, a Board representation decision is not
a reviewable "final order" within the meaning of section
considered
10(f). 236 The Supreme Court in Leedom v. Kyne 237 created an exception to this rule when the federal courts' failure to assert jurisdiction
would deprive a party of a right granted by Congress.238 The Court in
Boire v. Greyhound Corp.239 construed this exception narrowly because
"fj]udicial review in such a situation has been limited by Congress to
the courts of appeals, and then only under the conditions explicitly laid
457 F.2d 572, 578 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 852 (1972); NLRB v. IBEW Local 357,
445 F.2d 1015, 1016 (9th Cir. 1971); NLRB v. Lewis, 249 F.2d 832, 838 (9th Cir. 1957), af 'd,
357 U.S. 10, 15-16 (1958); accord Bova v. Pipefitters & Plumbers Local 60, 554 F.2d 226, 228
(5th Cir. 1977); ILGWU Local 415-475 v. NLRB, 501 F.2d 823, 830 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Saez v.
Goslee, 463 F.2d 214,215 (1st Cir.) (per curiam), cert.denied, 409 U.S. 1024 (1972); Mayer v.
Ordman, 391 F.2d 889, 889 (6th Cir.) (per curiam), cer. denied, 393 U.S. 925 (1968); Balanyi
v. IBEW Local 1031, 374 F.2d 723, 726 (7th Cir. 1967).
232. Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 188 (1958); Braden v. Herman, 468 F.2d 592, 593
(8th Cir. 1972) (per curiam), cert.denied, 411 U.S. 916 (1973); Saez v. Goslee, 463 F.2d 214,
215 (1st Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1024 (1972); Balanyi v. IBEW Local 1031,
374 F.2d 723, 726 (7th Cir. 1967) (citing Boire v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 343 F.2d 17,
21 (5th Cir.), cer. denied, 382 U.S. 824 (1965)); McLeod v. United Bhd. of Indus. Workers,
288 F.2d 198, 201 (2d Cir. 1961); S( NLRB v. IBEW Local 357,445 F.2d 1015, 1016 n.2 (9th
Cir. 1971) (citing Retail Store Employees Union Local 954 v. Rothman, 298 F.2d 330 (D.C.
Cir. 1962), which phrased the question of review of the General Counsel's decision not to
issue a complaint in terms of whether General Counsel had abused its discretion). This
citation in NLRB v. IBEW is curious because the case cited was decided in 1962, five years
before Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967), which in dictum stated that the decision was
nonreviewable. See supra notes 229-30 and accompanying text.
233. 611 F.2d 1309 (9th Cir. 1980).
234. Id. at 1312.
235. 29 U.S.C. § 160(t) (1976).
236. Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473, 476-77 (1964); AFL v. NLRB, 308 U.S.
401,407-11 (1940); see also Smith Steel Workers v. A.O. Smith Corp., 420 F.2d 1,6 (7th Cir.
1969); Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1163-64 (5th Cir.), cer. denied, 394
U.S. 1012 (1969); McCullock v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 403 F.2d 916, 917 (D.C. Cir.
1968), cert.denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969).
237. 358 U.S. 184 (1958).
238. Id. at 190.
239. 376 U.S. 473 (1964).
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down in... the Act." 2'
The Ninth Circuit has interpreted Boire to preclude invocation of
the Leedom exception to the final order requirement unless the Board

has violated statutes or regulations. 24 ' The Leedom exception does not
in any case extend to possible abuses of discretion involving non-final
orders. 242 In the 1980 case of Cannery Warehousemen v. Haig Berberian, Inc.,243 there were conflicting decisions by the Board and by an
arbitrator regarding employee representation. The issue raised by the
employer was the Board's abuse of discretion in failing to defer and not
a statutory or regulatory violation on the part of the Board. 2' The
court refused to decide whether the Board had erred in refusing to defer to the arbitrator's decision because a Board representation decision

is not a final order under section 10(f). 245

3. Issues not raised before Board
Section 10(e) of the Act2 precludes judicial review of objections
to unfair labor practice charges not raised before the Board absent "extraordinary circumstances." The Supreme Court in NLRB v. Cheney
Cal Lumber Co. 247 interpreted the intent of section 10(e) to be that all
controversies of fact, and the allowable inferences from the facts,

should be threshed out by the Board so that the courts may have the
benefit of the Board's expertise upon review of the problem.2 48
In the 1980 case of Stephenson v. NLRB, 24 9 the Ninth Circuit applied the tough "extraordinary circumstances" standard where issues

were raised for the first time at the appellate level. In Stephenson, the
employee was dismissed because of misconduct; he alleged his firing
240. Id. at 481-82.
241. Local 1547, IBEW v. Local 959, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 507 F.2d 872, 875 (9th Cir.
1974).
242. Id.
243. 623 F.2d 77 (9th Cir. 1980).
244. Id. at 80. The court may decide whether the Board abused its discretion in refusing
to defer when the appeal is from a final order. See, ag., Douglas Aircraft Co. v. NLRB, 609
F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1979) (Board abused discretion in failing to defer to arbitration).
245. 29 U.S.C. § 160(t) (1976).
246. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1976) provides in pertinent part: "No objection that has not
been urged before the Board... shall be considered by the court, unless the failure or
neglect to urge such objection shall be excused because of extraordinary circumstances."
(emphasis added).
247. 327 U.S. 385 (1946) (Supreme Court reversed Ninth Circuit modification of Board
order because employer had not argued before Board); see also NLRB v. Allied Prods.
Corp., Richard Bros. Div., 548 F.2d 644 (6th Cir. 1977).
248. 327 U.S. at 389.
249. 614 F.2d 1210 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
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was motivated by his union activities and filed a grievance under the
provisions of his union's collective bargaining agreement. The employee won reinstatement and backpay in arbitration, but he never returned to work because he was unsatisfied with the amount of backpay
awarded. 25 0 He then filed a charge with the Board, but the ALJ, without resolving contradictory testimony, deferred to the arbitration award
and was affirmed by the Board. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that
the Board erred in deferring to.the arbitration award and remanded the
1
case.

25

Stephenson did not ask for remand to the ALJ for credibility resolutions during the subsequent Board proceeding. Instead, he relied on
the Board Chairman's recitation of both the uncontradicted and contradicted evidence in his dissent and on the General Counsel's statement of position in the earlier Board proceeding.252 The Board then
held that Stephenson had been dismissed for cause. Stephenson appealed that decision on many bases, including the Board's failure to
resolve the contradicted evidence. Stephenson alleged that the resolution of that evidence in his favor would swing the case his way.253 The
court was not persuaded. It held that Stephenson had waived his right
to raise those issues before the court because of his noncompliance with
the section 10(e) requirement to raise all objections before the Board. 254
The court maintained its strict construction of the "extraordinary circumstances" required to raise a question before the court not raised
before the Board.255
The implication of the Stephenson case is clear: one must explicitly raise all contentions of fact and law in a Board proceeding to preserve the right of judicial review of the Board's finding. The
"extraordinary circumstances" that excuse this condition precedent are
narrowly construed. A party who assumes that the Board has addressed an unraised issue may lose the right to judicial review.
4. Election orders--contract-bar rule
A Board-created bar to an election order is the contract-bar rule,
which bars a representation election when there is a valid contract for a
period not exceeding three years between employer and union, unless
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

Id. at 1212.
Id. at 1212-13.
Id. at 1213.
Id. at 1214.
Id. at 1215,
E.g., NLRB v. STR, Inc., 549 F.2d 641, 642(9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam).
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the representation petition is filed more than sixty and less than ninety
days before the expiration of the agreement.256 If the contract term
exceeds three years, a petition will be dismissed if it is outside the sixty
to ninety day period preceding the contract's third anniversary date,
even though it is filed between sixty and ninety days before the contract's actual expiration date.2 5' The sixty to ninety day period is
strictly construed, and petitions filed on the fifty-ninth day are generally dismissed.2 58 The Board formulated the contract-bar rule in an
effort to strike a balance between the Act's competing goals of promoting industrial stability and employee freedom of choice.259
The Board, in balancing the competing goals of stability and employee choice, has created an exception to the contract-bar rule for contracts that illegally discriminate against non-union employees because
such contracts do not establish the kind of stability that the Act was
designed to protect.2 60 The Board has held that a contract which contains a provision extending special benefits to union members only,
known as a "members only" clause, will not bar an election petition.261
However, the Board has also established that it will not consider extrinsic evidence to determine if ambiguous contract provisions were intended to have, or in fact had, an illegal effect.262 When the Board
departs from its application of the contract-bar rule,2 63 it must give an
explanation so that a reviewing court will be able to determine whether
256. Dalewood Rehabilitation Hosp., Inc. v. NLRB, 566 F.2d 77, 79 n.2 (9th Cir. 1977);
Retired Persons Pharmacy v. NLRB, 519 F.2d 486, 488 n.1 (2d Cir. 1975); NLRB v. Bayliss
Trucking Corp., 432 F.2d 1025, 1027 n.3 (2d Cir. 1970); Bally Case and Cooler, Inc. v.
NLRB, 416 F.2d 902, 905 n.1 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 910 (1970).
257. Union Carbide Corp., 190 N.L.R.B. 191, 191 (1971).
258. Brown Co., 178 N.L.R.B. 57, 57 (1969).
259. See Leedom v. IBEW Local 108, 278 F.2d 237, 242 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Appalachian
Shale Prod. Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 1160, 1161 (1958); General Motors Corp., 102 N.L.R.B. 1140,
1142 (1953). The contract-bar rule balances the Act's goals of promoting industrial stability
and employee freedom of choice by limiting employees' abilities to change their representation to specific time periods and by maintaining the status quo in employer-union relationships in other time periods.
260. Paragon Prod. Corp., 134 N.L.R.B. 662,663 (1961); see R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXr ON
LABOR LAW UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 55-56 (1976).
261. Radio Frequency Connectors Corp., 126 N.L.R.B. 1076, 1077 (1960).
262. Jet-Pak Corp., 231 N.L.R.B. 552, 553 (1977); Loree Footwear Corp., 197 N.L.R.B.
360 (1972); H.L. Klion, Inc., 148 N.L.R.B. 656 (1964); Keystone Coat, Apron & Towel Supply Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 880, 886 (1958).
263. The Board is not strictly bound by its prior decisions. E.g., NLRB v. J.C. Penney
Co., 620 F.2d 718, 719 (9th Cir. 1980); NLRB v. Albert Van Luit & Co., 597 F.2d 681, 686
n.3 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
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it abused its discretion 2" or acted in a reasoned, deliberate manner. 6 5
266
In the 1980 case of Bob's Big Boy Family Restaurantsv. NLRB,

the Board refused to apply the contract-bar rule and ordered a representation election. The Board did so after finding, based on extrinsic

evidence involving ambiguous terms, that the contract contained an illegal "members only" clause. The Board also held that the employer
was estopped to deny that the election petition was filed in a timely
manner because it had helped create some confusion as to the effective
dates of the contract.2 67 The court remanded because the Board did

not explain its departure from policy in considering the extrinsic evidence and did not explain its alternative theory of estoppel by stating
whether it had applied the doctrine of equitable estoppel or had created

to its contract-bar rule based on some other
a new exception
268

principle.

II.

A.

UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES

Inteiference with Employees' Section 7 Rights

Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act269 provides
that "it shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of rights" guaranteed

in section 7 of the Act.27 To establish a violation of this section, it is
264. Judicial review of Board proceedings is limited to whether the Board abused its discretion. See supra note 5.
265. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 808 (1973);
NLRB v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 438, 442-43 (1965); NLRB v. Albert Van Luit
& Co., 597 F.2d 681, 686 n.3 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (an administrative agency such as
the Board must explain departure from its own policy).
266. 625 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1980).
267. Id. at 852.
268. The court indicated the standard for equitable estoppel to be applied by the Board if
it intends to apply that doctrine:
(1) The party to be estopped must know the facts; (2) he must intend that his
conduct shall be acted on or must so act that the party asserting the estoppel has a
right to believe it is so intended; (3) the latter must be ignorant of the true facts;
and (4) he must rely on the former's conduct to his injury.
Id. at 854.
269. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976).
270. Section 7 of the NLRA provides that:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosengage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective baring, andortoother
gaining
mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain
from an or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be afas a condiorganization
in a labor
requiring membership
an agreement
fectedofby
tion
employment
as authorized
in section 158(a)(3)
of this
title.
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
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only necessary to demonstrate that the employer's actions would rea-

sonably tend to interfere with employee rights.271 This section has been
construed to require merely a demonstration that the employer's ac-

tions have the effect of restraint or coercion, not that the employer intended to produce the effect.27 2

1. Employee filing of grievances against employer
Employees have the protected right to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of mutual aid and protection.273 The Ninth Circuit
has held that concerted activity exists where one person is seeking to
induce action by a group.27 4 The Second Circuit, in NLRB v. Interboro
Contractors,Inc. ,75 held that activities involving attempts to enforce

the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement may be deemed to
be "concerted" even in the absence of any interest by fellow workers.276
The Third and Fifth Circuits have explicitly disavowed the Interboro
271. ABA, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 166 (C. Morris ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as
DEVELOPING LABOR LAW].

272. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 795-803 (1945). The Supreme
Court in Republic Aviation held unlawful a company rule which prohibited solicitation of
any kind on company property and which was enforced against employees soliciiing for the
union during nonworking hours. It was not a defense that the no solicitation rule had been
in force well before the advent of the union, had not been motivated by anti-union animus,
and had been applied nondiscriminatorily against all forms of in-plant solicitation. In
NLRB v. Burnup & Sims, 379 U.S. 21, 22-24 (1964), the Court provided security from discharge to employees engaged in protected activities, i.e., conduct specifically protected by
§ 7, even though the employer had a good faith motive for the discharge. The Court, has
consistently emphasized the effect of the employer's acts, not the motive behind them. In an
effort to reinforce that standard, the Court, in Textile Workers v. Darlington Co., 380 U.S.
263, 269-74 (1965), held that it was not an unfair labor practice for an employer to close its
entire business, even if the closing was due to anti-union animus. The Court qualified its
holding by stating that such termination must be bona fide, and the employer must not seek
to obtain some future benefit at the expense of the employees. Id. at 274-77. The underlying reasoning of the Court was clearly that such bona fide closing does not truly have the
effect of coercing, restraining, or interfering in organizing activities because such activities
have essentially become moot once the employer's doors finally have closed. Id.
273. See supra note 270; see, eg., Walls Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 321 F.2d 753, 754 (D.C. Cir.)
(writing a letter complaining of sanitary conditions on behalf of fellow employees considered protected activity), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 923 (1963); Redwing Carriers, Inc., 137
N.L.R.B. 1545, 50 L.R.R.M. 1940 (1962), affidsub nonm Teamsters Local 79 v. NLRB, 325
F.2d 1011, 1012 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (refusing, in the course of employment, to cross a picket
line located at another employer's place of business considered protected concerted activity),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 905 (1964).
274. Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n v. NLRB, 206 F.2d 325, 326 (9th Cir. 1953)
(employee's circulation of a petition authorizing him to take action on behalf of fellow employees in regard to their grievances considered concerted activity).
275. 388 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1967).
276. Id. at 500.

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 14

rule on the ground that the pursuit of personal, as opposed to group,
goals is not "concerted" activity and is therefore unprotected. 7
These principles were applied by the Ninth Circuit during the surperiod
in NLRB v. Bighorn Beverage,278 in which a safety comvey
plaint was filed by an employee. The court held that because the
source of an employee's claimed rights when filing such a complaint is
a collective bargaining agreement, and because such an agreement was
not involved in the case, the employee was not engaged in protected
concerted activity. 279 This theory was originally expressed in an earlier
Ninth Circuit decision, NLRB v. C & lAir Conditioning,Inc.,280 where
an employee was discharged after complaining about the lack of safety
on the job site. The court refused to accept the employee's assertion
that he had engaged in protected concerted activity and held that the
activity was not protected because the employee's efforts were not directed at enforcing provisions of a mutual bargaining agreement.8
The court in Bighorn Beverage noted that its decision, based upon the
theory in C & IAir Conditioning,was consistent with that reached by
other circuits which have held that the implied concerted action theory
is a "legal fiction presenting an unwarranted expansion of the definition of concerted action unsupported by a statutory basis. 282
While it appears that the Second Circuit's theory in Interboro has
been accepted in principle by the Ninth Circuit, a later decision during
the survey period reveals a new wrinkle in its application in the Ninth
Circuit. In NLRB v. Adams Delivery Service, Inc.,283 an employee who
enlisted the aid of the union to enforce a contractually guaranteed employment right was discharged. The court held that in these circumstances, the employer committed an unfair labor practice even if the
employee was not motivated by an intent to enforce a provision of a
277. NLRB v. Buddies Supermarkets, Inc., 481 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1973); NLRB v. Northern Metal Co., 440 F.2d 881 (3d Cir. 1971).
278. 614 F.2d 1238 (9th Cir. 1980).
279. Id. at 1242.
280. 486 F.2d 977 (9th Cir. 1973).
281. Id. at 978. The rationale of the court was that the employee's action was a selfserving individual activity and therefore was neither an effort to promote mutual aid and
protection of other employees, nor an effort to enforce provisions of a mutual bargaining
agreement. Id.
282. 614 F.2d at 1242; see ARO, Inc. v. NLRB, 596 F.2d 713 (6th Cir. 1979); NLRB v.
Buddies Supermarkets, Inc., 481 F.2d 714, 719 (5th Cir. 1973) (employee's efforts to gain
more favorable contract terms for himself, when including some element of collective effort,
not considered protected concerted activity); NLRB v. Northern Metal Co., 440 F.2d 881,
884-85 (3d Cir. 1971) (employee's pressing for holiday for himself under collective bargaining agreement not considered protected concerted activity).
283. 623 F.2d 96 (9th Cir. 1980).
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collective bargaining agreement.2 84 The court noted that union partici-

pation in the complaint process distinguished this case from the line of
decisions which have applied the Interboro fiction.2 85 The court rea-

soned that "[w]here an employee enlists the aid of the union to enforce
a contractually-guaranteed employment right, the need to employ a
fiction of group activity vanishes,"2 86 and concluded that discussion

with a union representative to resolve an employment disagreement is a
right protected by sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) of the NLRA. 2 87 The
court thereby declined to apply the doctrine of Interboro and found
direct independent support for its decision in favor of the employee

under the NLRA.
2. Employer threats to discourage union activity
Employees have been granted the right by section 8(a)(1) to be
protected from employer threats, if such threats have the effect of interfering, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their protected rights.2 88 The extent of that right was discussed in an early
Supreme Court decision, NLRB v. Virginia Electric & Power Co. ,289 in

which the Court noted that conduct, although partially evidenced by
speech, may amount to coercion within the meaning of the NLRA if it

occurs in combination with other circumstances.290 The Court has emphasized the need to examine the totality of the employer's activities

and the background leading to the employer's course of conduct. 91
284. Id. at 100.
285. Id. at 99-100; see NLRB v. C & I Air Conditioning, Inc., 486 F.2d at 978; NLRB v.
Ben Pekin Corp., 452 F.2d 205, 206-07 (7th Cir. 1971) (questioning of union officials and coworkers regarding failure to receive expected pay raise considered protected concerted activity); G( Pacific Electricord Co. v. NLRB, 361 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1966) (activities of employee
which resulted in discharge not found to be solely on behalf of employee and therefore held
to be concerted).
286. 623 F.2d at 100.
287. Id.; see NLRB v. Lantz, 607 F.2d 290, 298 (9th Cir. 1979) (violation of § 8(a)(3)
found where employees were discharged partially for their expressed desire to obtain union
assistance); NLRB v. R.W. Little, Inc., 493 F.2d 1245 (9th Cir. 1974) (violations of § 8(a)(3)
found where employer had discharged two employees because of their grievance activities
through union); Inter-Polymer Indus. v. NLRB, 480 F.2d 631, 633 (9th Cir. 1973) (violation
of Act found where employer denied reemployment to employee who had sought assistance
of bargaining representative); NLRB v. Tom Johnson, Inc., 378 F.2d 342,344 (9th Cir. 1967)
(violation of Act found where employees were fired because they engaged in protected
activities).
288. See DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 271, at 75.
289. 314 U.S. 469 (1941).
290. Id. at 477.
291. Id.
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The Court subsequently held, in NLRB v. Exchange Part/s,292 that sec-

tion 8(a)(1) prohibits intrusive threats and promises and also prohibits
actions immediately favorable to employees, but which were undertaken with the express and calculated purpose of impinging upon the
employees' freedom of choice regarding unionization.
The Ninth Circuit has held that threats by employers are among

the clearest form of unfair labor practices.293 In evaluating the effect of
such threats, the Board is not obliged to consider facts and incidents
shown by testimony in isolation, but can consider them compositely
and draw inferences reasonably justified by their "cumulative probative effects. ' 294 Additionally, threats need not be explicit if the language used by the employer
or their representative can reasonably be
295
threatening.
as
construed

The Ninth Circuit test for such coercion is whether, under all the
circumstances, interrogation or other individual verbal communications reasonably tend to restrain or interfere with the employee's exercise of protected rights.2 96 This test was applied during the survey
period in NLRB v. ChagfeldAnderson.297 In that case, the employer

promised economic benefits through retroactive raises, threatened to
prolong negotiations with the union while withholding raises and bonuses during that period, and notified its employees of an "open door"
policy to improve communications between the employees and management.29 8 All of these activities occurred during a union election

campaign. The court reaffirmed the Ninth Circuit view that threats fall
within the category of the clearest form of unfair labor practices, 299 and
292. 375 U.S. 405, 409 (1964).
293. NLRB v. Randall Kane, Inc., 581 F.2d 215, 218 (9th Cir. 1978).
294. NLRB v. Radcliffe, 211 F.2d 309, 313 (9th Cir. 1954).
295. NLRB v. Ayer Lar Sanitarium, 436 F.2d 45, 49 (9th Cir. 1970); see also NLRB v.
Luisi Truck Lines, 384 F.2d 842, 845 (9th Cir. 1967) (threats of reprisal for union support
and promises by employers of benefits for voting against union are clearly coercive and
prohibited).
In Santa Fe Drilling v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 725 (9th Cir. 1969), the employer was charged
with discharging employees because of their union activities and with engaging in various
ithreatening acts toward its employees. The court held that the fact that the company supervisor had questioned employees about their involvement in strike violence occurring with
another employer, had mentioned company benefits, and had urged the employees to vote in
a representation election supported the conclusion that such discussions were violations of
§ 8(a)(1). Id. at 728. The court reasoned that repeated enumerations of existing benefits in
head-on confrontations with employees reasonably could be considered threats of reprisal
for union activity, whether or not explicit threats were made. Id.
296. Penasquitos Village v. NLRB, 565 F.2d 1074, 1080 (9th Cir. 1977).
297. 606 F.2d 266 (9th Cir. 1979).
298. Id. at 267.
299. Id. at 268.
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held that in considering the totality of the circumstances, the threats
alone constituted a violation of section 8(a)(1). 3°°
The Ninth Circuit again considered the viability of charges 'ofillegal threats against an employer in NLRB v. Sacramento ClinicalLaboratory,Inc. 30 1 In Sacramento, a supervisor stated that if the union was
installed, no employee would be able to come and talk to him directly,
but would have to go through channels. The court held that such a
statement was not a threat in violation of section 8(a)(1), basing its conclusion upon an earlier Ninth Circuit decision that an employer is free
to express opinions with respect to the consequences of unionization
which have some reasonable basis in fact.30 2 The Sacramento decision
was not truly based upon a question of whether the employer's speech
was appropriate, but whether the effect was coercive. The court reasoned that the mere effect of the statement by the supervisor was to
remind the employees of the substantive meaning of collective bargaining. 0 3 The court also held that the lack of evidence that the supervisor
was acting as an agent for management precluded a decision in favor of
the employees. 3 4
The same theories were again applied during the survey period in
L'Eggs Products,Inc. v. NLRB, °5 where the employer had stated that
30 6
it would use "every lawful means possible to avoid unionization."
Although the court held that the statement did not violate section
8(a)(1), it is interesting to note that while the statement alone was not
sufficient evidence of a violation, in combination with the other activities of the employer the statement created an overall coercive atmosphere which supported the finding of other section 8(a)(1) violations.30 7
L'Eggs, therefore, seems to add an "atmosphere of coercion" approach
to complement the previous "totality of circumstances" guidelines.
300. Id. The court did note that the threats made by the employer were generally mild,
and the coercive effect, if any, was not great. The company issued disclaimers which tended
to dissipate any coercive impact, and some statements were made by low-level supervisors.
The court found, however, that on balance, because many of the statements were promulgated by the company's executive officers and owners, the Board correctly ordered the election set aside because of the company's § 8(a)(1) viblations. Id.
301. 623 F.2d 110 (9th Cir. 1980).
302. Id. at 112 (citing Hecla Mining Co. v. NLRB, 564 F.2d 309, 314 (9th Cir. 1977)).
303. 623 F.2d at 112.
304. Id. at 114.
305. 619 F.2d 1337 (9th Cir. 1980).
306. Id. at 1347.
307. Id. The court found that the employer had committed other acts, including actively
soliciting revocations of union support and directly aiding employees in revoking union
authorization.
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An employer's statements to its employees of management's views,
arguments, or opinions may not be a violation of section 8(a)(1) if they
are protected by section 8(c) of the NLRA.30 8 Section 8(c) focuses on
the "protected" speech of the employer, and enforcement of that section essentially reflects a delineation of the line between coercive expression and the free speech rights protected by the first amendment to
toward the content of the emthe Constitution. Section 8(c) is directed
30 9
effect.
their
not
statements,
ployer's
The Supreme Court, in NLRB v. GisselPacking Co.,3 10 held that
the employer's right to free speech in communications with its employees is firmly established and cannot be encroached upon by a union or
the Board. The Court held that an employer may therefore express its
general views regarding unionism or its specific views regarding a certain union, as long as the expression does not represent a threat of reprisal, force or promise of benefit. 31' The Court further held that an
employer may predict the exact results that unionization may have, but
only if such views have some basis in objective fact to demonstrate
clearly that the probable consequences are beyond its control, or to
convey a prior management decision to close the plant in case of
unionization. 2
The Ninth Circuit in NLRB v. TRW-Semiconductors, Inc., recognized that section 8(c) was part of a revision of the NLRA made in
an effort to redress what was considered to be an imbalance in the manner in which the NLRA operated against employers and in favor of
employees. The court also noted the distinction between "privileged
speech," which indicates a prediction of events over which the employer has no control, and "unprivileged speech," in which the employer has made a prediction of events over which it has clear
control.3 1 4 The TRW court held that the mere fact that statements by
308. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1976). Section 8(c) provides:
The expressing of any views, argument or opinion, or the dissemination thereof,
whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this subchapter, if
such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.
309. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969); NLRB v. TRW-Semiconductors, Inc., 385 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1967).
310. 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
311. Id. at 617.
312. Id. at 618. The Court also held that the valuation of the exact scope or limit of
employer expression must be made in the context of the labor relations setting. The employer's rights, according to the Court in Gissel, must not outweigh the employees' equal
rights to associate freely and pursue activities clearly protected under the NLRA. Id. at 717.
313. 385 F.2d 753, 755 (9th Cir. 1967).
314. Id. at 758.
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an employer produce fear in the employees, and are intended to do so,

31 5
does not deprive the employer of the protection of section 8(c).
The Ninth Circuit has also concluded that employers' statements
suggesting that the terms of a union contract are disadvantageous or
that unfavorable consequences might result from unionization are pro-

tected, as long as the statements have a factual basis and are in fact

predictions rather than veiled threats of retaliation. 16 Employer statements which include threats to take action solely within the control of

the employer and not based on economic predictions are not
protected. 17
During the survey period, in NLRB v. Marine World USA,' 1 the

Ninth Circuit held that speech is coercive within the meaning of section
8(c) only if it-threatens reprisals or promises benefits, and not if it is

merely coercive within the context of section 8(a)(1). The court further
stated that the broad language of section 8(a)(1) is not the test of
whether statements violate the Act. 3 19 The court followed the holdings
315. Id. at 759-60. The court noted that such statements must still satisfy the requirement
of lack of employer control. The court also held that § 8(c) protects not only those statements, arguments, or opinions that are correct, but also statements that are demonstrably
incorrect. Id.
316. See NLRB v. Lenkurt Elec. Co., 438 F.2d 1102, 1106 (9th Cir. 1971) (statement by
company manager that working conditions might become more difficult due to unionization
because company might seek to reduce operating costs considered an opinion of unfavorable
circumstances based in fact); NLRB v. Sonora Sundry Sales, 399 F.2d 930, 935 (9th Cir.
1968) (statement by employer that employees would receive less pay under union contract
not considered a threat).
317. See Hertzka & Knowles v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 625, 628-29 (9th Cir. 1974). InHertzka,
the employer made statements prior to a union election that employees who had been courting the union were "playing with a loaded stick of dynamite," and stated that "we don't
have to put up with this, we can close down." Id. at 628-29. The court held that such words
were not protected by § 8(c) and were clearly threats to take action solely within the power
of the employer. Id.; see also NLRB v. Four Winds Indus., 530 F.2d 74, 78 (9th Cir. 1976).
In Four Winds, the court held that in making a prediction of what effect unionization may
have, an employer must be cautious to ground his statement upon an eventuality that is
capable of proof, and not upon any implication that his own effort might cause the economic
detriment. The court added that the interpretation of the employer's pre-election speech to
determine whether it constituted an unfair labor practice must take place in a context which
balances the rights of both parties but recognizes the economically dependent relationship of
the employee to the employer. Id. at 78.
318. 611 F.2d 1274, 1276 (9th Cir. 1980).
319. Id. at 1277. In Marine World, the employer's president, prior to scheduling an election date for the union, distributed a memorandum to Marine World employees that described his attempts to obtain the union's consent to a wage increase. On the day before the
scheduled election, the president issued another memorandum to the employees that generally criticized the union's performance as the employees' bargaining representative. The
president also charged that the union had held up the offered wage increase because they
could not take full credit for it. The union received less than 30% of the votes in the election.
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of both the Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit with regard to protected
language and reiterated the concern over the economically dependent
relationship of the employee to the employer, "and the tendency of the
former, because of that relationship, to pick up intended implications
of the latter320that might be more readily dismissed by a more disinterested ear."
The Ninth Circuit refined the earlier rules with regard to employer
opinions and predictions in the recent case of NLRR v. GeneralTelephone DirectoryCo.321 In that case, various general managers and district sales managers had made statements, during a pre-election period,
indicating the company's position with regard to the status of scheduled
wage increases if the union was elected.322 The Board found that the
company had specifically threatened to withhold a promised wage increase, and to eliminate pay increases through a district sales manager
if unionization were pursued. 3 3 The court disagreed with the Board's
interpretation of the circumstances in which the statements were made,
and concluded that the employer had merely made predictions regarding potential market changes which were beyond its control.3 24 The
court found that the employer's use of the words "budgeted," "extenuating circumstances," and "a negotiable term," when referring to the
wage increase, supported the conclusion that the statements were not
It filed objections to the election and charged Marine World with committing unfair labor
practices. The Board found that the letters issued by the employer were calculated to discredit the union and to discourage union membership and, thus, were coercive and not protected by § 8(c). Id.
320. Id. The court further held that while the printed statements of the employer were
critical of the union, they did not on their face threaten reprisals or promise benefits depending upon the outcome of the election. However, the court did note that there were potentially "implied" threats or promises in the letters and that the determination of their status
must be made by the Board. The court, therefore, remanded the matter to the Board for
consideration of the applicability of § 8(c) and directed it to give consideration to any general union hostility on the part of Marine World, as well as its past association with the
union, and the intended and perceived message of the two letters with respect to whether
they were in fact nonprivileged. Id.
321. 602 F.2d 912 (9th.Cir. 1979).
322. Id. at 914.
323. Id. at 916. A regional manager also indicated that budgeted salary increases would
become a negotiable term, that the company would start with a blank piece of paper, and
that unionization would initiate horse trading. Id.
324. Id. at 917. The court stated:
the mere fact of a businessman's awareness, and statements to that effect to his
employees, of the possible consequences of union representation, does not support,
we feel, in the absence of evidence of other anti-union activity, the inference herein
made by the Board of threatening or coercive behavior constituting unfair labor
practice by the company.
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threats and were reasonably based in fact.325 The court added to the

Ninth Circuit standards regarding privileged speech by holding that the
mere fact that statements made were vague and obtuse, even if inten-

lead to the inference that they represented a
tional, does not necessarily
326
threat of retaliation.

The Ninth Circuit, inNLRB v. Lant'z, 327 addressed the question of
whether an employer's threat to close down its plant in response to
union activities was protected by section 8(c). The court held that because the closing would have been both within the employer's sole disnecessity, the employer's
cretion and for reasons unrelated to economic
328

threat was a clear violation of section 8(c).

3. Interrogation
A motivation behind the enactment of the NLRA was to put the
employee on a more even level of power with his or her employer and
to prevent abuses of power by the employer. 329 An employee is quite
vulnerable to abuse by his or her employer during interrogation by the
employer. The Ninth Circuit has held that interrogation regarding
union activity alone does not violate section 8(a)(1) if it does not contain an express or implied threat or promise, or form part of a pattern
of restraint or coercion. 330 The court has specifically held that interrogation of employees by employers is not unlawfulper se, 33 1 but has also
325. Id.
326. Id. The court concluded that in light of the totality of the circumstances, including
the fact that it appeared that the company's representatives intended nothing more than to
infer that the advent of unionization could possibly alter the economic circumstances and
possibilities, and in applying a realistic view of the business/labor society, the statements of
the employer were protected under § 8(c). Id. at 920.
327. 607 F.2d 290 (9th Cir. 1979).
328. Id at 298. The employer had made the statement regarding plant closure in response to suggestions by an employee that he would go to the union to resolve a dispute over
nonpayment of fringe benefit contributions. The court reasoned that the employer's statements regarding the closedown revealed an obvious anti-union animus. When coupled with
testimony about the employer's actual continued operation on a nonunion basis, the employer's expressions were shown not to be privileged. Id.
329. In Garment Workers v. Quality Mfg., 420 U.S. 276, 281 (1975), and NLRB v. Weingarten, 420 U.S. 251, 256-58 (1975), the Supreme Court revealed its concern for this problem
of inequality. In Garment Workers (as in its companion case of Weingarten),the Court held
a denial by an employer of an employee's request that her union representative be present at
an investigatory interview which the worker thought might result in disciplinary action was
a violation of§ 8(a)(1). 420 U.S. at 281. The rationale of the Court included the theory that
its holding would allow an employer and employee to deal on more equal and balanced
levels in such situations. Id.
330. NLRB v. McCatron, 216 F.2d 212, 216 (9th Cir. 1954).
331. NLRB v. Super Toys, Inc., 458 F.2d 180, 182 (9th Cir. 1972); Santa Fe Drilling Co.
v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 725, 728 (9th Cir. 1967).

LOYOLA4 OF LOS ANGELES L4WRE VIEW

[Vol. 14

held that an employer's interrogation of its employees about union activities, unaccompanied by express assurances against reprisal, is inherently coercive and therefore an unfair labor practice.332
Three cases decided during the survey period involved interrogation of employees. In NLRB v. Bighorn Beverage,333 an employer's
president interviewed several prospective employees from a state employment agency and questioned each person regarding union membership.334 From a review of the totality of the circumstances, the court
concluded that the questioning violated section 8(a)(1). 335 The court
added to the previous Ninth Circuit requirement of express assurances
against reprisal by noting that the president should have taken steps to
alleviate the inherently coercive impact of the questions concerning
union membership. 336 The net effect of such questioning was clearly to
discourage employees from exercising their protected right to involve
themselves in any organizing activity. While the statements made by
the employer did not overtly indicate that it would hire only nonunion
sympathizers, the fact that it did not indicate otherwise led to the unavoidable 337
fear by the applicants that this was indeed the employer's
intention.

A similar result occurred in NLRB v. Chaofeld Anderson. 33i n
Cha/eld,the employer, through its senior executives, interrogated employees about their union sympathies and activities. The court restated
the policy of the Ninth Circuit that coercive interrogation concerning
union activities is a violation of the NLRA.339 In Chapield, the questioning did take place, the supervisors asked questions and gave no assurances against reprisals, and the company advanced no legitimate
business reasons for the questioning.340
In ClearPine Mouldings,Inc. v. NLRB,34 1 the court reaffirmed the
notion that interrogation of.employees concerning union activities is
332. 458 F.2d at 183 (1972).
333. 614 F.2d 1238 (9th Cir. 1980).
334. Id. at 1239-40. Each of the individuals interviewed indicated to the president that
either he did not belong to a union or that he would be willing to work without any union
representation. The court noted that the situation led the interviewees to believe that they
had to make such responses to be hired. Id.
335. Id. During the interviews, the president stated that refusal to cross picket lines
would not be an excuse for failing to deliver to customers. Id.
336. Id. at 1241-42.
337. Id.
338. 606 F.2d 266 (9th Cir. 1979).
339. Id. at 267.
340. Id.
341. 632 F.2d 721 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 984 (1981).
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not a per se violation of the Act, and restated the Ninth Circuit test of
coercion: "whether, under all the circumstances, the interrogation reasonably tends to restrain or interfere with the employees in the exercise
of their protected § 7 rights."342 The court held that in an employment
interview, similar to that of Bighorn Beverage,343 in which the interviewer urged a prospective employee not to join the union, there was a
clear implication that answers given by the employee affected his
chances of employment. That implication was sufficient to establish
violation of section 8(a)(1) even without testimony as to express threats
by the employer. 3 "
The three survey cases addressing the issue of interrogation present an employer with rather stringent guidelines for interrogating employees regarding union affiliation or activities. Employers must not
only avoid explicit threats, but must also give express assurances
against reprisal if any statements could reasonably be perceived as
threats.
4. Employer no solicitation rules
"No solicitation" rules promulgated by employers are designed to
prevent, for whatever reason, union activities within the time and location restrictions of the rule.3 45 While neither the Supreme Court nor
the Ninth Circuit has addressed this issue in great detail, it is clear that
such rules would have to satisfy the standards set by both section
8(a)(1) and the case law which has interpreted it.346 For example, a no
solicitation rule during nonworking hours in nonwork areas would reasonably be subject to some scrutiny as being an attempt by an employer
to interfere with the protected rights of union organization, but such
scrutiny would have to take into consideration the totality of
circumstances.34 7
During the survey period, in NLRB v. Silver Spur Casino,3 48 the

Ninth Circuit held that a rule prohibiting employee solicitation or distribution of literature during nonworking hours in nonwork areas is
presumptively invalid; however, the court noted that exceptions to the
general rule could be made when warranted by special circum342. Id. at 725.
343. 614 F.2d at 1239-40.
344. 632 F.2d at 725-26.
345. See DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 271, at 84-86.
346. See NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322, 325 (1974); Republic Aviation Corp. v.
NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 797-98, 802 n.10 (1945).
347. See DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 271, at 84-87.
348. 623 F.2d 571 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 906 (1981).

LOYOLA OFLOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

V 14
[Vol.

stances.349 In Silver Spur, the employers were engaged in direct service
to customers, providing gambling, restaurant, and bar facilities. The
court permitted such employers to establish no solicitation rules which
proscribe employee efforts to engage in solicitation or distribution of
materials for organizing purposes after working hours in areas open to
the general public."' But at the same time, seeming to twist its own
language, the court held that rules established by those same employers, preventing solicitation for union organizing purposes on company
premises after their shifts were over, were too broad.35 1 The distinction
appears to be that no solicitation rules are permissible if they prevent
employees from disrupting areas open to the public "in the selling areas
of stores and restaurants on the theory that such activity may tend to
drive away customers."3 52 This decision reflects the court's recognition
of the problems which employers face when engaged in that type of
interaction with the public. At the same time, the court reaffirmed the
limitations of employer control over employee solicitation where employer efforts reach the point of interfering with unionizing activity.
In NLRB v. Olympic Medical Corp. ,3 the court held that a rule
forbidding employees to discuss union issues during work hours, without barring discussions of other nonwork related matters, was a violation of section 8(a)(1). The president of the employer had testified that
the company had an unwritten rule barring nonwork related discussion. 354 However, due to the poor credibility of the president, and the
fact that other employees testified that nonwork related matters were
regularly discussed without reprimand, the court found that the company was enforcing a no solicitation rule in a discriminatory manner,
and thus was violating the NLRA.3 5 The holding implies that the
Ninth Circuit will sustain rules which have the same effect as no solicitation rules as long as such rules are couched in terms of barring all
discussion of a non-work nature and are not discriminatorily applied.
349. Id. at 582.

350. Id. at 583.
351. Id.
352. Id. at 582; see, e.g., Marriot Corp. (Children's Inn), 223 N.L.R.B. 978 (1978); May
Dep't Stores Co., 59 N.L.RB. 976, 981, enforced as modfed, 154 F.2d 533 (8th Cir.), cer.
denied, 329 U.S. 725 (1976); Goldblatt Bros., 77 N.L.R.B. 1262, 1264 (1948); see also Beth
Israel Hosp., 437 U.S. 483, 493 (1978).
353. 608 F.2d 762, 764 (9th Cir. 1979).

354. Id.

355. Id.
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5. Employer withholding or granting benefits to coerce employees
Employees are generally in a dependent relationship with their
employer, because the employer has the potential to instill in employees the fear of losing job benefits as a means of coercing them to refrain
from engaging in union activities. The employer can use its position to
achieve a similar result by providing additional benefits to reward or
encourage anti-union activity. 356 The Supreme Court has held that
such activities, when undertaken with the express intention of impinging upon employee freedom of choice, are unlawful under the
NLRA.3 57 The Court has also held, however, that an employer may
take action which appears to violate section 8(a)(1) if such action can
358
be justified by "legitimate and substantial business justifications."
The inference is that an employer could withhold or grant benefits in
an apparently coercive manner if the employer can provide an acceptable justification.
The Ninth Circuit has addressed similar issues in a more specific
manner and has consistently held that promises made by employers
offering benefits during union elections, including the mere mention of
company benefits during discussions with employees, are violations of
section 8(a)(1). 359 Unquestionably, the same violations should therefore be found when such benefits are actually withheld or granted.
During the survey period, in NLRB v. Swedish HospitalMedical
Center,360 the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of whether the grant of
a one day vacation to nonstrikers had a sufficiently coercive effect on
the striking employees to warrant a finding of a section 8(a)(1) violation. The employer claimed that its action was not a violation of the
NLRA because the benefit had only a minimal effect upon its employ356. See DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 271, at 97-99.
357. NLRB v. Exchange Parts, 375 U.S. 405, 409 (1964).
358. NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer, 389 U.S. 375, 378-80 (1965). In Fleetwood, the employer, at the end of a strike by union members, announced that it could not then reinstate
the strikers because of production curtailment caused by the strike, but failed to rehire them
when the jobs became available at a later date. The Court held that the employer's refusal
to reinstate the strikers constituted an unfair labor practice under § 8(a)(1) because the employer failed to show that its action was due to legitimate and substantial business justifications. Id.
359. See, ag., NLRB v. Ayer Lar Sanitarium, 436 F.2d 45, 49 (9th Cir. 1970) (combina-

tion of promises of benefits and threats of discharge, subcontracting, and plant closure found
to be coercive threats); Santa Fe Drilling v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 725, 728 (9th Cir. 1969) (em-

ployers discussions of company benefits and urging of employees to vote in representation
election found coercive); NLRB v. Luisi Truck Lines, 384 F.2d 842, 845 (9th Cir. 1967)
(promises by employer of benefits for voting against union clearly coercive and prohibited).
360. 619 F.2d 33, 35 (9th Cir. 1980).
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ees' right to strike, was based upon a legitimate business interest, and
was a gift, not a term or condition of employment.3 61 The court held
that the grant of a one day vacation is not so insignificant a benefit that
the employees will not reflect upon it in their participation in future
strikes; therefore, the employer's action constituted an interference with
the employees' right to engage in union activities. 3 62 The employer asserted the "business justification" that it had to compensate nonstrikers
for the additional burdens they bore. However, the court held that the
burden was insufficient to outweigh the employees' interest in uninhibited strike activity.363 Thus, the court, in balancing the Supreme Court
standard of "legitimate and substantial business justifications" against
the negative "effect" of the action, found that the potential repression
of employee organizing activity was by far the more important factor to
be considered. However, the Swedish Hospital court does not appear to
have ruled out the possibility that a more substantial business reason
could justify similar grants of benefits which may have some effect on
future union activities. 3"
In NLRB Y. Olympic Medical Corp.,365 the court held that the employer had violated the NLRA by withholding a periodic wage increase
close in time to the filing of a union representation petition. Such activity was clearly part of overt efforts by the employer to influence employees regarding union affiliation and had the net effect of interfering
with and coercing employees.366 This decision provided a reaffirmation
of the standards and protections considered throughout both the
Supreme Court's and Ninth Circuit's application of section 8(a)(1).
B. Employer Discrimination
NLRA section 8(a)(3) provides that it is an unfair labor practice
361. Id. at 35. The facts revealed that the employer had granted a compensatory day off
to all nurses who either did not strike, abandoned the strike, or were hired during the strike.
None of the other nurses who continued the strike received the day off. Id.
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. Id. The court also responded to a claim on behalf of the hospital that the holding of
NLRB v. Electro Vector, 539 F.2d 35, 36 (9th Cir. 1976), should be applied. The court noted
that, in Electro Vector, the § 8(a)(1) violation was merely a derivative of the § 8(a)(3) violation. Because the § 8(a)(3) violation was denied (because the benefits provided by the employer were not a term or condition of employment), the § 8(a)(1) violation necessarily was
unfounded. In Swedish Hospital, the question to which the Board and the court addressed
themselves concerned interference with § 7 rights, not whether the bonuses were a term or
condition of employment, and the court thereby distinguished the cases and rejected the
hospital's argument. 619 F.2d at 35.
365. 608 F.2d 762, 763 (9th Cir. 1979).
366. Id.
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for an employer to discriminate in hiring and retaining employees or in
setting any term or condition of employment to encourage or discour368
age membership in any labor organization. 67 Unlike section 8(a)(1),
section 8(a)(3) focuses primarily on the motive of the employer, and not
the effect of its actions.3 69 The Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit cases
which have applied this statute have consistently held in favor of employees who have been discharged because of their union affiliation or
for participating in union activities.37°
1. Discharge of employee for improper purpose
Both the Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit have held that the crux
of a violation of section 8(a)(3) is the determination of the actual motive of the employer behind the discharge of the employee. 37 1 However, there has been considerable discussion over the manner in which
motive is utilized to prove a section 8(a)(3) violation.
The Supreme Court began its analysis of the improper discharge
of employees in the mid-1950's by holding that, although an essential
element of a violation of section 8(a)(3) is that the employer's motive in
discriminating against the employee be to encourage or discourage
membership in a labor organization, specific evidence of intent is unnecessary where the conduct of the employer "inherently encourages or
discourages union membership. ' 372 Yet, it was not until NLRB v.
Great Dane Trailers373 was decided that a definitive test was established. The Court in Great Dane held that when an employer's discriminatory conduct was "inherently destructive" of important
367. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976).
368. 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976).
369. See DEVELOPiNG LABOR LAW, supra note 271, at 52 (Supp. 1971-1975).
370. See, eg., Republic Aviation v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 795-803 (1945) (a discharge
because of a violation of an invalid no solicitation rule held violative of § 8(a)(3)); Phelps
Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 182 (1941) (employer who refuses to hire a prospective
applicant for employment solely because of the applicant's affiliation with a labor union is
guilty of an unfair labor practice); NLRB v. Cantrall, 201 F.2d 853, 856 (9th Cir. 1953)
(employer who requires membership in a labor organization as a prerequisite for employment violates § 8(a)(3)).
371. See, eg., NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, 388 U.S. 26, 27-30 (1967); American Shipbuilding Co. v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 725,731-32 (9th Cir. 1967); Shattuck Denn Mining Corp. v.
NLRB, 362 F.2d 466, 470 (9th Cir. 1966); Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel v. NLRB, 284 F.2d
74, 77 (9th Cir. 1960).
372. Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 45 (1954). In Radio Officers, the employer was charged with discriminating against nonunion employees because it granted retroactive pay increases and vacation payments to union employees and refused such benefits
to other employees solely because they were not union members. Id. at 17-25.

373. 388 U.S. 26 (1967).
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employee rights, the Board was not required to show an anti-union motivation.374 However, if the effect of the discriminatory conduct on employee rights is "comparatively" minor, an anti-union intent must be
shown to sustain the charge if the employer has provided evidence of
legitimate and substantial business justifications for its conduct. 75
The Ninth Circuit expanded upon the holding of Great Dane in
PortlandWillamette v. NLRB 76 The court provided examples of what
it considered to be conduct "inherently destructive of the employees'
right to strike or engage in collective bargaining."' 377 The dispositive
test in the Ninth Circuit with regard to discharge of employees is stated
in Western Exterminator v. NLRB.378 The court in Western Exterminator held that where the discharge of an employee is motivated by both
legitimate business considerations and protected union activity, the test
is whether the business reason or the protected union activity is the
moving cause for the discharge. 379 The court noted that when examining an isolated discharge of an individual worker, it deems the "inherently destructive" analysis inappropriate;3 0 "[o]therwise, the discharge
of an employee who participates in union affairs might violate section
8(a)(3) regardless of whether the employer's motives were entirely
proper."' 381 In such cases, "the burden is on the NLRB and reviewing

courts to 'determine whether the employer has acted purely [for legitimate purposes] or has sought to damage employee organization.' "382
Recently, in NLRB v. Lantz, 8 3 the court held that Western Exterminator was not applicable. In Lantz, the court was faced with making
a determination of whether an employer's discharge of two employees
374. Id. at 34,
375. Id. In Great Dane, the employer revoked vacation benefits following initiation of a
strike, then later announced that it would grant vacation benefits for employees who had
returned to work during the strike. The court noted that the burden is on the employer to
show that it was motivated by legitimate business purposes, because proof of such purposes
is most accessible to it. Id.
376. 534 F.2d 1331 (1976).
377. Id. at 1334. In Portland,the court specifically stated that permanent discharges for
participating in union activities, granting superseniority to strike breakers, and other actions
creating visible and continuing obstacles to future exercise of employee rights were inherently destructive. Id.
378. 565 F.2d 1114 (9th Cir. 1977).
379. Id. at 1118.
380. Id. at 1117 n.2.
381. Id.
382. Id. The court also recognized the fact that the various other circuits are sharply
divided on the question of the exact amount of animus that must be shown for a § 8(a)(3)
violation. However, in the court's own judgment, the rule that anti-union animus must be
the dominant or moving cause is the better standard. Id.
383. 607 F.2d 290, 299 (9th Cir. 1979).

19811

LABOR LAW SURVEY

was a violation of section 8(a)(3) where there appeared to be multiple
reasons for the employer's action, including both anti-union motivation
and legitimate business reasons.3 14 The court in Lantz pointed out that
in Western Exterminator, the court was faced with a review of an isolated discharge of a single employee in which the action of the employer was not inherently destructive of important employee rights.
However, in Lantz, the court found that the employer's conduct was
inherently destructive in that the employees were discharged (or not
employed) at least partially because of their expressed desire to procure
union assistance to force compliance with the collective bargaining
agreement. Such employee activity is protected by section 7 of the
NLRA.385 While the facts of the case indicated that there were at least
two potential motivations for the employer's acts, the court in Lantz
found that it was not necessary for the Board to have shown that the
improper motive was the moving or dominant one., 86 Thus, Lantz appears to indicate that another test has been formulated, in which the
discharge in question need only be partially due to union activity, and
that employer motivation need not be dominant.
In another survey period case, L'Eggs Products,Inc. v. NLRB, 387
the court took exception to its own language in Lantz. In L'Eggs, the
employer received notice by mail from the union stating that the union
was actively engaged in an organizing program to obtain a union contract; the employer reacted by firing five employees.3

8

The court reaf-

firmed earlier standards set forth in both the Supreme Court case of
Great Dane and the Ninth Circuit case of Western Exterminator and
stated that it did not comprehend the distinction made in Lantz in
which the court stated that because Western Exterminatorinvolved an
isolated discharge of a single employee, the action of the employer was
not inherently destructive of section 7 rights. 3 9 The court in L'Eggs
rejected this distinction and found that the discharge in Western Exterminator was just as conclusive and permanent as that in Lantz. The
384. The facts indicated that after the employer decided to go nonunion, one employee
suggested that the employer was "kind of a crook," and that the employee was discharged by
the employer allegedly for this remark. The employer claimed in addition that the two
employees were not employed by him because of a legitimate closedown of the plant. The
employees claimed that they were not employed because of their protected efforts to enforce
a union contract and their suggestions that they would go to the union to achieve that end.
Id. at 299.
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. 619 F.2d 1337 (9th Cir. 1980).
388. Id. at 1340-41.

389. Id. at 1342.
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court concluded that "Lantz should be confined to its facts-discharges
for seeking to enforce the contract between the employer and the
union. ' 390 Thus, the L'Eggs case clearly reinforces the dominant motive test highlighted in Western Exterminator and provides an example
of an application of the Ninth Circuit's "dominant motive" test.
Several other decisions during the survey period applied the
"dominant motive" test to resolve questions regarding allegedly illegal
discharges. In Stephenson v. NLRB, 39' the court was faced with a dispute turning on whether the dominant motive behind an employee's
discharge was anti-union animus or a legitimate business reason.392
The employee claimed that the Lantz theory, under which an employer
may be found to have committed an unfair labor practice although a
discharge is onlypartialy motivated by anti-union animus, was applicable to his case.393 The court, however, rejected that reasoning, and
held that Western Exterminator'stest for determining whether the discharge of an employee is an unfair labor practice (whether the antiunion animus was the moving or dominant cause for the discharge) was
applicable.394 The court found, upon review of the evidence presented,
that the dominant motivation for the discharge was a legitimate business reason. 395 It is important to note that this case was decided after
Lantz but before L'Eggs, and therefore provides support for the conclusion in L'Eggs that the holding in Lantz should be confined to its
facts.
In NLJB v. Joseph,3 9 6 the court was faced with a situation in

which the employer discharged the least competent worker to make
room for a fellow worker whom the Board trial examiner had ordered
reinstated in an unrelated proceeding. The employee claimed that he
was discharged as a result of his union activities.397 The court held that
the dominant motive test applied and found that there was clear evi390. Id.
391. 614 F.2d 1210 (9th Cir. 1980).
392. Id. at 1211-13.
393. Id. at 1213.
394. Id.
395. Id. The facts indicated that the employee had continuously violated company smoking rules, and that he had been found smoking over a container of flammable solvent just
prior to the discharge. There was additional testimony by the employer that the company
had been warned by fire officials regarding smoking in the working area and that an employee had been previously burned by solvent coming into contact with a hot engine. Id.
396. 605 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1979).
397. Id. at 468. The discharged employee was a witness before the Board in the earlier,
unrelated proceeding which had led to the reinstatement order. Because he had essentially
testified against the employer, the court noted the potential for a claim of violation of
§ 8(a)(4) of the NLRA. Id. at 467. Section 8(a)(4) of the NLRA provides that it shall be an
unfair labor practice for an employer to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an em-
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dence that the dominant motive behind the termination was a legiti398
mate business reason.

In NLRB v. InlandEmpire Meat Co. ,399 an employee claimed that
he was discharged because of his union activities. The employer ar-

gued that there was insubstantial evidence that the employee's discharge was motivated by anti-union animus.4 ° ° The court, however,

found that there was substantial evidence indicating improper motivation by the employer, because the employer was inconsistently applying
40 1
the rules which that employer claimed the employee had violated.

The employer had based its claim ofproper motivation upon the rules.
The court, however, in applying the dominant motive test, found that

the inconsistent application of the rules in question supported
the find40 2

ing that the improper motive was the dominant one.
In another survey case, NLRB v. Bighorn Beverage,40 3 the court
held that if an employee is discharged for an allegedly improper mo-

tive, the appropriate test is whether the improper motive was the dominant one. 40 4 The court combined that test with an additional one
which required that the overall circumstances be considered in determining the dominant motive.40 5 The court concluded, on the basis of
the overall circumstances, that the dominant motive for the discharge
was anti-union animus. °6
ployee because he has filed charges or given testimony under the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4)
(1976).
398. Id. at 468. The court noted that the evidence supported the conclusion that the
employer's desire to minimize its potential backpay liability was the motivating factor leading to the termination of the employee. Because there was no evidence of anti-union animus, the legitimate business reason was the dominant motive. Id.
399. 611 F.2d 1235 (9th Cir. 1979).
400. Id. at 1238. The employer claimed that the employee either quit or was discharged
because he had violated company grooming policies, that he had in some manner verbally
abused a supervisor, failed to return a check to the company on the date of its receipt, and
on one occasion, picked up a wrong product when driving the company truck. Id.
401. Id. The employee in question was the shop steward, and he was told by the employer on the day he was discharged that the company was terminating him and intended to
get rid of the union next. He had been informed earlier that the company was going to start
at the top and "do a little cleaning up." Although the employee did report to work with long
hair and a beard in violation of company policy, there was testimony by fellow employees to
the effect that other employees had been seen in violation of such standards without being
reprimanded, and that other individual employees who had not returned company checks
on time and had not made correct pickups were not reprimanded. Id.
402. Id.
403. 614 F.2d 1238 (9th Cir. 1980).
404. Id. at 1242-43.
405. Id.
406. Id. The employee had initiated the union organizing activity at the employer's facility and solicited the union card signing campaign, leading to the eventual filing of a petition
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2. Reprimand of employee for improper purpose
The standards set by the Supreme Court in Great Dane Trailers
would appear to apply to all situations in which an employer violates
section 8(a)(3) by discriminating against its employees to discourage
union activity.40 7 It should be noted that Western Exterminator and
decisions which have followed have involved discharges of employees.40 8 However, during the survey period, two cases were decided
which involved reprimands instead of discharges. In ClearPineMouldings, Inc. v. NLRB, 4 9 the employer had reprimanded an employee,
410
allegedly as part of a deliberate effort to discourage union activity.
The court reaffirmed the Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court rules that
the employer's motive for engaging in the discriminatory conduct is
controlling; without a finding of anti-union animus, there is no unfair
labor practice unless the conduct was so inherently destructive of employee rights that the unavoidable and foreseeable consequences of the
employer's conduct bear their own indicia of motive. 4 1 1 In ClearPine,
the court did not consider whether the improper motivation was the
dominant one, as in discharge cases, but whether it was reasonable to
conclude that the employee was reprimanded because of her status as a
leading union activist.412 The court held that it was required to defer to
the Board's determination of motive, a matter within the Board's purview.413 Therefore, based upon the holding in ClearPine, the standard
with regard to employer reprimands is that the Board merely must rely
upon evidence of a reasonable inference that the reprimand was motivated by anti-union animus.
In NLRB v. Best Products,41 4 an employee was suspended for a
two month period for what the employer claimed was a leave of abfor representation by the union. The employer had earlier interrogated its employees regarding union sympathies, and statements made by the employer after the employee's dis-

charge revealed anti-union animus. Id.
407. See DEVELOPrNG LABOR LAW, supra note 271, at 61 (Supp. 1971-1975).
408. See DEVLOPiNG LABOR LAW, supra note 271, at 35 (Supp. 1977).
409. 632 F.2d 721 (9th Cir. 1980).
410. Id. at 725.
411. Id. The court cited the case of NLRB v. Triumph Curing Center, 571 F.2d 462, 474
(9th Cir. 1978), as a recent affirmation of the general rule previously initiated by Great Dane
Trailers. The court also reaffirmed the holding in NLRB v. Folkins, 500 F.2d 52, 53 (9th

Cir. 1974), finding that the Board may rely on circumstantial as well as direct evidence, and
that its inferences and findings must prevail where they are reasonable and supported by
substantial evidence. Id.
412. 632 F.2d at 725.
413. Id. at 724. See NLRB v. Fort Vancouver Plywood Co., 604 F.2d 462, 474 (9th Cir.
1979).
414. 618 F.2d 70 (9th Cir. 1980).
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sence designed for the employee to regain her health. The employee
was actively involved in union matters, particularly during an election
campaign. In addition, the company showed a general anti-union animus in its conduct in the prior year's election. 415 The court held that,
for disciplinary action to constitute an unfair labor practice, it must be
determined that the employer's motivation was unlawful. 416 The court
reaffirmed the holding of Shattuck Denn Mining Corp. v. NLRB, 4 17 in

which the court had held that the Board may infer the existence of an
unlawful motive behind a disciplinary action taken against an employee if the employer's asserted motive is false.418 However, the court
in Best Productsadded that the ultimate finding of an improper motive
must still meet the test of substantial evidence. The court was unable to
find substantial evidence on the improper motive issue because the
claims against the employer were based merely upon inferences.419
The court held that a general anti-union spirit on the part of the company, absent a history of concerted unlawful conduct, is not evidence of
unfair labor practices.420
Best Products complements the reasonable inference approach in
Clear Pine by providing a refinement of the applicability of circumstantial evidence in determining motive. In Best Products, the Board
had improperly relied upon the inferences that the employer was generally hostile to union activity; because there was no concrete evidence to
support the Board's finding, the court reversed the Board's decision.421
C. Union Discrimination
Sections 8(b)(1)(A) 42 and 8(b)(2) 4 1 of the NLRA provide that it is

an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents to restrain
or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights of self-organization
and collective bargaining, or to discriminate against employees on the
basis of membership, or to cause or attempt to cause an employer to
discriminate against an employee.424 Violations of these sections often
415. Id. at 71-72. This claim was based upon the fact that the employer had asked employees to remove union buttons while in the showroom area, questioned employees regarding union activity, and discriminatorily enforced a no solicitation rule. Id.
416. Id. at 74.
417. 362 F.2d 466, 470 (9th Cir. 1966).
418. I1d. at 470.
419. 618 F.2d at 74.
420. Id.
421. Id.
422. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1976).
423. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1976).
424. Id.

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14

occur in connection with hiring hall arrangements between unions and
employers and as a result of attempts by unions to prevent any activity
which might undermine a strike.425 Several decisions during the survey
period addressed these issues and have provided refinements to the previous standards applied in those situations.
1. Enforcement of exclusive hiring hall agreements
The purpose of an exclusive hiring hall arrangement between an
employer and a union is to eliminate nonproductive, continuous
searching for employment by workers and to avoid similarly unorganized scouting by employers for employees.426 The Supreme Court has
held that exclusive hiring hall arrangements are not illegal per se, un427
less they in fact result in discrimination prohibited by the NLRA.
The Ninth Circuit similarly has held that such agreements are not illegal per se, but the court has noted that they might violate the NLRA if
discriminatory practices are used to supply workers.4 28 The Ninth Circuit has ruled, additionally, that a contract which includes discriminatory provisions is illegal per se, but a contract which is "fair on its face"
is not illegal simply because it does not contain clauses whichprohibit
illegal action.429
During the survey period, the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of
a discriminatory application of an exclusive hiring hall arrangement by
a union in NLRB v. Laborer's InternationalUnion, Local 300.430 In
Laborer'sInternational,the union was charged with violating sections
8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2) of the NLRA by initially causing the employer
to discharge an employee, and then later refusing to refer that employee to a job opening for the same employer who had requested him
by name.43 Both actions were allegedly taken because of the em425. See, e.g., Booster Lodge v. NLRB, 412 U.S. 84, 85-87 (1973); NLRB v. Granite
State, 409 U.S. 213, 215-23 (1972); Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423, 427-36 (1969); International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 357 v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667, 668-75 (1961); NLRB v. International Ass'n of Bridge Workers Local 75,583 F.2d 1094, 1095-97 (9th Cir. 1978); NLRB v.
Mountain Pacific, 270 F.2d 425, 427-28 (9th Cir. 1959).
426. International Bhd. of Teamsters Local 357 v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667, 672-77 (1961).
427. Id. The Court also held that discrimination cannot be inferred from the face of a
hiring hall agreement when it specifically provides that there will be no discrimination
against casual employees because of the presence or absence of union membership. Id.
428. NLRB v. Mountain Pacific, 270 F.2d 425, 427-28 (9th Cir. 1959).
429. Id. The Eighth Circuit has held that a union violates §§ 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2) if "it
or its agent, adversely affects an employee's job for personal or arbitrary reasons." FruinCoinon Corp. v. NLRB, 571 F.2d 1017, 1023 (8th Cir. 1978).
430. 613 F.2d 203 (9th Cir. 1980).
431. Id. at 205.
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ployee's activities against the union.432 The court held that the union
had in fact violated those sections because the union was inconsistent
in its application of the nondiscretionary referral procedure which it
was required by contract to follow.433 The court found that there was
sufficient evidence linking the discriminatory application of the hiring
hall rules to the employee's dissident activities, and that while the contract itself was not illegal, the discriminatory application of its terms
violated the line drawn by both the Supreme Court4 34and the Ninth Circuit with regard to such hiring hall arrangements.
The union in Laborer'sInternationalargued that its failure to refer
to a job opening, even though the employee was reemployee
the
quested by name, was justified under NLRB v. InternationalAssociation
of Bridge Workers Local 75.435 In Bridge Workers, the Ninth Circuit
held that when a union respects its nondiscretionary referral process
but refuses to send an employee to a job for which the employee has
been requested by name by an employer, it is not violating the NLRA,
and the union's motive in taking such action is irrelevant.436 The court
in Laborer'sInternationalnoted, however, that the union failed to enforce the hiring hall provisions in a consistent manner, contrary to the
union in Bridge Workers.4 37 The court also emphasized that, in Bridge
Workers, the only example in the record of a violation by the union of
its agreement was an "extraordinary situation" where the local granted
referral cards to workers hired out of order due to unusual circumstances.4 38 In Laborer'sInternational,the employee's discharge was arranged only after the union's agent was advised of the employee's
dissident activities. 439 There was no indication that the actions of the
agent were the result of extraordinary or unusual circumstances. Based
upon the evidence presented, the court concluded that the employee
was -denied the referral because of his anti-union activities and other
432. Id. The union claimed that it had a legal right to remove the employee because he
had held the position in violation of the hiring hall provisions of the agreement. As to the
refusal to refer the employee, the union argued that it had relied on its attorney's conclusion
that the employee was not eligible for the "by name" work request, and that such reliance
was in good faith and not for invidious or discriminatory reasons. Id.
433. Id. at 207-08.
434. Id. The facts-indicated that the employee was only discharged through the efforts of
the union when the union discovered the employee's dissident union activities. There was
significant evidence that the union harbored strong animus against the employee. Id.
435. Id. (citing NLRB v. International Ass'n of Bridge Workers Local 75, 583 F.2d 1094
(9th Cir. 1978)).
436. 583 F.2d at 1097.
437. 613 F.2d at 207-08.
438. Id.
439. Id.
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arbitrary considerations. 44°
In another decision during the survey period, NLRB v. Wismer &
Becker," 1 the Ninth Circuit was faced with another refusal by a union
to refer an employee, contrary to a union hall hiring arrangement. The
union also caused the employer to fire employees who had been hired
during a labor dispute. In Wismer, the court was not willing to make a
determination as to whether the union's hiring hall practice was discriminatory and therefore violative of the federal law (leaving such
judgment to the NLRB as provided by Congress)," 2 but it did set out
some general standards by which the Board should be guided in considering such situations." 3 The court held that a hiring hall may not be
used to restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights to
form labor organizations and to bargain collectively or to refrain from
such activities. Nor may a hiring hall be used to cause an employer to
discriminate against employees to encourage or discourage union membership.' It was also determined, however, that not every union attempt to influence employer action which in turn encourages or
discourages union membership violates the Act." 5 In addition, the
court noted that if a union's action directed toward an employer is intended to discipline an individual or a particular group for violation of
union rules, to encourage individuals to accept the authority of union
officers, or to obtain advantages for union members over nonunion
members, such action constitutes an unfair labor practice." 6 The Wismer decision also emphasized the importance of ascertaining the
union's true motive, which can be determined from inferences derived
from circumstantial evidence. 447
2. Restraint and coercion by unions
Unions have the right to regulate the activities of their members in
order to provide effective representation. However, that right is not
without boundaries. The Supreme Court has held that internal regula440. Id. at 210.
441. 603 F.2d 1383 (9th Cir. 1979).
442. Id. at 1389.
443. Id.
444. Id. at 1388.
445. Id.
446. Id. The court noted that some conduct which inherently suggests the intent of the
union may lead the Board to conclude that the encouragement or discouragement of union
membership was a "natural foreseeable consequence of the conduct and that the action [sic]
must have intended that result." Id.
447. Id.
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tion of union affairs cannot affect a member's employment status."
However, the Court has also held that internal regulation through the
assessment of reasonable fines on union members who decline to honor
an authorized strike is permissible because such fines are necessary to
enable unions to protect their status through reasonable discipline of
members who violate rules and regulations governing membership. 449
In Scofield v. NLRB,4 5 ° union members were fined and suspended by
their union for violating a. union rule relating to production ceilings.
The Court held that section 8(b)(1) allows a union to enforce "a properly adopted rule which reflects a legitimate union interest, impairs no
policy Congress has imbedded in the labor law, and is reasonably enforced against union members who are free to leave the union and escape the rule."4 5

The Supreme Court has modified the Scofield rule in situations
where unions have fined employees for violating lawful strikes, but
where the employees have resigned from the union before the actual
violations occurred. This modification was initiated in NLRB v. Granite State,45 2 in which the Court held that it was an unfair labor practice
for a union to fine employees who had resigned prior to the alleged
violation of a lawful strike, when neither the union-employer contract
nor the union's constitution or bylaws defined or limited the circumstances under which a member could resign from the union.453 The
Court expressly declined, however, to address the question of the extent
to which a contractual restriction on a member's right to resign may be
limited by the NLRA. The Court reasoned that absent any contractual
or constitutional provision, a court must apply the law which is normally reflected in free institutions: theright of the individual freely to
objoin or resign from associations, "subject of course to any financial 454
ligations due and owing the group with which he was associated."
The Court went a step further in Booster Lodge v. NLRB,4 5 5 in

which the union sought enforcement of fines imposed for the strikebreaking activities of employees who had resigned from the union.
The union's constitution expressly prohibited members from strikebreaking, but was silent on the subject of voluntary resignation from
448.
449.
450.
451.
452.
453.
454.
455.

NLRB v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 185-95 (1967).
Id.
394 U.S. 423 (1969).
Id. at 430.
409 U.S. 213 (1972).
Id. at 215-18.
Id. at 216.
412 U.S. 84 (1973).
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the union.45 6 The Supreme Court held that in such a situation, the

union committed an unfair labor practice when it sought enforcement
of its fines.457 There was no indication that the union members were
informed, prior to the assessment of fines, that the constitutional provision was to be interpreted as imposing any obligations upon a
resignee 458 and the Court was not inclined to find an "implied" postresignation commitment against the employees.45 9
The Ninth Circuit applied the Supreme Court standards during
the survey period in NLRB v. MachinistsLocal 1327.460 In Local 1327,
the union added to its constitution explicit restrictions on the circumstances under which a member could resign. 461 The union attempted to
fine employees who had formally resigned from the union and had
later crossed picket lines to return to work during a legal strike.462 The
court, citing Booster Lodge, held that a rule which permits a union to
discipline a member for crossing a lawful picket line or returning to
work during a strike is a legitimate internal regulation of the conduct of
union members, and that the imposition of a fine on a member is lawful." 3 The court also held that a union member has the right to resign
from a union and that when the member does resign, the union has no
more control over that member than it has over a person on the
street.464 The court, however, refused to consider the validity of the
union's restriction regarding a member's right to resign, a question
which was not reached by the Supreme Court in either GraniteState or
Booster Lodge.4
456. Id. at 85-86.
457. Id. at 88-90.

458. Id. at 89.
459. Id.
460. 608 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1979).
461. Id. at 1222. The applicable constitutional provision read as follows:
Improper Conduct of a Member.
...
Accepting employment in any capacity in an establishment where a strike or
lockout exists as recognized under this Constitution, without permission. Resignation shall not relieve a member of his obligation to refrain from accepting employment at the establishment for the duration of the strike or lockout or within 14 days
preceding its commencement. Where observance of a primary picket line is required, resignation shall not relieve a member of his obligation to observethe primary picket line for its duration if the resignation occurs during the period that the
picket line is maintained or within 14 days preceding its establishment.
Id. at 1220.
462. Id. at 1221.
463. Id.
464. Id.
465. Id. The court concluded that such a question was expressly reserved by the Board
majority in this case. Id. The dissent argued that the provision in the union's constitution
sought not to condition resignations by members, but rather sought to control the post-
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In the recent case of Dycus v. NLRB,4 66 the Ninth Circuit was
faced with a different sort of union internal regulation. In that case, an
employee, after efforts to become a candidate for union office, was
4 67
transferred from one union local to another without his consent.
The court was required to determine whether the transfer of jurisdiction by the union local was coercive and in violation of section
8(b)(1)(A), or whether it was a proper internal regulation.4 68 The court
concluded that the transfer was a proper action by the union, in accordance with its regulations, and was motivated by legitimate business
reasons associated with effective union organization and representation. 469 The employee claimed that regardless of the purpose or intent
of the transfer, such transfer without the consent of the members of the
bargaining unit restrained him in his exercise of the right to choose
freely his collective bargaining representative. The court, however,
ruled against the employee, finding that the transfer, in effect, was a
valid disclaimer by the first local of its interest in representation of his
bargaining unit, and was a noncoercive offer by the second local to
assume the role of representative.47 0 In making this determination, the
court in Dycus was essentially reiterating the standard of Scofield v.
NLRB. 471 The court noted that the action "contravened no national
labor policy, and reflected a legitimate union interest."47 2
resignation conduct of employees who were no longer union members, and concluded that it
is unlawful for a union to fine a former member for post-resignation conduct otherwise
protected by § 7 of the Act. The dissent also argued that the Supreme Court decisions
should have been applied, because they hold that the disciplinary power of a union is restricted to those employees who are members of the union. Id. at 1222-23 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
466. 615 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1980).
467. Id. at 823.
468. Id. Following the transfer from one local to another, the employee was declared
ineligible as a candidate for office because he was no longer a member of the local from
which he transferred. There was evidence that the transfer was motivated by improper purposes, because as a member of the initial local, the employee often spoke out against the
union's policies and administration. Id.
469. Id. at 825.
470. Id. at 826.
471. 394 U.S. at 430.
472. 615 F.2d at 826.
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THE REPRESENTATION PROCESS AND UNION ELECTIONS

A. RepresentationProceedings andElections
1. Eligibility to vote
a. supervisors
Section 9(c) of the Act473 provides the mechanism under which
employees may hold a representation election to designate a collective
bargaining agent. Supervisors, however, are not employees under sec475
tion 2(3) of the Act474 and cannot vote in representation elections.
Section 2(11) of the Act 476 includes as supervisors those individuals
who exercise authority, using independent judgment over other employees for the interest of the employer.477
During the survey period, in NLRB v. Big Three Industries,478 an
employee's ballot in a representation election was successfully challenged before the Board by the union because the employee was a supervisor and therefore could not be included in the bargaining unit.
The employee in question performed both supervisorial and nonsupervisorial tasks as a part of his daily routine. His supervisorial
duties included directing unit employees on a daily -basis, administrating sick leave and overtime, and assisting in the hiring, discipline,
and merit review of other employees. 479 These factors were sufficient to
persuade the Ninth Circuit that the Board acted within its discretion in
finding that the employee was a supervisor.480 The employee's parttime performance of work performed by other unit employees did not
473. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1976).
474. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976).
475. See NLRB v. Doctor's Hosp. of Modesto, Inc., 489 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1973).
476. 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1976) provides:
The term "supervisor" means any individual having authority, in the interest of the

employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibility to direct them, or to adjust
their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the
foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment.
477. See Laborers &Hod Carriers Local 341 v. NLRB, 564 F.2d 834, 837 (9th Cir. 1977);
accord Sweeny & Co. v. NLRB, 437 F.2d 1127, 1131 (5th Cir. 1971); Federal Compress &
Warehouse Co. v. NLRB, 398 F.2d 631, 634-35 (6th Cir. 1968).
478. 602 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1979). For a full discussion of this case and the distinction
between employees and supervisors, see supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text in Part I:
ADMNmTRATiON OF THE AcT.
479. 602 F.2d at 902.
480. Id. (citing Dynamic Mach. Co. v. NLRB, 552 F.2d 1195 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 827 (1977)); see NLRB v. Broyhill Co., 514 F.2d 655, 658 (8th Cir. 1975).
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48 1
alter this conclusion.

b. plant and office "clericals"
Employees who work in production and maintenance may be
properly joined in a bargaining unit with clerical employees whose
work is closely tied to production, and who have substantially the same
working hours and fringe benefits as clericals, because they share the
same community of interest.48 2 Clerical employees who may be included in the same bargaining unit with production and maintenance
workers are termed plant clericals, while those who may not be inthey work apart from production are termed office
cluded because
48 3
lericals.
Disputes arise when clerical employees are added to existing production employee bargaining units, or when they are allowed to vote
with production employees for representation. These disputes revolve
around the issue of whether the clerical employees are plant or office
clericals and can thus be included in the unit.4 84 The Ninth Circuit, in
resolving whether clerical or other employees may be properly included or added to an existing bargaining unit during an election, has
focused on whether the disputed employees share a community of interest with the other unit members.4 85 In Pacjfc Southwest Airlines v.
NLRB, 486 the Ninth Circuit outlined six factors the Board considers in
determining whether there is sufficient common interest to render a
bargaining unit, or the inclusion of an employee in a bargaining unit,
appropriate:
(1) similarity in skills, interests, duties, and working
conditions;
(2) functional integration of the plant, including interchange
and contact among employees;
(3) the employer's organizational and supervisory structure;
(4) the employees' desires;
481. 602 F.2d at 902 (citing NLRB v. Fullerton Publishing Co., 283 F.2d 545, 550 (9th

Cir. 1960)).
482. Pacific Southwest Airlines v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 1032, 1038, 1040 (9th Cir. 1978).
483. Id. at 1038-39.
484. See, &g.,Pacific Southwest Airlines v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 1032, 1038-46 (9th Cir. 1978)
(clerical employees improperly added to existing production workers' bargaining unit);
NLRB v. Adrian Belt Co., 578 F.2d 1304, 1312-13 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (union's
challenge to clerical employee's ballot in production workers' representation election overruled because clericals properly included within unit).
485. See Pacific Southwest Airlines v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 1032 (9th Cir. 1978); NLRB v.
Adrian Belt Co., 578 F.2d 1304, 1312-13 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam).
486. 587 F.2d 1032 (9th Cir. 1978).
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(5) bargaining history; and
(6) the extent of union organization among the
employees. 8 7
During the survey period, in NLRB v. Big Three Industries,"' the
Ninth Circuit reaffirmed its direct approach of determining whether
employees share a substantial community of interest when reviewing
disqualification of clericals' ballots in production employees' representation elections. In Big Three, the Board sustained challenges to two
ballots in a plant workers' representation election because they were
cast by office clericals rather thanplant clericals.489 The Ninth Circuit
extensively reviewed the clericals' activities in light of the first three
factors enumerated in Pacjfc Southwest Airlines and concluded that
they lacked a sufficient community of interest with the plant employees
to be classified as plant clericals.49°
c. retiredemployees
As a general rule, to be eligible to vote in a representation election,
an employee must work in the designated bargaining unit during the
eligibility period and on election day. 49 1 A worker on a leave of ab-

sence is presumed to continue as an employee and is eligible to vote
unless it is established by clear communication or overt act that the
employment relationship has been terminated. 492
During the survey period, in Universal Paper Goods Co. v.
NLRB,493 the Ninth Circuit upheld a union's challenge to an employee's ballot in a representation election on the basis of the employee's retirement. Prior to the representation election, the president
of the employer company said to the employee, "I hear you're planning
to leave us," and subsequently gave her a retirement check. She was
later honored by her coworkers at a retirement party, and her departure
487. Id. at 1038 (citing Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 146, 153 (1941);
NLRB v. Security-Columbian Banknote Co., 541 F.2d 135, 140 (3d Cir. 1976)); 14 NLRB
ANN. REP. 32, 33 (1949); DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 271, at 201, 231.
488. 602 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1979).
489. Id. at 902.

490. Id. at 903-04.
491. NLRB v. Adrian Belt Co., 578 F.2d 1304, 1308 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam); accord
Westchester Plastics of Ohio, Inc. v. NLRB, 401 F.2d 903, 907 (6th Cir. 1968); Macy's Mo.Kan. Div. v. NLRB, 389 F.2d 835, 842 (8th Cir. 1968); Trailmobile Div., Pullman, Inc. v.
NLRB, 379 F.2d 419, 423 (5th Cir. 1967).
492. Valley Rock Prods., Inc. v. NLRB, 590 F.2d 300, 303-04 (9th Cir. 1979); NLRB v.
Adrian Belt Co., 578 F.2d 1304, 1308 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam); accordTrailmobile Div.,
Pullman, Inc. v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 419, 423 (5th Cir. 1967).
493. 638 F.2d 1159 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
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was announced in the company bulletin. 494
The employee then quit work, but unknown to her, the company
chairman instructed the personnel director to place her on a two-month
leave of absence so she could return if she wanted to.495 The employer,
also without her knowledge, continued to pay for her health
insurance.496
The employee had applied for Social Security benefits, but without
communicating with anyone in the company, she then decided to
forego retirement. She voted against the union in the representation
election and returned to work six days later.4 97
The Ninth Circuit held that her ballot was invalid because she
had, by her acts, overtly demonstrated her retirement. The employer's
unilateral placement of her on a temporary leave of absence and her
uncommunicated alleged change of heart about retirement were insufficient to alter the court's conclusion.49
d

employers' blood relatives andspouses

Section 2(3) of the Act provides in pertinent part that "[t]he term
'employee' shall include any employee, . ..but shall not include...
any individual employed by hisparent or spouse....
Section 9(b) 500 states in part that "[t]he Board shall decide in each
case whether, in order to assure to employees the fullest freedom in
exercising the rights guaranteed by this subchapter, the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit,
craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof. ..."
The Board has, at various times, chosen one section over the other
in determining whether to include or exclude an employer's blood relative from a designated bargaining unit. When section 2(3) has been
applied, blood relatives have faced absolute exclusion, whereas under
section 9(b), the Board has decided each case on its facts. In early
Board decisions, absolute exclusion of blood relatives under section
2(3) was the rule.501 The Board changed this policy after the Sixth Cir494. Id. at 1159.
495. Id. at 1159-60.
496. Id. at 1160.

497. Id.
498. Id.
499. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976) (emphasis added).

500. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1976).
501. E.g., Peter A. Mueller & Sons, Inc., 105 N.L.R.B. 552 (1953); Louis Weinberg Assocs., 13 N.L.R.B. 66, 69 (1939).
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cult held, in NLRB v. Sexton,5 "2 that exclusion based solely on family
relationships other that those specified in section 2(3), namely, parent
or spouse, was improper.
Subsequent to Sexton, the Board required that employees related
to corporate shareholders or officers enjoy some special status, privilege, benefit, or favored treatment resulting from the blood relationship
with management before they would be disqualified from voting.50 3
The Board then departed from both the special status concept and the

section 9(b) analysis discussed in Foam Rubber City Number 2 of Florida, Inc.,5°4 and focused on whether the challenged employee shared a

community of interest with the others in the bargaining unit. In Foam
Rubber, the Board held that spouses or blood relatives of substantial

shareholders of corporate employers must be excluded from bargaining
units because they are necessarily more closely identified with management than with their fellow employees. 05
Since Foam Rubber, the Board has taken varying approaches to
the disqualification of blood relatives and spouses of shareholders and

management. The Board has applied the special status test alone;"0 6
interpreted Foam Rubber as requiring disqualification of relatives of
individuals owning fifty percent or more stock in closed corporations,
while considering community of interest50 7 or specialstatus50 otherwise;
and considered the degree of ownership of the employee's relatives

within the community of interest analysis." 9
The Seventh Circuit, in NLRB v. Caravelle Wood Products,Inc.
(Caravelle 1),51o criticized the Board's Foam Rubber formulation excluding children and spouses of "substantial" shareholders as a repeal
of the discretion granted the Board by section 9(b).511 The court saw
no reason to give the Board total discretion to disqualify blood relatives
502. 203 F.2d 940, 940 (6th Cir. 1953) (per curiam).
503. See Cherrin Corp. v. NLRB, 349 F.2d 1001 (6th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 981
(1966); International Metal Prods. Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 65 (1953).
504. 167 N.L.R.B. 623 (1967).
505. Id. at 624. Before Foam Rubber, the Board interpreted § 2(3) to exclude the children
of asole shareholder. See Bridgeton Transit, 123 N.L.RLB. 1196 (1959); Colonial Craft, Inc.,
118 N.L.R.B. 913 (1957); Peter A. Mueller & Sons, Inc., 105 N.L.R.B. 552 (1953).
506. See NLRB v. Warner, 587 F.2d 896, 902 (8th Cir. 1978) (specialstatustest dispositive factor in community of interest test); Pareas of Crescent City, Inc., 194 N.L.R.B. 616
(1971); Buckeye Village Mkt., Inc., 175 N.L.R.B. 271 (1969).
507. See Tops Club, Inc., 238 N.L.R.B. 928 (1978); Toyota Midtown, Inc., 233 N.L.R.B.
797 (1978); Cerni Motor Sales, Inc., 201 N.L.R.B. 918 (1973).
508. See Tops Club, Inc., 238 N.L.R.B. 928 (1978).
509. See Parisoff Drive-In Mkt., Inc., 201 N.L.R.B. 813 (1973).
510. 466 F.2d 675 (7th Cir. 1972).
511. Id. at 678.
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under section 9(b) because it could not do so under section 2(3). 5 12 Instead, the court provided a list of factors for the Board to consider,
including (1) the percentage of stock the parent or spouse owned;
(2) the number of shareholders related to one another; (3) whether the
shareholders actively engaged in management or held a supervisory
position; (4) the number of relatives employed as compared with the
total number of employees; and (5) whether the relative lived in the
same household or was partially dependent upon the shareholder.513
In NLRB v. Caravelle Wood Products,Inc. (Caravelle 1),514 the SevI formula, dubbing it the expanded
enth Circuit approved the 5Caravelle
15
community of interest test.
During the survey period, in Linn Gear Co. v. NLRB, 1 6 the Ninth
Circuit confronted the divergent lines of authority concerning employers' relatives and bargaining units. In Linn Gear, the Board granted a
motion for summary judgment disqualifying the son of the employer's
majority shareholder from voting in a representation election. The
Ninth Circuit, after reviewing the several lines of authority, vacated
and remanded, holding that the expandedcommunity of interest test set
forth in CaravelleI would be the standard adopted by the Ninth Circuit. In expanding the factors listed in Caravelle I, the court added
(1) the activity, if any, of the employee in the union; (2) the total
number of employees as against the number of blood related employees; and. (3) the overall ties and social activities of the family
involved. 17
2. Election procedures
a primary andrunoff elections
Section 9(c) of the Act5" 8 empowers the Board to investigate representation petitions and to oversee representation elections. Section
9(c)(3) 519 provides, in part, that "[i]n any election where none of the
choices on the ballots receives a majority, a runoff shall be conducted,
the ballot providing for a selection between the two choices receiving
512. Id.
513. Id. at 679.
514. 504 F.2d 1181 (7th Cir.), reh'g en banc denied, 510 F.2d 257 (7th Cir. 1974).
515. Id.at 1187.
516. 608 F.2d 791 (9th Cir. 1979).
517. Id. at 796; see Parisoff Drive-In Mkt., Inc., 201 N.L.R.B. 813 (1973) (degree of employee's family ownership of employer corporation considered in community of interest
analysis).
518. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1976).
519. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1976).
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the largest and second largest number of valid votes cast in the
election."
520
Section 102.70(d) of title 29 of the Code of Federal Regulations
provides in pertinent part that the Board shall certify any election in
which "two or more choices receive the same number of ballots and
another choice receives no ballots and there are no challenged ballots
*. . and. .. all eligible voters have cast valid ballots. . . . Only one
such further election pursuant to this paragraph may be held."
During the survey period, in Sohio Petroleum Co. v. NLRB, 5 21 a
small group of a larger unit of employees voted in favor of separate
union representation in a referendum. In that referendum, nine employees expressed their preference for one union, seven expressed preference for another, while eight cast votes for no union. A third union
received no votes. 52
A representation election was then held in which a choice was offered between no union and the two unions receiving votes in the referendum. The first union received nine votes, the second received one,
and ten votes were cast for no union. In a runoff election between the
first union and no union, the first union prevailed fourteen votes to five.
As a result, the Board certified the union as the bargaining
representative. 52
The employer challenged the offer of three choices in the second
election as being violative of the provision of section 9(c)(3) of the Act
which requires runoff elections between the top two choices in the primary election. The court dismissed this contention because the first
election was only a referendum on whether the employees desired separate representation for their unit and was not a primary representation
election. 5 The employer also contended that the results of the second
election should have been certified under the provision in title 29 of the
Code of Federal Regulations, section 102.70(d), which requires Board
certification of elections in which two or more choices received the
same number of ballots and another choice received no ballots.
The court, without elaborating, stated that the employer's suggested procedure was not supported by the regulations. 525 The court
was correct, because the language of title 29 of the Code of Federal
520.
521.
522.
523.
524.
525.

29 C.F.R. § 102.70(d) (1980).
625 F.2d 223 (9th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 225.
Id.
Id. at 226.
Id.
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Regulations, section 102.70(d), addresses tie votes between two choices
and not votes in which ties result from the aggregation of second and
third choices. This is evident from the proviso in the regulation which
states that it applies to situations in which "another choice receives no
ballots. 526
The court's decision was also correct under section 9(c)(3), which
provides for runoff elections between the top two choices when no
choice receives a majority of votes. That was precisely the situation in
this case. Curiously, the court did not look to section 9(c)(3) in its
analysis.527
b. investigation of electionpetitions5 28
5 29

c. invalidation of elections

d

the contract-barrule53
B. AppropriateBargainingUnits

Section 9(b) of the Act531 empowers the Board to designate an appropriate bargaining unit to secure for employees the fullest freedom in
exercising their rights. When determining an appropriate bargaining
unit, the Board balances individual freedom against the need for efficiency and stability.5 32 Under section 9(b), employee freedom must be
paramount.533
Board determinations of appropriate bargaining units will not be
526. 29 C.F.R. § 102.70(d) (1980) (emphasis added).
527. In Soho, the employer also contended that placement of the union on the first ballot
was improper because it had originally disclaimed interest in representing the unit. The
employer protested that because it relied on the disclaimer, it did not offer evidence to rebut
the union's qualifications during the election. The court summarily rejected this argument
because the union timely petitioned to appear on the ballot, the employer made no showing
that the union's placement on the ballot was prejudicial, and the employer offered no evidence that the union was unqualified to represent the unit. 625 F.2d at 226.

528. See supra notes 80-88 and accompanying text in Part I:

ADMImSTRATION OF THE

AcT.

529. See supra notes 89-102 and accompanying text in Part I:

ADMINISTRATION

OF

THE

AcT.

530. See supra notes 249-61 and accompanying text in Part I:

ADMImSTRATION OF THE

AcT.

531. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1976).
532. See, eg., Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers, Local I v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404
U.S. 157, 172 (1971); Pacific Southwest Airlines v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 1032, 1037 (9th Cir.
1978).
533. Pacific Southwest Airlines v. NLRB, 587 F.2d at 1037; see also Sheraton-Kauai
Corp. v. NLRB, 429 F.2d 1352, 1354-55 (9th Cir. 1970); accord Retail, Wholesale and Dep't
Store Union v. NLRB, 385 F.2d 301, 305 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
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overturned by the courts unless there has been an abuse of discretion
because the issue of determining bargaining units is within the particular expertise of the Board. 34 The Board is not required to select the
most appropriate unit; it need only select a unit which is not clearly
inappropriate. 35 The Board decides each case on its own facts5 36 and
537
is not strictly bound by its prior decisios.
Critical to the determination of a bargaining unit's appropriateness is whether the unit's employees share a community of interest.538
Factors used to gauge the communi y of interest and resulting appropriateness of bargaining units include: (1) similarity in skills, interests,
duties and working conditions; (2) functional integration of the plant,
including interchange and contact among the employees; (3) the employer's organizational and supervisory structure; (4) the employees'
desires; (5) bargaining history; and (6) the extent of union organization
among the employees.539
During the survey period, in Sohio Petroleum Co. v. NLRB, 540
Board certification of a small group of a larger unit of employees was
challenged by the employer as arbitrary and inappropriate. The larger
group of employees worked in all facets of oil production on Alaska's
North Slope. The smaller group of employees staffed the central power
station which provided power for the employer's as well as another ma541
jor oil company's North Slope operations.
The Board based its decision, that the power station employees
shared a sufficient community of interest to constitute an appropriate
bargaining unit, on the following facts: (1) they were not directly involved in oil production but acted, rather, as a "defacto public utility"
supplying power to the two oil companies; (2) the power facility had its
own complex of buildings and separate supervision; and (3) power sta534. Eg., Beck Corp. v. NLRB, 590 F.2d 290, 292 (9th Cir. 1978); Pacific Southwest
Airlines v. NLRB, 587 F.2d at 1037.
535. Beck Corp. v. NLRB, 590 F.2d at 292; NLRB v. Retail Clerks Local 588, 587 F.2d
984, 987 (9th Cir. 1978); accord Banco Credito y Ahorro Ponceno v. NLRB, 390 F.2d 110,
112 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 832 (1968).
536. Pacific Southwest Airlines v. NLRB, 587 F.2d at 1038.
537. NLRB v. Albert Van Luit & Co., 597 F.2d 681, 686 n.3 (9th Cir. 1979).
538. Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers, Local 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. at
172-73.
539. Pacific Southwest Airlines v. NLRB, 587 F.2d at 1038; see also, e.g., Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 146, 153 (1941); NLRB v. Big Three Indus., 602 F.2d 898, 903
n.5 (9th Cir. 1979) (survey period case); NLRB v. Retail Clerks Local 588, 587 F.2d at 987;
see supra note 487 and accompanying text for additional authority.
540. 625 F.2d 223 (9th Cir. 1980).
541. Id. at 225.
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tion employees generally had prior experience in powerhouse work,
and were never temporarily exchanged with the employer's other
North Slope employees.5 42 Although there was merit to the employer's
contention that one unit for all the North Slope employees would better
serve the needs of both employees and employer, the court sustained
the Board's unit certification because the evidence in the record supported the Board's finding that the power station employees shared a
community of interest. Thus the bargaining unit was not
inappropriate.543
Board certification of a subunit of a larger group of employees was
also challenged as inappropriate by the employer in NLRB v. J. Penney Co., Store No. 29-9.5" In J.C. Penney, the department store employer consisted of a main store and an automobile center. The Board
545
certified the employees of the automobile center as a bargaining unit.
The Ninth Circuit sustained the Board's certification of the employees as a separate bargaining unit because of the substantial evidence which supported the Board's finding that they shared a
community ofinterest apart from the other employees. Facts in the record supporting the Board's conclusion included (1) the automobile
center employees were all skilled in the sale and installation of automobile parts, while the other employees were involved in the sale of a wide
range of other consumer goods; (2) the automobile center employees
worked longer hours, though all employees received the same fringe
benefits; (3) little temporary or permanent transfer between the two
groups of employees occurred; (4) all automobile center work, other
than the storage of excess parts, was conducted at the automobile
center, located 100-200 feet from the main store; and (5) there was no
indication that the other employees sought union representation, nor
any history of collective bargaining between the employer and its
employees. 54
542. Id. at 226.
543. Id.
544. 620 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1980).
545. Id. at 719.
546. Id. at 720; see also NLRB v. Retail Clerks Local 588, 587 F.2d at 987-88 (unit of
drug store employees carved out from employees of a chain of combination food and drug
stores not inappropriate).
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C. Recognition without an Election: Bargaining Orders5 47

IV. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
. The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith

Sections 8(a)(5) and 8(b)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA), taken together, impose a continuing mutual duty on an employer and the representative of a majority of its employees to "bargain
collectively. 5 48 Both sections make it an unfair labor practice to refuse
to bargain in good faith. The definition of good faith collective bargaining was embodied in section 8(d) twelve years after the 1935 enactment of the NLRA.549 No static definition of "good faith" has been
developed,5 50 and the Board and the courts approach "good faith"

questions on a case by case basis.5 51

547. Seesupra notes 197-221 and accompanying text in Part I: ADMINIST RTION OF THE
AcT.
548. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976) was included in
the original Wagner Act passed in 1935, and made it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees." National Labor Relations Act § 8(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3) (1976), which makes it an unfair
labor practice for a labor organization to "refuse to bargain collectively with an employer,"
was not enacted until the NLRA was amended by the Taft-Hartley Act (the Labor Management Relations Act) in 1947.
549. National Labor Relations Act § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976), defines collective
bargaining as
the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of
the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment,. . . but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a
concession ....
550. ABA, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, 83-97 (Supp. 1976) [hereinafter cited as DEVELOPING LABOR LAW]. In its first Annual Report, the Board discussed some guidelines of
good faith:
Collective bargaining is something more than the mere meeting of an employer
with the representatives of his employees; the essential thing is rather the serious
intent to adjust differences and to reach an acceptable common ground... . The
Board has repeatedly asserted that good faith on the part of the employer is an
essential ingredient of collective bargaining.
1 NLRB ANN. REP.85-86 (1936).
551. DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 550, at 83. Courts have, of course, attempted
to define "good faith" in the course of their opinions. For example, the Fourth Circuit in
NLRB v. Highland Park Mfg., 110 F.2d 632, 637 (4th Cir. 1940), regarded good faith as
requiring that the parties "negotiate in good faith with the view of reaching an agreement if
possible." See also NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 152 (1956) ("While Congress did
not compel agreement. . . .it
did require collective bargaining, in the hope that agreements
would result."); NLRB v. Southwestern Porcelain Steel Corp., 317 F.2d 527, 528 (10th Cir.
1963) (parties may not come to the bargaining table with a "predetermined position not to
bargain"); NLRB v. Herman Sausage Co., 275 F.2d 229, 231-32 (5th Cir. 1960) (tactics employed while bargaining made collective bargaining futile; there must be an attempt to reach
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1. Indicia of good and bad faith
a. su face bargaining/dilatorytactics

Surface bargaining and dilatory tactics during negotiations have
been recognized by the Board and courts as evidence of bad faith,552
though neither alone is sufficient to demonstrate aper se violation of

the Act.553 Although these activities embrace different concepts, they
overlap to some extent. Surface bargaining means going through the
554
motions of bargaining without intending to reach an agreement.
of unreasonable delays or
Dilatory tactics, on the other hand, consist
55

tactics calculated to frustrate bargaining.s

During the survey period, in Clear Pine Mouldings, Inc. v.
NLRB,5 5 6 the Ninth Circuit found the employer's refusal to make

counterproposals a dilatory tactic, and therefore affirmed a Board findan agreement); NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 133 F.2d 676, 686 (9th Cir. 1943) (the
parties must meet with a present intention to find a basis for agreement); Globe Cotton Mills
v. NLRB, 103 F.2d 91, 94 (5th Cir. 1939) (good faith requires the entering "into discussion
with an open and fair mind, and a sincere purpose to find a basis of agreement.").
552. DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 550, at 84-85.
553. As the number of incidents of surface bargaining or dilatory tactics increase, so does
their "persuasiveness" as indicators of the lack of good faith. Cox, The Duty to Bargainin
GoodFaith, 71 HARV. L. lv. 1401, 1421 (1958). It should be emphasized that the § 8(d)
requirement to bargain in good faith does not compel the parties to reach an agreement.
NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 402 (1952) (explaining the statutory language of § 8(d)).
554. For examples of surface bargaining in the Ninth Circuit, see NLRB v. West Coast
Casket Co., 469 F.2d 871, 874-75 (9th Cir. 1972) (the cancellation of many meetings, refusal
to return phone calls, and failure to provide counterproposals until long after promised,
showed a "lack of. . . 'spirit" and was therefore a § 8(a)(5) violation); NLRB v. Holmes
Tuttle Broadway Ford, Inc., 465 F.2d 717, 718-19 (9th Cir. 1972) (although bargaining sessions were held, employer, who made only stylistic or typographical objections to a proposed
contract, proposed a contract with a seven-week span, and insisted on the right to withdraw
his contract proposals at any time, held to be engaging in a "cat and mouse game" and not
hard bargaining); see also NLRB v. My Store, Inc., 345 F.2d 494, 498 (7th Cir.) (refusal to
bargain on wages based on job classifications, failure to supply information, delay in making
counteroffers, and failure to reach any substantial agreements held to indicate surface bargaining), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 927 (1965).
555. See, e.g., Inter-Polymer Indus., 196 N.L.R.B. 729, 761-62 (1972) (employer representatives' delaying meetings, discussing irrelevant experiences, offering irrelevant counterproposals, shifting positions, forcing proposals or marathon bargaining sessions, and
insisting on the location of meetings held to be dilatory tactics); see also General Motors
Acceptance Corp. v. NLRB, 476 F.2d 850, 855 (1st Cir. 1973) (insistence that union come to
New York for meetings and the scheduling of only a few meetings held to be dilatory conduct); NLRB v. Southwestern Porcelain Steel Corp., 317 F.2d 527, 530 (10th Cir. 1963)
(unreasonable delays in scheduling meetings considered dilatory conduct); NLRB v. Vander
Wal, 316 F.2d 630, 633 (9th Cir. 1963) (procrastination in execution of written agreement
declared a dilatory tactic).
556. 632 F.2d 721 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 984 (1981).
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ing of a section 8(a)(5) violation for actions tantamount to a refusal to
bargain. In ClearPine, the employer delayed making any counterproposals for five months after negotiations began, until the conclusion of

negotiations between the union and the employer's competitors. 7
The court, while speaking in terms of dilatory tactics, often used
language associated with surface bargaining, and took into consideration the company's dilatory actions together with the bargaining table
conduct.55 8 This case presents a good example of the interplay between
surface bargaining and dilatory tactics, for the employer used the tactic
of surface bargaining to delay agreement until its competitors had
reached agreements.
b. proposalsanddemands

The Ninth Circuit has held that the content of bargaining proposals is relevant in determining bad faith. The Board must take "some
cognizance of the reasonableness of the position taken . . . in the

course of bargaining negotiations. 5 5 9 However, this principle must be
read in light of the section 8(d) mandate that bargaining in good faith

does not require the agreement to any proposals or the making of any
concessions. 6 °
557. Id at 727. The employer's bad faith was further indicated because his only proposal
was a sketchy agreement he knew would be unacceptable. Id at 729. The employer never
presented concrete counterproposals, but only "complained of having to negotiate prior to
its competitors." Id The employer made no economic proposals until learning of competitors' wage settlements. Id at 728.
558. Id at 728-29. Initially, the court spoke of "hard" bargaining, a term associated with
surface bargaining.
559. NLRB v. Holmes Tuttle Broadway Ford, Inc., 465 F.2d 717, 719 (9th Cir. 1972)
(quoting NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131, 134 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 346
U.S. 887 (1953)).
560. For text of § 8(d), see supra note 549. The Board cannot "emasculate and render
ineffective Section 8(d)... by an arbitrary finding that the Company had a 'bad state of
mind' or 'improper motivation,' simply because [the Board] disapproved of the Company's
proposals." Gulf State Mfg., Inc. v. NLRB, 579 F.2d 1298, 1326 (5th Cir. 1978). The Ninth
Circuit has also followed this rule:
We may also assume arguendo that in certain exceptional cases the extreme or
bizarre character of a party's proposals may give rise to a persuasive inference that
they were made only as a delaying tactic or that they should be viewed as a facade
concealing an intention to avoid reaching any agreement .... We believe, however, that such a principle, if accepted at all, must be narrowly restricted. Otherwise, the policy supporting section 8(d).. . would be impermissibly undermined.
NLRB v. MacMillan Ring-Free Oil Co., 394 F.2d 26,29 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 914
(1968); see also H.K. Porter v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 108 (1970) (allowing Board to compel
agreement when parties are unable to agree would violate the fundamental premise upon
which the Act is based-private bargaining under governmental supervision, without any
official compulsion over the contractual terms); NLRB v. Tomco Communications, Inc., 567
F.2d 871, 884 (9th Cir. 1978) (a strong company's refusal to succumb to a weak union's
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In ClearPineMouldings,Inc. v. NLRB, 56 1 the employer's only proposal was made with the knowledge that it would be found unacceptable.5 62 The Board held that the employer engaged in bad faith

dilatory bargaining, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The employer's
offer of a clearly unacceptable proposal was an important factor in confinding of dilatory bargaining was
vincing the court that the Board's 63
supported by substantial evidence.1

2. Per Se violations
a.

unilateralchanges

Unilateral changes by an employer in employment conditions

which are a mandatory subject of bargaining have been regarded asper
se violations of section 8(a)(5).s

4

The Ninth Circuit, in NLRB v. Sky

Wolf Sales,561 held that the employer's unilateral initiation of wage increases and dependent health benefits on its own terms violated section
8(a)(5).566
In Clear Pine Mouldings, Inc. v. NLRB,5 67 the Ninth Circuit held
that a unilateral health plan change made by the employer was aperse

refusal to bargain.

68

The court, while recognizing that pressures by

economic weapons and company's use of this advantage to restrain as many rights as possible not inconsistent with statutory duty to bargain in good faith).
561. 632 F.2d 721 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S 984 (1981).
562. The Board decision relied on the unacceptable proposal as an indicium of bad faith.
See Clear Pine Mouldings, Inc., 238 N.L.R.B. 69 (1978).
563. 632 F.2d at 729.
564. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743 (1962). In Katz, the Court did not expressly hold
that unilateral action was aperse violation. However, the Court did hold that:
Unilateral action by an employer without prior discussion with the union does
amount to a refusal to negotiate about the affected conditions of employment
under negotiation, and must of necessity obstruct bargaining, contrary to the congressional policy ... It follows that the Board may hold such unilateral action to
be an unfair labor practice in violation of § 8(a)(5), without also finding the employer guilty of over-all subjective bad faith.
Id at 747; see also Electri-Flex Co. v. NLRB, 570 F.2d 1327, 1332-38 (7th Cir.) (unilateral
implementation of written warning disciplinary system, call-in rule, and 60-day probationary period heldper se violations of § 8(a)(5)), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 911 (1978); NLRB v.
Tom Joyce Floors, Inc., 353 F.2d 768, 772 (9th Cir. 1965) (new wage program, unilaterally
implemented, constitutes failure to bargain in good faith without reference to subjective
motive of employer). Note, however, that unilateral changes in conditions may also be indicative of bad faith analysis separate and apart from per se analysis. See DEVELOPING
LABOR LAW,

supra note 550, at 323.

565. 470 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1972).
566. Id at 830.
567. 632 F.2d 721 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 984 (1981).
568. Id at 729-30. During months of delay, and a month and one-half long strike, the
employer failed to submit substantive proposals. It finally presented a package proposing a
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health and welfare trustees created a dilemma for the company, stated
that it could not "condone Clear Pine's conduct in offering to negotiate
about a plan that it had, in fact, already unilaterally adopted. 5 69 Because the company chose to act alone, the court affirmed the Board's
finding of sections 8(a)(5) and 8(a)(1) violations.5 7 0
b.

refusalto execute a written agreement

Collective bargaining, under the good faith definition of section
8(d), includes the obligation to execute, upon request by either party, a
written agreement embodying oral agreements reached during negotiations. 7 The refusal to do so is considered a refusal to bargain and a
per se violation of section 8(a)(5).5 72 The Supreme Court, in NLRB v.
Strong,5 73 found that an employer, seeking to withdraw from a multi-

employer group after an agreement had been reached, had violated section 8(a)(5) by refusing repeated demands to sign the contract.5 74 The
Court thus extended the section 8(d) execution obligation to agree-

ments negotiated on a party's behalf prior to its withdrawal from a bargaining organization.57 5
During the survey period, in NLRB v. Electra-FoodMachinery,
Inc. ,576 the employer justified its refusal to execute an oral agreement

by contending that the union constitution prohibited an agreed upon
open shop clause.5 77 The court rejected this argument, reasoning that

internal union matters do not relieve an employer from its bargaining
obligation.5 7

The court further reasoned that permitting "critical ex-

health and welfare plan and an eight percent wage increase which had been implemented
two weeks prior to the proposal. Id
569. Id at 730. The dilemma was created because the trustees of the health and welfare
plans refused to accept contributions that did not meet industry settlement standards. Id at
726-27. The court, therefore, took into account the decision the company had to make, but
concluded that the company should have presented a health and welfare plan to the union
and then should have negotiated it with them before adopting it. Id at 730.
570. Id
571. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976) provides in pertinent part that: "to bargain collectively is
the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the
employees. . . [to] execut[e] a written contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party, but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal ...
572. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976); see supra note 548.
573. 393 U.S. 357 (1969).
574. Id at 359. The Court also held that the NLRB had the power to require payment of
fringe benefits in the collective bargaining agreement. Id at 360.
575. Id at 359-61.
576. 621 F.2d 956 (9th Cir. 1980).
577. Id at 957.
578. Id at 958 (citing NLRB v. Cheese Barn, Inc., 558 F.2d 526, 529-30 (9th Cir. 1977)
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amination" of union constitutions by employers would be offensive.

3. The duty to furnish information
An employer is obligated to furnish requested information needed
by the collective bargaining representative for the proper performance
of its duties."' In NLRB v. Truitt Manufacturing Co.,18 for example,
the Supreme Court held that the Board could consider an employer's
refusal to furnish financial information during the course of wage increase negotiations as indicative of bad faith. 82 The facts of the case
determine the relevancy of the information. As the information becomes more important to the representative, because of the issues
raised in collective bargaining, the employer's duty to furnish it becomes mandatory. 83
The Ninth Circuit, in San Diego Newspaper Guild Local 95 v.

NLAB, 58 4 recognized the employer's duty to provide requested information when the union would not be able to bargain meaningfully
without it.585 The court also discussed the burdens of proving the rele-

vance of the requested information to the bargaining process. When
(members of union have right to decide on the extent of authority of their bargaining unit);
Houchens Mkt. of Elizabethtown, Inc. v. NLRB, 375 F.2d 208, 211-12 (6th Cir. 1967)).
579. 621 F.2d at 958 (citing Stelling v. IBEW, 587 F.2d 1379, 1388-89 (9th Cir. 1978)
(absent bad faith, constitutional provision subject only to union scrutiny), cert. denied sub
nom. Darby v. IBEW, 442 U.S. 944 (1979); Adams Potato Chips, Inc. v. NLRB, 430 F.2d 90,
92 (6th Cir. 1970) (employer refused to sign based on a vacation clause), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 975 (1971); Vestal v. Hoffa, 451 F.2d 706, 709 (6th Cir. 1971) (court will not interfere
with fair and reasonable interpretation of union constitution by union officials), cert. denied,
406 U.S. 934 (1972)).
580. E.g., NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 435-36 (1967); NLRB v. Western
Wirebound Box Co., 356 F.2d 88, 92 (9th Cir. 1966).
581. 351 U.S. 149 (1956).
582. Id at 152.
Good faith bargaining necessarily requires that claims made by either bargainer
should be honest claims. This is true about an asserted inability to pay an increase
in wages. If such an argument is important enough to present in the give and take
of bargaining, it is important enough to require some sort of proof of its accuracy.. . . [A] refusal to attempt to substantiate a claim of inability to pay increased wages may support a finding of a failure to bargain in good faith.
Id at 152-53.
583. Id at 153-54; see also NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 435-36 (1967) ("no
question" of employer's duty to provide information for the carrying out of the duties of the
bargaining representative).
584. 548 F.2d 863 (9th Cir. 1977).
585. Id at 866-67. However, simply because the information requested is relevant, it
does not follow that all failures to produce are unlawful refusals to bargain. See, e.g.,
NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 153-54 (1956) ("Each case must turn upon its particular facts.") (footnote omitted); Shell Oil Co. v. NLRB, 457 F.2d 615, 618 (9th Cir. 1972)
(failure to produce relevant evidence is not aperse violation).
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the information relates to a subject at the core of the employee-em-

ployer relationship, such as wages, the presumption is that the information is relevant, and the burden is on the employer to show its
irrelevancy.5 6 When the information is not clearly relevant, the union
must show its relevance.58 7 The circuits are in general agreement about
the duty to provide relevant information.5 8
During the survey period, in NLB v. Silver Spur Casino,58 9 the
Ninth Circuit upheld the Board's decision that an employer's refusal to

furnish the union a copy of a new insurance plan violated section
8(a)(5). The employer in Silver Spur unilaterally implemented a new
insurance program.5 90

Because insurance benefits are a mandatory

subject of collective bargaining,59 1 information about the new plan was
clearly relevant to negotiations.
4. Impasse

It is well established that an employer's withdrawal from a multiemployer unit after the commencement of bargaining is a breach of the
duty to bargain in good faith and violates section 8(a)(5).192 However,

such a withdrawal during the course of negotiations may be permitted
if an "unusual circumstance" exists.59 3 An impasse in negotiations be-

tween the union and part of the employer group is an "unusual circum586. 548 F.2d at 867; see, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 412 F.2d 77, 84 (2d Cir.)
(information of names and addresses of unit members held presumptively relevant), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 928 (1969). But see Emeryville Research Center, Shell Dev.Co. v. NLRB,
441 F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 1971) (bona fide objection to form in which information is requested along with offers to meet needs in a mutually satisfactory form shifts burden to
union to show relevancy of desired information).
587. 548 F.2d at 867; see NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 435-36 (1967) (information requested by union concerning employer's movement of machinery was necessary
for the performance of the union's representative duties).
588. See, e.g., NLRB v. Pearl Bookbinding Co., 517 F.2d 1108, 1'113 (Ist Cir. 1975) (list
of employee addresses held relevant and necessary due to union's inability to communicate
through handbills); United Aircraft Corp. v. NLRB, 434 F.2d 1198, 1204-05 (2d Cir. 1970)
(refusal by employer to give home addresses of employees who were widely dispersed held
violation of § 8(a)(5)), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 993 (1971).
589. 623 F.2d 571 (9th Cir. 1980), cer. denied, 451 U.S. 906 (1981).
590. Id at 583.
591. Id
592. See, e.g., McAx Sign Co. v. NLRB, 576 F.2d 62, 67-68 (5th Cir. 1978) ("The Board
has repeatedly held that withdrawal from a multi-employer bargaining unit is untimely if
attempted after the commencement of negotiations.") (citing NLRB v. Tulsa Sheet Metal
Works, Inc., 367 F.2d 55, 57 (10th Cir. 1966); NLRB v. Sheridan Creations, Inc., 357 F.2d
245, 248 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1005 (1967); NLRB v. Sklar, 316 F.2d 145, 150
(6th Cir. 1963)), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1116 (1979).
593. NLRB v. Associated Shower Door Co., 512 F.2d 230,232 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 423
U.S. 893 (1975).
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stance" which may warrant an employer's withdrawal.594
During the survey period, in Authorized Air Conditioning Co. v.
NLR B,5 95 the employer attempted to justify its withdrawal during ne-

gotiations from a multiemployer bargaining unit by alleging an impasse in negotiations. The Ninth Circuit sustained the Board's finding

that there was no evidence of any impasse and held that the withdrawal
was therefore an unfair labor practice.59 6

5. Defenses to the duty to bargain
a

construction industryproviso

An employer must bargain collectively with a union selected by a
majority of workers. 597 An employer may not grant exclusive recogniticsn to a union that has not obtained majority recognition. 598 However,
an employer in the building and construction industry will not be
found to have committed an unfair labor practice if, in reliance on section 8(f) of the Act, it enters into a prehire agreement with a union that
has not attained majority status prior to the execution of the agreement. 599 In NLAB v. Local 103, InternationalAssociation of Bridge

Workers,6c ° the Supreme Court held that an employer does not commit
an unfair labor practice under section 8(a)(5) by refusing to honor a

prehire agreement if the union fails to establish in the unfair labor
594. See, e.g., NLRB v. Associated Shower Door Co., 512 F.2d 230, 232 (9th Cir.) (impasse during negotiations is defense to unfair labor practice charges for single employer's
withdrawal during negotiations), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 893 (1975); NLRB v. Hi-Way Billboards, Inc., 500 F.2d 181, 184 (5th Cir. 1974) (no unfair labor practice where company
employer refused to accept agreement made with a multiemployer unit after the employer
had withdrawn from unit during an impasse); NLRB v. Beck Engraving Co., 522 F.2d 475,
482 (3d Cir. 1975) (selective strike does not create per se unusual circumstance allowing
withdrawal, but if unusual circumstance exists, withdrawal would be valid); NLRB v. Acme
Wire Works, Inc., 582 F.2d 153, 156-57 (2d Cir. 1978) (finding of impasse would justify
withdrawal during negotiations though the court found no impasse in this case); Fairmont
Foods Co. v. NLRB, 471 F.2d 1170, 1172-73 (8th Cir. 1972) (withdrawal held timely since
"irreconcilable differences" had been reached). But cf Bill Cook Buick, Inc., 224 N.L.R.B.
1094, 1096 (1976) (impasse not unusual circumstance).
595. 606 F.2d 899 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 950 (1980).
596. Id at 906-07.
597. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976); see supra note 548.
598. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976); ILGWU v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731, 738 (1961).
599. 29 U.S.C. § 158(t) (1976). Section 158(f) provides in part: "It shall not be an unfair
labor practice... for an employer engaged primarily in the building and construction industry to make an agreement.., with a labor organization... because... the majority
status of such labor organization has not been established.... ." Section 158(f) was added
to the NLRA in a 1959 amendment under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act. Pub. L. No. 86-257, § 705(a), 73 Stat. 545.
600. 434 U.S. 335 (1978).
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practice proceeding that it ever had majority support.6 °1
During the survey period, in Authorized Air Conditioning Co. v.

NLRB, 6°2 a majority of employees became union members after a

prehire agreement was entered into. 60 3 The employer attempted to jus-

tify its refusal to honor the agreement by asserting the union's lack of
majority support. 6° However, the court held that a rebuttable presumption of the union's majority status was created once a majority of
the employer's employees joined the union. The employer could not
overcome the presumption and base its defense for refusing to bargain
upon a lack of majority support.6 °5
b.

waiver

Although the NLRA requires that an employer collectively bargain with its employees "in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of
employment, or other conditions of employment, ' 60 6 the Supreme
Court, in NLRB v. Columbian Enameling& Stamping Co.,607 held that
an employer is not required to seek out the employees or their repre60 8
sentatives for their participation in the collective bargaining process.
A corollary to this rule is that when a union has sufficiently clear and
timely notice of an employer's plans to change conditions which are
subject to bargaining, but makes no protest or effort to bargain, it
waives its right to bargain.60 9 The Ninth Circuit observed these rules in
NLRB v.Johnson,610 where it held that a letter describing changes in
employment, presented as afait accompli, was not proper notice. The
601. Id at 345.
602. 606 F.2d 899 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 950 (1980).
603. Id at 905.
604. Id
605. Id at 906.
606. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976).
607. 306 U.S. 292 (1939).
608. Id at 297.
609. See, e.g., ILGWU v. NLRB, 463 F.2d 907, 918 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (no waiver based on
union's "suspicion or conjecture" that relocation would take place); NLRB v. Spun-Jee
Corp., 385 F.2d 379, 383-84 (2d Cir. 1967) (employer's statement concerning possibility of
moving and subcontracting held to be sufficient notice; union's failure to take action held to
be a waiver); NLRB v. Rapid Bindery, Inc., 293 F.2d 170, 176 (2d Cir. 1961) (conjecture or
rumor not adequate substitute for employer's notice of change in working conditions; no
waiver by union). Unilateral changes in conditions which are subject to bargaining without
prior notice by an employer areper se unfair labor practices. See supra notes 564-70 and
accompanying text.
610. 368 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1966). An employer decided to stop using its own union
employees to install carpeting, and began using outside laborers as part of a contracting out
agreement. The court found that this change in working conditions was a mandatory subject of bargaining, and discussed the waiver issue in a footnote. Id at 551 n.l.
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union, which did not act, was deemed not to have waived its right to

bargain.l
During the survey period, in Sun Maid Growers v. NLRB, 6 12 the
employer fired three employees after denying rumors that it intended to
replace them. 3 The employer knew the rumors were true.614 After
the employer fired the employees, it refused to discuss the firings with a

union representative, 1 5 claiming that because the union failed to request the employer to bargain on its decision to replace the employees,
it had waived its bargaining rights. 6

The court, without elaboration,

found the employer's contention meritless6

7

6. Loss of union's majority status
Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA requires that an employer bargain
with the representative selected by a majority of its employees.61
Within a reasonable time after certification or voluntary recognition of
the union, the employer may rebut the union's presumption of majority
status 19 and assert the loss of majority status as a defense to the duty
to bargain. 2°
611. Id.; Sf NLRB v. Spun-Jee Corp., 385 F.2d 379, 383-84 (2d Cir. 1967) (employer's
statement of intention to change conditions sufficient as formal notice to union).
612. 618 F.2d 56 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
613. Id at 58.
614. Id
615. Id.
616. Id at 59.
617. Id (citing ILGWU v. NLRB, 463 F.2d 907 (D.C. Cir. 1972)).
618. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976). 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976) requires that the bargaining
representative be designated or selected by the majority of the employees. Thus, the employer is only required to bargain with a union which has the majority backing of its employees. In an unfair labor practice case alleging a § 8(a)(5) violation, the General Counsel
must show that the union represented a majority of the employees of the bargaining unit at
the time the employer refused to bargain. NLRB v. Tahoe Nugget, Inc., 584 F.2d 293, 297
(9th Cir. 1978), ceri. denied, 442 U.S. 921 (1979).
619. The reasonable time, absent unusual circumstances, is usually one year. NLRB v.
Tahoe Nugget, Inc., 584 F.2d at 297; NLRB v. Lee Office Equip., 572 F.2d 704,706 (9th Cir.
1978).
620. The union's majority status is irrebuttably presumed for one year. After one year,
the presumption becomes rebuttable. NLRB v. Tahoe Nugget, Inc., 584 F.2d at 297. Thus,
after the one year period, if an employer can rebut the presumption of majority status, the
loss of majority is a valid defense. To rebut the presumption, a "clear, cogent, and convincing" showing must be made by the employer that the union's status was no longer a majority, or that the employer had a good faith reasonable doubt as to majority support at the
time of refusal to bargain. Id at 297; see also Pioneer Inn Assocs. v. NLRB, 578 F.2d 835,
839 (9th Cir. 1978) (reasonable good faith doubt must be based on objective evidence and
must be "clear, cogent, and convincing") (quoting NLRB v. Tragniew, Inc., 470 F.2d 669,
674-75 (9th Cir. 1972)); NLRB v. Vegas Vic, Inc., 546 F.2d 828, 829 (9th Cir. 1976) (em-
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The Ninth Circuit addressed a union's loss of majority status as a
defense in NLRB v. Tahoe Nugget, Inc.6 2 The employers in Tahoe
Nugget asserted two defenses: (1) objective facts sufficient to support a
reasonable doubt as to the union's majority support, and (2) the employers' good faith belief that the union had lost majority support.6 22
The Ninth Circuit held the "good faith" defense was satisfied as long as
the employer was aware of "facts manifesting lack of union support
and employer misconduct did not contribute to the loss of support. 6 23
The employers argued that by withdrawing from the multiemployer
unit, the presumption of majority support should cease because recognition was based only on majority support within the larger unit.6 24 In
rejecting this argument, the court reasoned that the employers' voluntary conduct in joining the multiemployer unit amounted to a declaration that a majority of its employees favored the union.625 Also
important to the court was the policy of industrial peace, which would
be undermined if single employers could negate a union's majority sup626
port presumption by withdrawal from multiemployer units.
The court upheld the Board's determination that the employers'
evidence was insufficient to rebut the presumption, irrespective of
whether the points raised were examined singly or cumulatively.627
The court held that because of the subjectivity and ambiguity of some
of the evidence, more reliable evidence of lost support had to be shown
before a unilateral break in the bargaining relationship could be
condoned. 62
During the survey period, in NLRB v. CardaHotels, Inc. 629 and
NLRB v. Sierra Development Co. ,630 the Ninth Circuit summarily enployer must show refusal to bargain predicated on "reasonably grounded good faith doubt
of majority support"), cer. denied, 434 U.S. 818 (1977).
621. 584 F.2d 293 (9th Cir. 1978). In 1959, a multiemployer association was established
as a voluntary unit. The defendant employers later joined the association and recognized
the union as the bargaining representative although no election was ever held in the defendant employers' single unit or in the multiemployer unit. The employers then withdrew from
the multiemployer association and refused to bargain. Id at 296.
622. Id at 298.
623. Id at 300.
624. Id at 302.
625. Id at 303.
626. Id at 303-04.
627. Id at 304-08. The factors were employee discontent, turnover, union inactivity, low
membership, financial difficulties of the union, bargaining history, and admissions. Id at
304-05.
628. Id at 308.
629. 604 F.2d 605 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
630. 604 F.2d 606 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
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forced Board orders rejecting the employers' claims of lack of majority
status as a defense to their refusal to bargain. 63 Both cases arose from
the same factual setting as in Tahoe Nugget and in Sahara-TahoeCorp.

v. NR0B, 632 and the court therefore rejected identical arguments to the
effect that withdrawal from a multiemployer group was justified by a
good faith reasonable doubt.633
In NLRB v. Silver Spur Casino,6 34 the court again addressed em-

ployers' defenses of loss of union majority status against a charge of
refusal to bargain.635 In Silver Spur, the employers alternatively asserted good faith reasonable doubt and actual loss of majority. 636 The

employers argued that the presumption of majority support should not
survive the employer's withdrawal from a multiemployer unit.637 The
court, however, reaffirmed its holding in Tahoe Nugget that the presumption survives the employer's withdrawal, noting that the presumption is grounded in the policy of industrial peace as well as in
probability. 638 The court, noting that the evidence did not differ materially from that considered in TahoeNugget and Sahara-Tahoe,upheld
the Board's finding that the employer failed to establish good faith reasonable doubt because the evidence on the record introduced by the
employers presented only an equivocal inference of loss of majority
support.639 The court also rejected arguments that there had been an
actual loss of majority status by the union. As to one of the employers,
the court simply affirmed the Board's finding that the evidence fell
short of actually proving lost support."' The other employers argued
that the Board's disallowance of certain evidence" and quashing of a
subpoena of a Board field examiner" 2 precluded a showing of actual
majority loss, and that the case, therefore, should be remanded. How631. CardaHotels, 604 F.2d at 606; SierraDevelopment, 604 F.2d at 607.
632. 581 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917 (1979).
633. 604 F.2d at 606-07.
634. 623 F.2d 571 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 906 (1981).
635. Id at 576. The employers were, as in Tahoe Nugget, members of the Reno Employers Council. The employers in this case withdrew, and subsequently told the union they
would negotiate new individual collective bargaining agreements. The union accordingly
filed § 8(a)(5) charges and the Board ordered the employers to bargain.
636. Id at 576, 578-79.
637. Id at 577.
638. Id at 578; accord NLRB v. Sierra Dev. Co., 604 F.2d 606, 606-07 (9th Cir. 1979)
(per curiam); NLRB v. Carda Hotels, Inc., 604 F.2d 605, 605-06 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam);
Sahara-Tahoe Corp. v. NLRB, 581 F.2d 767,771 (9th Cir.), cert.denied, 442 U.S. 917 (1979).
639. 623 F.2d at 579.
640. Id
641. Id at 580.
642. Id at 579-80.

LOYOLA OFLOS ANGELES LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 14

ever, the court upheld the Board's actionsfr43
The employers also argued that the Board had demanded more
evidence than should be required to rebut the presumption. 644 They
asserted that other circuits have found the presumption rebutted upon
similar or weaker evidence than in their case.6 5 While accepting that
other circuits impose a lesser burden to rebut the presumption, the
court held, however, that the policies and46goals of the Act were best
served by the current Ninth Circuit view.
7. Dual employer operations: the "double breasted" issue
An employer may violate the section 8(a)(5) requirement to bargain in good faith by engaging in "double breasting," a practice in
which the employer, whose original company is bound by a collective
bargaining agreement, establishes additional or separate companies
and fails to include the separate companies' nonunion employees in the
collective bargaining agreement between the union and the established
unionized company.' 4 Such a situation occurred in South PrairieConstruction Co. v. Local 627, IUOE. 8 The Supreme Court delineated
the factors considered by the Board for a finding that two companies
are in actuality a "single employer."" 9 The factors, as developed in
Board decisions, consist of an "interrelation of operations," common
643. Id at 579-81. The employers tried to subpoena a Board field examiner to testify
concerning informal investigative material. The Board refused to permit this and the court
affirmed, finding a valid evidentiary privilege in "informal deliberations of all prosecutorial
agencies." Id at 580 (quoting Stephens Produce Co. v. NLRB, 515 F.2d 1373, 1376 n.l (8th
Cir. 1975)). The employers also sought to question a union agent to get records showing
actual union membership. The court found the introduction of this evidence unnecessary
because it would not have had enough weight, in light of the other evidence, to rebut the
presumption. 623 F.2d at 580-81.
644. Id at 581.
645. Id The employers cited twelve cases where the presumption of majority status was
deemed rebutted. Id at 581 n.9. Of these cases, the court felt that there were only three
cases in which other circuits could have found the presumption of majority support rebutted
upon similar or weaker evidence than in Silver Spur. They were W & W Steel Co. v. NLRB,
599 F.2d 934, 938-40 (10th Cir. 1979); Star Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 536 F.2d 1192, 1195 (7th Cir.
1976); and Ingress-Plastene, Inc. v. NLRB,430 F.2d 542, 546-47 (7th Cir. 1970).
646. 623 F.2d at 581.
647. See DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 550, at 196 and cases cited therein. Although the cases described therein resulted in findings of § 8(a)(5) violations, "double
breasting" may also result in an unfair labor practice violation under §§ 8(b)(1), 8(b)(3),
8(b)(4), 8(e), and 301. Id
648. 425 U.S. 800 (1976) (per curiam).
649. 1d at 801-02 n.3. The union filed suit alleging that §§ 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) were violated by the failure of South Prairie and Peter Kiewit Sons' Co. (both wholly owned subsidiaries of Peter Kiewit Sons', Inc.) to include the former as employees in the latter's collective
bargaining agreement with the union. Id
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management and ownership, and a centraloperation of labor-management relations.6 50 The court of appeals-found that the facts of the case
mandated a finding that the union and non-union companies should
have been considered as single employers, even though the Board had
held otherwise. The Supreme Court upheld this part of the appellate
court decision.65 '
The Ninth Circuit, in NLRB v. Don Burgess Construction Corp. ,652

applied the South Prairie criteria to two interconnected employers.
The court applied the four factors 653 but emphasized that no single factor was controlling, 654 nor was it necessary that all the factors be present in any one case.6 55 The court held that all four factors weighed
against the employers, and in taking the facts as a whole, that the two
companies comprised a single employer.656
In NLRB v. Lantz,657 the Ninth Circuit utilized a "double breasting" approach in finding that an employer's two companies were actually a single employer.6 5 The court rejected the employer's argument
and found evidence on the record that all the factors were present and
that the Board's finding should be upheld. 9
B.

The Subjects of Bargaining

1. Executive decisions
Section 8(d) of the Act places an obligation on the employer and
the representative of its employees to "confer in good faith with respect
650. Id at 802 n.3. "'[TIn determining the relevant employer, the Board considers several
nominally separate business entities to be a single employer where they comprise an integrated enterprise. The controlling criteria, set out and elaborated in Board decisions, are
interrelation of operations, common management, centralized control of labor relations and
common ownership."' 425 U.S. at 802 n.3 (quoting Radio Union v. Broadcast Service, 380
U.S. 255, 256 (1965)) (citation omitted).
651. 425 U.S. at 802-03.
652. 596 F.2d 378 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 940 (1979). The president of one employer entered a partnership with his carpentry foreman to operate a subcontracting
company.
653. Id at 385-86.
654. Id at 384 (citing NLRB v. Welcome-American Fertilizer Co., 443 F.2d 19, 21 (9th
Cir. 1971)).
655. 596 F.2d at 384. "Single employer status ultimately depends on 'all the circumstances of the case' and is characterized as an absence of an 'arm's length relationship found
among unintegrated companies."' Id (quoting Local 627, IUOE v. NLRB, 518 F.2d 1040,
1045-46 (D.C. Cir. 1975), mod,ed sub nom. South Prairie Constr. Co. v. Local 627, IUOE,
425 U.S. 800 (1976)).
656. 596 F.2d at 385-86.
657. 607 F.2d 290 (9th Cir. 1979).
658. Id at 295-98.
659. Id
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to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment." 660 In
NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corp.,661 the Supreme
Court held that it is lawful to insist upon matters within the scope of
charge may result if
these mandatory subjects. An unfair labor practice
662
there is a refusal to bargain over these subjects.

In FibreboardPaper Products Corp. v. NLRB,663 the Supreme
Court held that contracting out plant maintenance work previously
performed by unit employees is a mandatory subject of collective bargaining under the phrase "terms and conditions of employment. 664
Justice Stewart, in his concurring opinion, made an effort to clarify the
Court's decision. He emphasized that the Court was not holding that
an employer has a duty to bargain over "managerial decisions, which
lie at the core of entrepreneurial control," and concluded that while
subcontracting decisions are not "in themselves" conditions of employment, they may have the effect of terminating employment.665 Where
such an effect is present, subcontracting becomes a mandatory subject
of bargaining.
The Ninth Circuit, in NLRB v. TransmarineNavigation Corp.,666
held that a managerial decision to terminate a business was not a
mandatory subject of bargaining. 667 The company's decision to terminate its business and reinvest, based on changed economic conditions,
was purely managerial, and not a mandatory subject of collective bargaining. 668 The court indicated, however, that an employer is still obli660. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976).
661. 356 U.S. 342 (1958). The employer in this case insisted upon the inclusion of a
"ballot" clause, requiring a pre-strike secret vote of employees as to the employer's last offer,
and a "recognition" clause, excluding a previously certified international union and substituting an uncertified local. Id at 343-44. The Court held that because neither clause fell
within the ambit of § 8(d)'s "wages, hours, and conditions of employment," they were not
mandatory subjects and, therefore, could not be insisted upon. Id at 349-50. The employer
seeking "ballot" and "recognition" clauses could only propose, not insist upon, such subjects. Id
662. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976).
663. 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
664. Id at 210-13.
665. Id at 223-24 (Stewart, J., concurring).
666. 380 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1967).
667. Id at 939.
668. Id The Transmarinecourt found the factual situation presented in Fibreboarddistinguishable. The court surveyed a number of other circuits for their interpretations of
Fibreboardand approved the approach taken in the Third and Eighth Circuits. Id at 93740. Compare NLRB v. William J. Burns Int'l Detective Agency, Inc., 346 F.2d 897, 902-03
(8th Cir. 1965) (unilateral decision to terminate a branch office, with no anti-union sentiment, held not a mandatory subject of bargaining) and NLRB v. Royal Plating & Polishing
Co., 350 F.2d 191, 196 (3d Cir. 1965) (decision to close plant for economic reasons involving
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gated to notify the union of a managerial decision to allow the union
to bargain over the rights of employees affected by the
an opportunity
6 69
decision.

During the survey period, in NLRB v. InternationalHarvester
CO. ,670 the Ninth Circuit held that the employer's decision to transfer
executives as part of a marketing reorganization (causing the closure of
several branch offices) was not a mandatory subject of bargaining because the decision "involved the sale of significant assets, fundamental
changes in marketing structure, and a significant reallocation of capital. '671 The court, as in Transmarine, qualified the employer's lack of
duty to bargain by stating that the employer was still bound to bargain
over employee rights altered by the decision.672

2. Health plans
Health plans are included in the area of mandatory subjects of
bargaining. 673 During the survey period, in ClearPine Mouldings, Inc.
V.NLRB, 674 the Ninth Circuit upheld the Board's finding of an unfair
labor practice resulting from the company's implementation of a new
health and welfare plan without the union's knowledge. 675 The employer argued that implementation of the new plan was not unilateral
because the union had notice, that it was entitled to act because it had
a major change in the economic direction of the company held not a mandatory subject of
bargaining) with NLRB v. American Mfg. Co. of Texas, 351 F.2d 74, 80 (5th Cir. 1965)
(anti-union motivation in subcontracting without notice to union held mandatory, in accordance with decision announced in Fibrebroard)and NLRB v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 361
F.2d 512, 516-17 (5th Cir.) (discontinuance of certain operations for economic reasons held
subject to mandatory bargaining, under American Manufacturing),cert. denied, 385 U.S. 935
(1966). The court, in distinguishing the two Fifth Circuit cases, pointed out that anti-union
sentiment is the key factor. 380 F.2d at 938.
669. Id at 939;'see also NLRB v. Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 350 F.2d 191, 196 (3d
Cir. 1965) (employer faced with economic necessity of moving or consolidating operations
under no duty to bargain over the decision, but must bargain over rights of affected employees); NLRB v. Rapid Bindery, Inc., 293 F.2d 170, 176 (2d Cir. 1961) (decision to relocate
held not mandatory subject because it was clearly within management discretion, but effects
of relocation must be bargained over).
670. 618 F.2d 85 (9th Cir. 1980).
671. Id at 87.
672. Id at 88.
673. NLRB v. Sir James, Inc., 446 F.2d 570, 570 (9th Cir. 1971) (per curiam) (early unilateral discontinuance of health and welfare payments an unfair labor practice); Hinson v.
NLRB, 428 F.2d 133, 137 (8th Cir. 1970) (per curiam) (payments by employer into the
Union's health, welfare, and retirement fund held to be mandatory bargaining subject).
674. 632 F.2d 721 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 984 (1981).
675. Id at 729. At the third of five bargaining sessions, the subject of health and welfare
plans was raised, but the company stated that because the proposed premiums were too
high, it would pay only the current premiums. Id at 727.
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bargained to an impasse with the union, and that there was no material
change between the old and new plans.676 The court found no actual
notice of a new plan, despite the fact that plans and premiums were
discussed during negotiations, 6 "7 and that there was no specific showing
by the employer that the two plans were identical.6 78 The court also
held that there could have been no impasse in bargaining because the
employer never apprised the union of the new plan's terms.67 9
C. Enforcement ofAgreements Under Section 301
1. The scope of section 301
The Supreme Court held in Smith v. Evening News Association,680

that in cases arising under section 301 of the LMRA,681 the district
courts have jurisdiction to enforce collective bargaining agreements,

even though the conduct sought to be enforced arguably falls within
the unfair labor practice jurisdiction of the Board.682 However, an attempt to sidestep the bargaining and representation process through a
section 301 action to enforce a contract clause will not be upheld by the
676. Id at 729-30.
677. Id at 729.
678. Id at 730. The court distinguished Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. NLRB, 476
F.2d 1079, 1082 (2d Cir. 1973), in which a specific showing was made that the plans were
identical. In the instant case, the employer's manager testified that he did not know whether
the plans were identical, and the union contended they were not. 632 F.2d at 730.
679. Id at 729.
680. 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
681. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976). Section 301(a) provides that:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce.. . or between any such
labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
Two purposes are stated in the preamble to the LMRA (raft-Hartley Act), enacted in 1947:
to further structuralize the mediation procedure between parties, and to equalize union and
employer responsibilities. Congressional reaction to the Board's "overzealous regulation of
employer conduct through its unfair labor practice jurisdiction" after the enactment of the
NLRA was a compelling factor in promoting the Act. R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR
LAW, UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 5 (1976). By giving jurisdiction to the
district courts under § 301, Congress further delegated the Board's previously exclusive
power in the labor field.
682. 371 U.S. at 197. The Court noted the possibility of concurrent jurisdiction over both
unfair labor practices and the enforcement of contracts: "The authority of the Board to deal
with an unfair labor practice which also violates a collective bargaining contract is not displaced by § 301, but it is not exclusive and does not destroy the jurisdiction of the courts in
suits under § 301." Id In other words, jurisdiction is not destroyed in a § 301 action simply
because there is also an unfair labor practice charge. See also William E. Arnold Co. v.
Carpenters Dist. Council, 417 U.S. 12, 16-18 (1974) (§ 301 action lies to enforce no-strike
clause, despite its viability as an unfair labor practice claim before the Board).
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district courts.6 83

In Local 3-193, International Woodworkers v. Ketchikan Pulp

Co. ,68 decided during the survey period, the employer had acquired
new operations but had refused to recognize the union as its employees'
representative. The union brought suit in state court for interpretation
and enforcement of a clause in the collective bargaining agreement

concerning representation and appropriate bargaining units. The employer removed the suit to district court, assuming that the complaint

stated a claim for relief under section 301 of the LMRA. 6 5 Although
the company's refusal to bargain over the new operations was an ap-

parent unfair labor practice, the union did not file unfair labor practice

charges with the Board.6 86
The court indicated that identification of an appropriate bargaining unit and self-determination in representation should be left to the
Board. 6 7 The court thus found it had jurisdiction limited solely to an

interpretation of the clause in question, leaving the remaining issues to
the Board's determination. 8 8

683. See, e.g., South Prairie Const. Co. v. Local 627, IUOE, 425 U.S. 800, 803-04 (1976)
(court of appeals "invaded the statutory province of the Board" when it failed to remand § 9
question of who was appropriate bargaining unit); NLRB v. Retail Clerks Local 588, 587
F.2d 984, 986 (9th Cir. 1978) (contractual usurpation of § 7 rights frowned upon); SheratonKauai Corp. v. NLRB, 429 F.2d 1352, 1357 (9th Cir. 1970) (Board's discretion under § 9(b)
cannot be limited by a contract between a union and employer).
684. 611 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1980).
685. Id at 1296-97.
686. Id at 1297. The clause in the collective bargaining agreement gave the union authority over certain employees in southeastern Alaska. The employer acquisitions were in
southeastern Alaska, but these new operations were "geographically distinct, had no interchange of employees, and were autonomously operated by subsidiary corporations." Id
Both the union and the employer urged the court to interpret the contract under § 301, and if
unfair labor practices were found, complaints could then be filed with the Board. Id at
1298.
687. Id The court noted the principles of concurrent jurisdiction, but stated:
there is a critical difference between an unfair labor practice charge and the basic
policy of the National Labor Relations Act vesting primary (ifnot exclusive) jurisdiction in the NLRB in two decisive areas of labor-management relations: (1) the
designation of an exclusive bargaining agent, and (2) identification of an appropriate collective bargaining unit under Section 9 of the Labor Management Relations
Act (29 U.S.C. § 159).
Id
688. Id at 1301. "[W]e conclude that Congress did not intend by enacting Section 301 to
vest in the courts initial authority to consider and pass upon questions of representation and
determination of appropriate bargaining units. The court does have jurisdiction to interpret
Article I of the labor agreement between these parties." Id The Court found that the sole
operative e~ffect of the clause would be to waive the employer's right to demand an election
to prove union majority support. Id If the clause was meant to determine the appropriate
bargaining area or unit outside the collective bargaining agreement's reach, or if it was
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a. exhaustion of remedies
A union's failure to exhaust exclusive remedies provided for in the
collective bargaining agreement precludes judicial action under section
301 of the LMRA to enforce that agreement.689 These remedies are
presumed exclusive when the parties do not specifically agree that the
grievance and arbitration remedies are not exclusive.690 In Vaca v.
Spes, 69 1 the Supreme Court stated that an exception to the exhaustion
rule exists when an employee can show that the union, having sole
power to invoke arbitration, "wrongfully" refused to seek
arbitration.692
During the survey period, in Clayton v. IYT Gilfllan,693 an employee sued his employer in district court for wrongful discharge under
section 301 of the LMRA and sued his union, which refused to press
for arbitration under the collective bargaining agreement, for breach of
its duty of fair representation. The union constitution provided for internal grievance procedures for members aggrieved by any action of
the local and required members to exhaust those remedies before appealing to a civil court or governmental agency. Under the union constitution, an employee could receive damages only for the local's
breach of its duty of fair representation.694 Both the union and the
employer raised the employee's failure to exhaust internal union remedies as a defense. The district court dismissed the suits against the
union and the employer.6 95
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal in favor of the union but
reversed the judgment in favor of the employer.696 The court upheld
the dismissal in favor of the union in part because the employee could
receive no more in a court action for damages than he could have received by going through the internal procedure. The district court's
meant to give the union authority to act as a bargaining agent apart from the authority it
had initially been granted by the unionized employees, then it was a contractual usurpation
of the rights under §§ 7 and 9 and was thus "illegal and unenforceable." Id
689. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 184 (1967); see also Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox,
379 U.S. 650, 652-53 (1965); Otero v. IUE, 474 F.2d 3, 4 (9th Cir. 1973) (per curiam) (grievance and arbitration procedure as the sole and exclusive remedy).
690. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 657-59 (1965).
691. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
692. Id at 185. To be a wrongful act, the failure to seek arbitration must be "arbitrary,
discriminatory, or in bad faith." Id at 190; see also Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc.,
424 U.S. 554, 567 (1976).
693. 623 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1980).
694. Id at 566.
695. Id at 566-67.
696. Id at 571.
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also appropriate so
requirement of exhaustion of internal remedies6 9 was
7
that facts and issues could be hammered out.
The court reversed the judgment in favor of the employer because
union remedies could not have given the employee adequate relief
against it. The employee sought reinstatement while the union constitution provided for damages only. An award of damages against the
local would not get the employee his job back or force the local to press
for arbitration.6 98 The court remanded to the district court for a determination of the employer's liability. The district court concluded that
the employer would be liable if the union's failure to arbitrate was
"wrongful" in the Vaca sense, and that the discharge was a breach of
699
contract.
b. federalsubstantive law
In suits brought in district court to enforce agreements under section 301 of the LMRA the court must apply federal substantive law
"fashion[ed] from the policy of our national labor laws."'7"o Despite the
duty to apply federal substantive law in section 301 actions, state law
may be used to help develop federal policy "if [the state law is] compatible with the purpose of § 301.''7°1 The Supreme Court, in Local 174,
Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co. ,702 emphasized that "the subject
matter of § 301(a) is 'peculiarly one that calls for uniform law,' "703 and
that consistency in the enforcement of labor contracts is of fundamental

importance. 7M

697. Id at 566-67.
698. Id at 569-70.
699. Id at 570. The Court noted that exhaustion of internal remedies could, in some
cases, be of concern to the employer. Id at 569 n.6 (citing Harrison v. Chrysler Corp., 558
F.2d 1273, 1278-79 (7th Cir. 1977) (exhaustion may be required before employer is sued if
appeal could result in reversal of union's refusal to press grievance and grievance could be
reinstated under forms of collective bargaining agreements)). The Ninth Circuit decided
another "exhaustion" case during the survey period in Williams v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n,
617 F.2d 1321 (9th Cir. 1980). The court held that all remedies in the collective bargaining
agreement were complied with in an action by an employee against both union and employer, and therefore a failure to exhaust could not bar the action in the case. Id at 1328.
700. Local 174, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103 (1962).
701. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957).
702. 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
703. Id at 103.
704. Id at 104.
The importance of the area which would be affected by separate systems of substantive law makes the need for a single body of federal law particularly compelling. The ordering and adjusting of competing interests through a process of free
and voluntary collective bargaining is the keystone of the federal scheme to promote industrial peace. State law which frustrates the effort of Congress to stimu-
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In Rehmar v. Smith,"' the Ninth Circuit held that in section 301

actions, state cases interpreting commercial insurance contracts were
inapplicable, because using their principles would not be consistent
with the federal labor policy of treating parties to collective bargaining
agreements as parties of equal strength. Labor agreements dealing
with benefits to survivors are presumably made by parties of equal bargaining strength, while commercial insurance contracts are standardized and offered to a party of lesser strength on a take-it or leave-it
basis.7°" During the survey period, in Gordon v. IL WU-PMW Benefot
Funds,"7 the Ninth Circuit, relying on Rehmar, held that the district
court's application of California probate and insurance law to a death
benefit provision
in a collectively bargained employee welfare plan was
70 8
erroneous.

D.

GrievanceArbitration

1. The arbitration process and the courts
When two plausible interpretations of a collective bargaining
agreement exist, the question of interpretation should be left to the arbitrator and should not be disturbed by the courts.709 "A mere ambiguity in the opinion accompanying an award which permits the inference
that the arbitrator may have exceeded his authority is not a reason for
t 1 The Ninth Circuit has followed this
refusing to enforce the award 710
'7 11

basic rule."

late the smooth functioning of that process thus strikes at the very core of federal
labor policy.
Id.; see also International Union v. Hosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 702 (1966) (uniformity needed most in the areas of formation of collective bargaining agreements and their
speedy resolution); Seymour v. Hull & Moreland Eng'g, 605 F.2d 1105, 1110 (9th Cir. 1979)
(survey period case) (reliance on state corporate law proper if consistent with the federal
policy of uniform interpretation and enforcement of collective bargaining agreements).
705. 555 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1976).
706. Id at 1368-69.
707. 616 F.2d 433 (9th Cir. 1980).
708. Id at 438-39.
709. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597-99 (1960).
It was the arbitrator's construction which was "bargained" for, and his interpretation should
therefore stand. Id at 599. The Enterprise Wheel decision is only one decision of the socalled "Steelworker's Trilogy." See also United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363
U.S. 564, 567-68 (1960) (court function limited when arbitrator given all issues of contract
interpretation); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578
(1960) (industrial peace substantially aided by arbitration procedures in the collective bargaining agreement). Taken together, these three cases laid the foundation for arbitration
review in the courts.
710. 363 U.S. at 598.
711. E.g, Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Teamsters, 557 F.2d 1263, 1267 (9th Cir. 1977).
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During the survey period, in InternationalAssociation of Machin-

ists Aerosfpace Workers Local 389 v. San Diego Marine Construction
Corp.,712 the Ninth Circuit refused to accept the employer's arguments
that two of the arbitrator's decisions should be reversed. The employer

argued that the arbitrator's interpretation of one part of the collective
bargaining agreement was incorrect and that his opinion demonstrated

followed
he acted improperly in interpreting another part.71 3 The 7court
14
well established precedent and rejected both arguments.
2.

The scope of arbitration

It is axiomatic that a party need arbitrate only those disputes that
are within the scope of the arbitration clause.7 15 Unless the parties

have explicitly agreed to the contrary, courts decide which issues the
parties have agreed to submit to arbitration. 716 During the survey period, inAmalgamated Clothing andTextiles Workers v. Ratner Corp.,717
the Ninth Circuit made an initial finding that a successor employer was
bound by the collective bargaining agreements in question.71 8 A dis-

pute arose under one of the collective bargaining agreements which

made arbitrable the scope of the entire arbitration agreement.71 9 As a

result, the court compelled the employer to arbitrate the issue.7 20

712. 620 F.2d 736 (9th Cir. 1980).
713. Id at 738-39.
714. Id
715. Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368, 374 (1974) ("No obligation to arbitrate a
labor dispute arises solely by operation of law. The law compels a party to submit his grievance to arbitration only if he has contracted to do so."). See generally Burke v. Adams &
Ells of Ells, Inc., 603 F.2d 114, 116 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) ('Trustees of employee
benefit funds cannot be compelled to arbitrate a dispute in accordance with a collective
bargaining agreement to which they are not signatories when the defendant-employer has
never requested arbitration.").
716. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 546-47 (1964); see also Leyva v.
Certified Grocers of Cal., Ltd., 593 F.2d 857, 861 (9th Cir.) (unless parties have explicitly
agreed to the contrary, courts and not arbitrator decide whether the parties have agreed to
submit specific issues to arbitration), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 827 (1979); Las Vegas Local Joint
Executive Bd. v. Las Vegas Hacienda, Inc., 383 F.2d 667, 668 (9th Cir.) (whether or not one
is a party to an agreement is a question for the court), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 958 (1967). See
generaly Kodiak Oil Field Haulers, Inc. v. Teamsters Local 959, 611 F.2d 1286, 1290 (9th
Cir. 1980) (in case where employer challenged choice of arbitrator as violating bargaining
agreement, district court authorized to use past conduct and bargaining history of parties in
construing arbitration clause).
717. 602 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1979).
718. See infra notes 721-24 and accompanying text.
719. 602 F.2d at 1367.
720. Id at 1370-71.
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3. Successor-employer's duty to arbitrate
A party will be compelled to arbitrate if its collective bargaining
agreement invokes the duty to arbitrate. 721 A successor to an employer
bound by an arbitration clause may be bound by that original clause.
The Supreme Court, in John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston,722 held that
"similarity and continuity of operations across the change in ownership" 7' should be factors in determining whether the successor-em72
ployer should be compelled to arbitrate. A
The Supreme Court again looked at the successor-employer's duty
to arbitrate in Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive
Board.72 1 The Court refused to compel arbitration when a successoremployer completely bought out the old owner under terms repudiating the assumption of the predecessor's obligations and retained only a
few of the predecessor's employees.726 The Court distinguished Wiley
because similarity and continuity of operations across the change of
ownership was lacking. Additionally, the union could realistically enforce the predecessor's contractual obligations because the predecessor
remained in operation with substantial assets, while in Wiley, the original employer had disappeared through a merger.7 27
During the survey period, in Amalgamated Clothing and Textile
Workers v. Ratner Corp. ,728 the Ninth Circuit held that an employer's
corporate reorganization would not defeat its duty to arbitrate. The
court reasoned that the arguments for imposing the duty to arbitrate
were even stronger than in the two prior cases of Wiley and Howard
Johnson because all the personnel inAmalgamated remained employed
after the corporate reorganization.729
721. Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368, 374 (1974).
722. 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
723. Id at 551. The Court held that the duty to arbitrate would not always survive a
change in ownership, but the wholesale transfer of Interscience employees to Wiley, with no
interruption, necessarily led to a conclusion that arbitration was compelled. Id
724. Interscience, the company that had contracted with the union, merged with John
Wiley. Wiley kept most of Interscience's employees, but entered into no contract with the
union. The union, asserting that it represented all the employees covered by the initial
agreement, petitioned to compel arbitration. Id at 544-46. The Court reasoned that compelling arbitration was consonant with the federal policy of settling labor disputes by arbitration. If a mere change in corporate structure could destroy a previously contracted duty
to arbitrate, the fundamental policy would be destroyed. d at 549.
725. 417 U.S. 249 (1974).
726. Id at 250-52.
727. Id at 256-65. See generally Note, The Bargaining Obligations of Successor Employers, 88 HARv. L. Rnv. 759 (1974).
728. 602 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1979).
729. Id at 1369.

1981]

LABOR L W SURVEY
V.

.

CONCERTED ACTIONS

4. Strikes
Combination and concerted action are the essential elements of
the labor union movement. While devices like picketing, handbilling,
and refusing to patronize are significant phases of concerted action, virtually the entire structure of a labor union's self-help program rests on
one simple practice-the refusal to work. The strike7 30 is the most simple and widely known manifestation of this practice. While there is a
constitutional right to free speech and constitutional protection against
involuntary servitude, there is no absolute constitutional right to
strike.73 ' The right to strike is subject to the legislative protections and
regulation embodied in the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947
(LMRA).732 Strikes may, however, be declared illegal if unlawful
730. Although widely known, utilized and litigated, the labor strike has eluded precise
legal definition. A strike has been described as "the act of quitting work by a body of workmen for the purpose of coercing their employer to accede to some demand they have made
upon him, and which he has refused." Jeffrey-De Witt Insulator Co. v. NLRB, 91 F.2d 134,
138 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 731 (1937); see also The Point Reyes, 110 F.2d 608, 60910 (5th Cir. 1940) (In defining the term strike, "[tihere must be the relation of employer and
employee, and there must be a quitting of work.").
731. In Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 306 (1926), the Court stated that "[n]either the common law, nor the Fourteenth Amendment, confers the absolute right to strike." Id. at 311.
For a discussion of some of the constitutional issues raised by strikes, boycotts, and picketing, see Cox, Strikes, Picketing and the Constitution, 4 VAND. L. REv. 574 (1951).
732. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1976). There are many sections of the LMRA that deal with
the right to strike. Section 7 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976), for example, provides in
part that "[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively ... ,and to engage in other concerted activities for
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection .

. . ."

Section

8(b)(4)(B) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (1976), which regulates secondary picketing and boycotts, provides that "nothing contained in this clause (B) shall be construed to
make unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or any primary picketing." Section 13 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1976), which preserves the right to strike
provides that "[niothing in this Act except as specifically provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike, or to
affect the limitations or qualifications on that right." Section 502 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C.
§ 143 (1976), provides:
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to require an individual employee to
render labor or service without his consent, nor shall anything in this chapter be
construed to make the quitting of his labor by an individual employee an illegal
act; nor shall any court issue any process to compel the performance by an individual employee of such labor or service, without his consent; nor shall the quitting of
labor by an employee or employees in good faith because of abnormally dangerous
conditions for work at the place of employment of such employee or employees be
deemed a strike under this chapter.
The other sections of the LMRA dealing with the right to strike are § 8(d), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(d) (1976), which requires that a party serve notice of its intention to terminate or
modify a collectively bargained agreement and prohibits a strike for the notice period, and
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means are utilized to achieve a lawful purpose 733 or if a lawfully conducted strike is used to accomplish an unlawful objective. 3 A strike
which has an objective proscribed by the National Labor Relations Act
735
(NLRA) is illegal.

Consistent with these principles, a strike having an objective or
purpose to force an employer to join a multiemployer association 736 has
been held by the Board to violate section 8(b)(4)(A) 737 of the NLRA. 738
Not until the 1980 case of Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Local 137, International
Brotherhoodof Teamsters7 39 did the Board or the Ninth Circuit face
the question of whether the illegal objective must be to force actual
membership in an existing multiemployer organization.740 In FritoLay, the union argued that section 8(b)(4)(A) proscribed coercive
§ 8 (g), 29 U.S.C. § 158(g) (1976), which requires that a labor organization give ten days
notice of its intention to engage in a strike, picketing or any other concerted activity at a
health care facility. For a discussion of the statutory protection and regulation afforded the
right to strike, see DEVELOPING LABoR LAW, supra note 550, at 521-23 (1971).
733. See, e.g., NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 253 (1939) (strike
initiated and conducted by seizure and retention of employer's property held to be illegal
even though triggered by employer's unfair labor practices).
734. E.g., Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 40 (1942) (strike in violation of federal mutiny statute).
735. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (1976).
736. A multiemployer association is a consensual arrangement in which employers voluntarily join an association; the multidmployer association and the union voluntarily enter into
negotiations culminating in a contract. The Board has held that an employer may freely
withdraw, subject only to the requirement that notice of withdrawal must be timely and
unequivocal unless there is mutual consent. See, e.g., Anderson Lithographic Co., 124
N.L.R.B. 920, 928-29 (1959), enforcedsub nom. NLRB v. Jeffries Banknote Co., 281 F.2d
893 (9th Cir. 1960). For a topical treatment of the multiemployer association, see [2 Labor
Relations] LAB. L. REP. (CCH) 1 26610 (1972).
737. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(A) (1976).
738. See, e.g., United Mine Workers Local 1854 (Amax Coal Co.), 238 N.L.R.B. 1583,
1587 (1978); Glass Workers Local 1892, (AFL-CIO), 141 N.L.R.B. 106, 116 (1963).
739. 623 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1013 (1980).
740. In Frito-Lay, the plaintiff had been a member of a multiemployer organization between 1960 and 1973 and had entered into a number of collective bargaining agreements
negotiated by the multiemployer organization with the defenaant union during this period.
Before entering into negotiations for a contract to succeed the agreement due to expire on
February 28, 1974, the employers of the multiemployer organization gave timely notice of
withdrawal, thereby dissolving the multiemployer organization. The union, evidently dissatisfied with the breakup of the employer organization, had, during the ensuing separate
negotiations, conditioned the approval of Frito-Lay's proposals upon the acceptance of those
proposals by the other former members of the multiemployer organization. On many occasions during the contract negotiations, the union representatives suggested that the employers confer together to work out contract provisions that would be substantially identical for
all members. Id. at 1356-57.
On May 12, 1974, unable to secure agreements that were sufficiently similar through
separate bargaining, the union struck all employers, and Frito-Lay brought an action for
damages suffered as a result of an unlawful strike. The district court concluded that the
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union conduct only when it was directed at forcing an employer to become an actual member of an existing employer association. 41 In
other words, actual membership should be required before a violation
of the section could be found.
The Ninth Circuit had little problem in disposing of the union's
argument. The court pointed out that in forming a multiemployer organization no formalities are required. The "individual employers
need only express an unequivocal intention to be bound in collective
bargaining by group rather than individual action."'742 Recognizing the
potential informality of multiemployer organizations, the court reasoned that congressional intent to combat forced multiemployer bargaining should not be circumvented by the form of the employer
participation in multiemployer bargaining. The court stated:
we think it unlikely that Congress sought in section 8(b)(4)(A)
to prohibit a union from forcing an employer to become a
formal member of an employer organization but to permit a
union to force competing employers to bargain together as an
informal group. Attributing that interpretation to the section
would allow a union to force employers to engage in multiemployer bargaining so long as the Union did not make the mistake of requiring the employers involved to become members
of a formal, existing employer organization.74
The court concluded that section 8(b)(4)(A) must be construed to prohibit coercive conduct aimed at forcing participation in multiemployer
organizations without regard to the formalities of membership or existence of such an organization. 744
The union next argued that the actions that had been attributed to
it during the contract negotiation period constituted approved tactics in
furtherance of its legitimate efforts to secure uniform contracts for its
members. 745 Conceding that the tactics employed by the union may
have been acceptable collective bargaining techniques, the court reunion's conduct evidenced an intent to force the employers to reconstitute the employer
organization, thereby violating § 8(b)(4)(A). Id. at 1357.
741. Id. at 1358.
742. Id. (citing Komatz Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 458 F.2d 317, 321 (8th Cir. 1972)).
743. Id.
744. Id. at 1359.
745. Id. Among other things, the union had conditioned its acceptance of Frito-Lay's
proposal upon the acceptance of those proposals by the other companies with which they
were negotiating. When the proposals were submitted for ratification, the union implemented group voting procedures under which the employees of all the companies concemed
voted on the proposals despite the companies' protestations. Id. at 1357.
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sponded that such tactics "although innocent in and of themselves, can
746
in context become part of an illegal overall pattern of conduct."
Such tactics may therefore be used to mask illegitimate union motives.747 Thus, the court reasoned, there is a violation of section
8(b)(4)(A) if a substantial object of the union's actions was to force
multiemployer bargaining, in spite of the fact that otherwise lawful tactics were used.748 This holding simply restates the proposition that the
use of otherwise legitimate methods will not save union action where
the objective of such action is proscribed.
B. Pickets
Peaceful picketing is traditionally one of organized labor's most
effective techniques for achieving strike objectives. 74 9 In NLRB v. InternationalRice Milling,7 0 the United States Supreme Court articu-

lated some of the distinctions between primary and secondary
objectives of picketing activity."

Decided on the same day as Rice

Milling was another landmark case of equal importance to the primary-secondary distinction: NLRB v. Denver Building & Construction
Trades Council.752 Denver Building further refined the primary-secon746. Id. at 1360.
747. Id.
748. Id.
749. The statutory restrictions on the right to engage in picketing are contained in
§§ 8(b)(4) and (8)(b)(7) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(b)(4), (7) (1976). Section 8(b)(4)
protects primary picketing and proscribes picketing aimed at secondary objectives. See
NLRB v. International Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665, 671 (1951) (primary pickets have the
right, at the primary location, to appeal directly to customers, suppliers, fellow employees,
and striker replacements not to cross the picket fines); cf.NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 688-89 (1951) (union having a dispute with construction contractor cannot picket the project to force termination of the subcontractor). Section 8(b)(7)
of the NLRA was added by the 1959 amendments, Pub. L. No. 86-257 § 704(c), 65 Stat. 601
(1959). Section 8(b)(7) restricts recognition or organizational picketing by uncertified unions
and prohibits the picketing of any employer for the purpose of forcing an employer to recognize or bargain with a union, or forcing employees to accept a union as their bargaining
agent. For a detailed examination of§ 8(b)(7), see [3 Labor Relations] LAB. L. REP.(CCH)
15150 (1974). There are other statutory restrictions on picketing. For example, under § 602
of the Labor-Management Reporting Disclosure Act (LMRDA) of 1959, 29 U.S.C. § 522
(1976), extortionate picketing is made a federal crime. See generally [3 Labor Relations]
LAB. L. REP. (CCH) 5130 (1974).
750. 341 U.S. 665 (1951).
751. In Rice Millin& the United States Supreme Court held that pickets in a dispute with
a primary employer can seek to persuade neutral employees appearing at the primary line
not to cross the line in support of the picket. If any employees of another employer honor
the line, there is a secondary effect of a primary object. Id. at 671. Thus, so long as the
object is primary, picketing is lawful even though there may be a secondary effect.
752. 341 U.S. 675 (1951).
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dary distinction in the context of picketing at a construction site where
employees of more than one employer were on site.7 53
1, Common-situs picketing
Prior to Denver Building, the Board fashioned and followed a set
of standards called the Moore Dry Dock rule754 to determine whether

picketing a common-situs 755 violated the section 8(b)(4) secondary activity ban. The United States Supreme Court approved the use of the
Moore Dry Dock rule and its application to common-situs picketing in
Local 761, InternationalUnion ofElectrical Workers v. NLRB (General
Electric).756 The Ninth Circuit, while recognizing the efficacy of the
75 7
Moore Dry Dock rule, has limited its use to an evidentiary tool.
Thus, the inference of primary activity, raised by compliance with the
Moore Dry Dock rule, may be dissipated if a secondary objective is
indicated by the "totality of the circumstances. 7 5 8
This very result was recently obtained in Allied Concrete, Inc. v.
NRLB. 75 9 InAllied Concrete, the striking union's pickets followed the
trucks of the subcontractor, with whom the union had the primary dispute, to the construction site where deliveries were made. Responding
to the pickets, employees of the general contractor walked off the
job.7 60 The Board held that the union's picketing of the primary em753. Denver Building involved the picketing of a general contractor at the construction
site where an electrical subcontractor used nonunion employees. After all of the building
tradesmen refused to cross the picket line, the general contractor terminated the subcontractor. The Supreme Court held that each employer on a construction site should be treated as
a separate employer. Since the union could have made the project an all-union job only by
forcing the general contractor to terminate the subcontractor, the picketing of the entire
project violated § 8(b)(4) because one of its objects was to force the termination of the subcontractor. Id. at 689.
754. In re Sailors Union of the Pacific (Moore Dry Dock), 92 N.L.R.B. 547 (1950). The
Board in Moore Dry Dock established a four-part test for determining the legality of common-situs picketing:
(a) The picketing is strictly limited to times when the situs of dispute is located on
the secondary employer's premises; (b) at the time of the picketing the primary
employer is engaged in its normal business at the situs; (c) the picketting [sic] is
limited to places reasonably close to the location of the situs; and (d) the picketing
discloses clearly that the dispute is with the primary employer.
Id. at 549 (footnotes omitted).
755. When two or more employers are engaged in separate tasks on the same premises,
the location is generally referred to as a "common-situs."
756. 366 U.S. 667, 679 (1961).
757. International Ass'n of Bridge Workers Local 433 v. NLRB, 598 F.2d 1154, 1157 (9th
Cir. 1979); accord Carpenters Dist. Council v. NLRB, 560 F.2d 1015, 1018 (10th Cir. 1977).
758. 598 F.2d at 1157.
759. 607 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1979).
760. Id. at 829.
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ployer's trucks on the construction site did not violate section 8(b)(4)
because the picketing had met the Moore Dry Dock test and was "the
only effective way" to pressure the employer.76 ' Although the court did
not disturb the Board's findings with respect to the Moore Dry Dock
rule, the Ninth Circuit reversed the Board's decision. The court stated
that the Board "fail[ed] to recognize that the reserve gate provided a
reasonable alternative which would have accomplished the legitimate
purposes of the picketing, without involving secondary employees. 762
Further, the court restated its position on the union's "duty to 'picket
with restraint' "763 when a union engaged in a labor dispute pickets a
common-situs job site.
The opinion in Allied Concrete did not address the issue of
whether it was of any significance that the president of Allied had established the reserved gate and made all the decisions concerning
wording, location and establishment of the signs reserving a gate for his
employees and other gates for the employees of the general contractor.76 The court merely stated that the gate, "which was properly established, put the Union on notice" as to those areas where the union
was to limit its picketing. 76 Thus, in the Ninth Circuit, the way is clear
for primary employers in common-situs cases to reserve gates for picketing, and upon notice to the union, to limit picketing directed at the
primary employer to those areas.
2. Product picketing
The question of product picketing was first addressed by the
Supreme Court in NLRB v. Fruit and Vegetable Packers Local 760
(Tree Fruits).766 In Tree Fruits,the Court held that picketing the con761. Teamsters Local 83 (Allied Concrete), 231 N.L.R.B. 1097, 1098 (1977). The Board,
in Allied Concrete, relied on International Bhd. of Teamsters Local 807 (Schultz Refrigerated Services), 87 N.L.R.B. 502 (1949). The Board in Schultz AefrigeratedServices held that
the picketing of a primary employer's trucks at his customers' premises was lawful primary
activity and did not violate § 8(b)(4) when the trucks could be identified with the "actual
functioning of the primary employer's business at the situs of the labor dispute," and there
was no other place available for effective picketing. Id. at 505-06.
762. 607 F.2d at 831.
763. Id. at 830 (quoting Carpenters Local 470 v. NLRB, 564 F.2d 1360, 1363 (9th Cir.
1977)).
764. This issue was apparently viewed as one of some importance by the Board. The
Board pointed out that the "parties who traditionally establish reserved gates" were the site
owners or the general contractor. As viewed by the Board, "[s]ection 8(b)(4)(i) and
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) is [sic] intended to protect the rights of neutral employers and was [sic] not
designed for the aid and convenience of primary employers." 231 N.L.R.B. at 1099.
765. 607 F.2d at 831.
766. 377 U.S. 58 (1964).
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sumer entrances of large grocery stores to dissuade customers from

purchasing apples which were packed by firms which the union. was
striking did not violate section 8(b)(4)(B). 7 6 7 Analyzing the legislative
history of section 8(b)(4) and its amendments, 768 the Supreme Court
upheld the union's right to picket the product peacefully. 76 9 The Court
perceived a distinction between picketing that limits its appeal to a boycott of a specific product, such as occurred in Tree Fruits, and that
which urges a total boycott of the neutral party's business.77 °
The Tree Fruits primary product picketing at a secondary site has
been limited by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Retail Store Employees
Local 1001 (Safeco).771 In Safeco, the Court held that where product
picketing can reasonably "be expected to threaten neutral parties with
ruin or substantial lOSS,' ' 772 such picketing will constitute a violation of
section 8(b)(4). The Safeco Court distinguished Tree Fruits, where the
product picketed was but one item of many that the neutral party carried in its retail stock,773 from Safeco, where the product picketed generated over ninety percent of Safeco's gross income. 7 The Court also
anticipated situations in which secondary picketing could be directed
against a product representing a significant portion of a neutrars business but significantly less than that represented by a single dominant
767. Id. at 71. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (1976) provides in part:
(b) It shall be an unfair 'labor practice for a labor organization or its agents(4)(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by any
person engaged in commerce. . . to engage in, a strike or refusal in the course of
his employment to use.. . or otherwise handle or work on any goods.. . or to
perform any services; or (ii) to threaten, coerce or restrain any person engaged in
commerce... where in either case an object thereof is(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using.. . or otherwise dealing in the
products of any other producer.., or to cease doing business with any other
person...
Provided, That nothing contained in this clause (B) shall be construed to make
unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful any primary strike or primary picketing
768. 377 U.S. at 63-71. In reviewing the legislative history behind the 1959 amendments
to the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-166 (1947), as amended by Pub. L. No. 86-257 (1959), the
Supreme Court concluded that where peaceful picketing was at issue, the Court would not
outlaw such picketing "unless 'there is the clearest indication in the legislative history'...
that Congress intended to do so." 377 U.S. at 63 (quoting NLRB v. Drivers Local No. 639,
362 U.S. 274, 284 (1960)).
769. 377 U.S. at 71-73.
770. Id. at 63-64 n.7.
771. 447 U.S. 607 (1980).
772. Id. at 614.
773. Id. at 613.
774. Id. at 609.
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product. 775 The legality of the picketing would turn on whether the
appeal to consumers to boycott the product would reasonably be likely
to threaten the neutral with ruin or substantial loss. 776 The
Court left
777
the resolution of this issue to the expertise of the Board.
The product picketing permitted by Tree Fruits is qualified by the
mergedproducts or integratedproductsdoctrine. 7 78 The Board and the
courts in construing Tree Fruitshave held that product picketing is illegal when the product picketed is merged or integratedinto products of
the neutral employer.779 In cases where the consumer cannot separate
the product picketed from the other components of the merged product, picketing aimed at a boycott of the picketed product is "tantamount to urging the prospective purchaser not to deal with the
secondary employer." 780 This activity is clearly prohibited by section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B).781
In Maxey v. Butchers' Local 126,782 the Ninth Circuit upheld the
district court's application of the integratedproductsdoctrine to a situation in which a union both picketed and threatened to picket customers
of an employer with whom the striking union had a dispute.78 3 In
Maxey, the primary employer was a meat processing company engaged in preparation of meat products for resale to restaurants and
other institutions in and around Fresno, California. The union picketed some of the restaurants and threatened to picket other customers
of the primary employer.7 4
The issue, as framed by the court, was whether the union sought to
appeal to consumers to boycott the meat products or whether the union
sought to induce the customers, namely, the restaurants, to cease doing
775. Id. at 615-16 n.ll.

776. Id.
777. Id.
778. See, e.g., K & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 592 F.2d 1228, 1234 (3d Cir. 1979); NLRB v.
Cement Masons Local 337, 468 F.2d 1187, 1190-91 (9th Cir. 1972); American Bread Co. v.
NLRB, 411 F.2d 147, 154 (6th Cir. 1969); Honolulu Typographical Union No. 37 v. NLRB,
401 F.2d 952, 955-56 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Local 248, Meat & Allied Food Workers, 230
N.L.R.B. 189, 190-91 (1977).
779. See K & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 592 F.2d 1228, 1234 (3d Cir. 1979); NLRB v.
Cement Masons Local 337, 468 F.2d 1187, 1190-91 (9th Cir. 1972); American Bread Co. v.
NLRB, 411 F.2d 147, 154 (6th Cir. 1969); Honolulu Typographical Union No. 37 v. NLRB,
401 F.2d 952, 955-56 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Local 248, Meat & Allied Food Workers, 230
N.L.R.B. 189, 190-91 (1977).
780. K & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 592 F.2d 1228, 1232 (3d Cir. 1979).
781. NLRB v. Cement Masons Local 337, 468 F.2d 1187, 1191 (9th Cir. 1972).
782. 627 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1980).
783. Id. at 915.
784. Id. at 914.
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business with the primary employer.785 The latter object is clearly for-,
bidden under section 8(b)(4).78 6 But an appeal to consumers would be
permitted under Tree Fruits, were it not for the integratedproducts

doctrine.78 7 The Ninth Circuit found that the evidence supported the
district court's findings that the union sought to coerce the restaurants
that the prito cease doing business with the primary employer and
788
mary products were integrated in the neutral products.
VI.
A.

THE EMPLOYEE AND THE UNION

The Union's Duty of FairRepresentation

A union which serves as an exclusive collective bargaining representative has a statutory duty to represent fairly all employees in its
bargaining unit.78 9 A unit member may sue the union for breach of
that duty if there is evidence the union engaged in arbitrary or discriminatory conduct, or acted in bad faith.7 90
The law of fair representation permits a union to negotiate for and
agree to contract provisions involving disparate treatment of distinct
classes of workers so long as the union does not act arbitrarily or in bad
faith.79 1 This may result in an agreement containing terms favorable to
some employees and unfavorable to others.7 92
During the survey period, in Williams v. Pac/qc MaritimeAssociation, 7 a group of employees sued their union for breach of its duty of

fair representation after they lost all prospects of working for the employer as longshoremen under a new collective bargaining agreement.
Longshoremen had for many years been classified either as preferred
employees, referred to as Class A, or as limited registered longshore785. Id. at 915.
786. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (1976).
787. 627 F.2d at 915.
788. Id.
789. The duty of fair representation has been read into various labor statutes, including
§ 8(b)(1)(A) of the NLRA. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177-78 (1967); cf. Dycus v.
NLRB, 615 F.2d 820, 826-27 (9th Cir. 1980) (union which unequivocally and in good faith
disclaimed further interest in representing employee's unit had no duty of fair representation
because it was no longer the exclusive representative of that unit).
790. Stephens v. Postmaster Gen., 623 F.2d 594, 596 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (citing
Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1965)); see also Beriault v. Local 40, ILWU, 501 F.2d 258,
263-64 (9th Cir. 1974).
791. See Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338-39 (1953); Duggan v. IAM, 510
F.2d 1086, 1088 (9th Cir.), cer. denied, 421 U.S. 1012 (1975); Beriault v. Local 40, ILWU,
501 F.2d at 263-64.
792. E.g., Beriault v. Local 40, ILWU, 501 F.2d at 260.
793. 617 F.2d 1321 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 101 (1981).
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men, referred to as Class B.7 9

Class A longshoremen received priority for available work while
Class B workers had limited rights to available work and were subject
to stricter rules and more stringent penalties. Class B longshoremen
could, for example, be deregistered at any time for "cause," including
pilferage, intoxication, assault, unexcused failures to be available for
work, and dropping hours from time sheets to facilitate the receipt of
however,
new work ("chiseling"). The option remained open to79them,
5
to apply periodically for promotion to Class A status.
As the longshoremen's industry became mechanized, fewer, but
more highly skilled workers were needed. The union thus agreed with
the employer to reclassify qualified Class B workers to Class A, and to
deregister the rest. The standards by which Class B workers were
judged included the number of times the worker had "chiseled," had
been late in paying hiring hall fees, had been unavailable when needed
for work, and had been the subject of employer complaints for intoxication or pilferage.796
Employees who were not reclassified to Class A sued the union for
breach of its duty of fair representation in negotiating the standards.797
The Ninth Circuit found for the union on the ground that it had not
acted arbitrarily or in bad faith because the standards themselves and
the provisions according differential treatment to Class B had a rational
basis.798 The court also held that the union had not breached its duty
to warn Class B workers of conduct that might lead to their deregistration. The court reasoned that because previous agreements provided
that Class B workers would be deregistered for reasons similar to those
specified in the new standards there was no obligation on the part of
the union to give such warning.799
In upholding the union's action because it had a "rational basis,"8 °0 the court placed a light burden of fair representation upon un-

ions. Under the rational basis or "not in bad faith or arbitrary" test, 80
794. Id. at 1323-24.
795. Id.
796. Id. at 1324.
797. The union asserted that the suit was barred because the employees had failed to
exhaust internal union remedies. The court countered that claims alleging breach of the
duty of fair representation in negotiating the collective bargaining agreement are not subject
to the exhaustion requirement. Id. at 1328 (citing Beriault v. Local 40, ILWU, 501 F.2d at
266).
798. 617 F.2d at 1331, 1333-34.
799. Id. at 1331-32.
800. Id. at 1330.
801. Id.
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a union need not negotiate an agreement that is desirable for all bar-

gaining unit members. It is sufficient if the agreement eventually consummated is somehow justifiable.

The duty of good faith representation is not breached by a Union if
it refuses to process an employee grievance against an employer be80 2
cause it has reasonably found that the grievance is unmeritorious.
The Ninth Circuit followed this well-settled rule during the survey period in Fristoe v. Reynolds Metals Co. 8 03 In Fristoe, the aggrieved em-

ployee was fired after an off-premises altercation with his supervisor
which arose from a job-related dispute. The employer based its firing

on the signed statements of two eyewitnesses, the contents of which

disclosed that the employee provoked the fight. 804
The collective bargaining agreement provided that arbitration was

the exclusive remedy for employee grievances. 805 At the employee's

request, the union filed a grievance over the discharge, and processed it

through the first three steps of the procedure. After failing to obtain
employee reinstatement, the union decided not to pursue the arbitration further because of evidence unfavorable to the employee. 8°

The employee then sued the employer for breach of the collective
bargaining agreement and the union for breach of its duty of fair representation.80 7 The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's grant of
summary judgment for the union on the ground that it had neither ac-

ted arbitrarily nor refused to press the grievance in a hostile manner.80 8

The court noted that the union had justifiably determined that the em-

ployee's case was a bad one, and its refusal to process it any further8was
9
consonant with the, goals of the grievance and arbitration system. 0
802. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. at 191; Fountain v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 555 F.2d 753, 75657 (9th Cir. 1977).
803. 615 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1980).
804. Id. at 1210-11.
805. Id. at 1214.
806. Id. at 1211.
807. Id. at 1210. As a general rule, when a collective bargaining agreement provides that
arbitration will be the exclusive remedy for employee grievances, an employee may not instead bring the employer to court. Id. at 1214 (citing Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 186
(1967)). However, this rule is excepted when the employee shows that the union breached its
duty of fair representation by failing to pursue arbitration. 615 F.2d at 1214 (citing Hines v.
Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 563-69 (1976); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. at 186).
Because the employee failed to show any breach on the part of the union, he could not
maintain a cause of action against the employer.
808. 615 F.2d at 1215.
809. Id. (citing Fountain v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 555 F.2d 753, 756-57 (9th Cir. 1977)).
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B. Discipline of Union Members
Section 7 of the NLRA 10 guarantees the right of employees to
form, assist, or join labor organizations or to refrain from doing so.8 I
Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act812 declares that a union's restraint of employees' section 7 rights is an unfair labor practice, though the union
has the right to prescribe rules for acquisition and retention of union
membership.
A union does not violate section 8(b)(1) by fining members for
working during a lawful strike authorized by its membership and by
suing to collect the fines. Such action has been construed813
to fall within
the ambit of the union's control over its internal affairs.
The United States Supreme Court, in NLRB v. GraniteState Joint
Board,Textile Workers' Union,814 held that absent any restrictions in a
union's constitution upon a member's right to resign, a union cannot
fine a member for resigning and then crossing a picket line. The basis
815
for this rule is the union's lack of control over the former member.
The Court, however, left open the question of whether and when a
union may, through its constitution and bylaws, define or limit the cir816
cumstances under which a member may resign from the union.
During the survey period, in NLRB v. Machinists' Local 1327,
1rAM, 8 17 a union sought to collect fines levied against members who

resigned after a strike had started and subsequently crossed the picket
line. The union's constitution prohibited members from dishonoring
strikes or lockouts without permission, and provided that any resignation submitted within fourteen days of a strike's commencement would
not relieve the member's obligation of honoring the strike for its
duration.818
The NLRB, in a divided opinion, determined that the constitutional provision was an unlawful attempt to regulate post-resignation
810. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
811. See NLRB v. Martin A. Gleason, Inc., 534 F.2d 466, 476 (2d Cir. 1976).
812. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1976).
813. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 195 (1967); see also NLRB v.
Granite State Joint Bd., Textile Workers' Union, 409 U.S. 213, 215 (1972).
814. 409 U.S. 213 (1972).
815. Id. at 215-17; see also Booster Lodge 405, 1AM v. NLRB, 412 U.S. 84, 88 (1973);
Bise v. IBEW Local 1969, 618 F.2d 1299 (9th Cir. 1979), cer. denied, 449 U.S. 101 (1980)
(damages awarded to union members who legally resigned under union's constitution and
crossed picket line during strike, then rejoined union after strike, for union's attempt to fine
them).
816. 409 U.S. at 216.
817. 608 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1979).
818. Id. at 1220.
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conduct rather than a restriction upon the right to resignY' 9 The Ninth
Circuit, in a split opinion, disagreed with the Board's characterization,
and determined that the constitutional provision was a restriction on
members' right to resign. 2
Because the Supreme Court in GraniteState82 1 left open the question of the legality of constitutional restrictions on members' right to
resign, 82 2 the Ninth Circuit remanded Machinists'to the Board for consideration and resolution based upon its expertise in the labor relations
field. 82
The dissent argued that the employees were no longer subject to
union control as members because union membership entails the right
to have a voice in the union's continuing course of action. 24 One can8 25
not be a "member" by merely remaining subject to union discipline.
The dissent's opinion appears better reasoned than the majority's. The
union's anti-strikebreaking provision was a contractual obligation undertaken by members. The Ninth Circuit should have decided whether
the contractual provision violated the NLRA, rather than recharacterizing it as a restriction on the right to resign.
C. Union Elections
82 6

Section 41 l(a)(1) of Title I of the Labor-Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act (LMDRA) 27 guarantees equal voting and nominating rights to union members in union elections. Section 412828 permits a private civil action for relief, including injunctive relief, for a
union's violation of its members' rights. Section 482(a) 829 of Title IV of
the LMDRA permits a union member who has exhausted internal
union remedies to file a complaint with the Secretary of Labor alleging
his or her union's violation of its constitution and bylaws in the conduct of an election. Section 482(b)830 empowers the Secretary to bring

a civil action in district court against the union to set aside the election
if he or she deems the complaint valid.
819.
820.
821.
822.
823.
824.
825.
826.
827.
828.
829.
830.

Machinists' Local 1327, LAM, 231 N.L.R.B. 719 (1977).
608 F.2d at 1222.
409 U.S. 213 (1972).
Id. at 217.
608 F.2d at 1222-23.
Id. at 1223.
Id.
29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1) (1976).
The LMDRA is codified in 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1976).
29 U.S.C. § 412 (1976).
29 U.S.C. § 482(a) (1976).
29 U.S.C. § 482(b) (1976).
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Often, a union's election conduct may potentially subject it to actions under both Titles I and IV. The Supreme Court, in Calhoun v.
Harvey,8 3 1 held that a union member seeking to challenge the discriminatory effect of a union's candidate eligibility requirements may do so
only under Title IV of the LMDRA and not under Title 1.832 Title IV
preempts Title I in such cases.
The circuits have divided on the question of whether Title IV
preempts Title I in all cases where they overlap, particularly when an
individualis discriminated against in the course of an election. 33 During the survey period, the Ninth Circuit, -inKupau v. Yamamo o, 834
adopted the view that Title I remedies are not necessarily preempted by
the existence of Title IV claims. Under the Ninth Circuit view, one
may pursue a Title I action if he or she has been discriminated against
in the exercise of his or her Title I rights, regardless of other claims.8 35
In Kupau, the plaintiff defeated an incumbent for union office.
Prior .to the election, the plaintiff was assured by the international
union's general president and by his local's election committee that he
was eligible to run. After the election, the defeated incumbent protested that the plaintiff was ineligible. The officers of the union, most
of whom had run on a common slate with the incumbent, bypassed
ordinary procedure by failing to invite unit officers representing the
rank and file to the hearing. The plaintiff was declared ineligible and
831. 379 U.S. 134 (1964).
832. Id. at 138.
833. Tide IV was held not to preempt Title I when an individual was discriminated
against in an election in Depew v. Edmiston, 386 F.2d 710 (3d Cir. 1967). Suits under Title I
were permitted without specific analysis of the relation between Title I and Title IV in Bunz
v. Moving Picture Mach. Operators Local 224, 567 F.2d 1117 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Pignotti v.
Local 3, Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, 343 F. Supp 236 (D. Neb. 1972), af 'd, 477 F.2d
825 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,414 U.S. 1067 (1973); Stettner v. International Printing Ass'n, 278
F. Supp. 675 (E.D. Tenn. 1967). Preemption of Title I remedies because of the existence of
Title IV claims has been criticized by commentators. See Comment, Ydes1IandlVof the
LMDRA: 4 Resolution ofthe Conflict ofRemedies, 42 U. Cm. L. Rnv. 166 (1974); Note, Preelection Remedies Under The Landrum-Grnffin Act The 'Twilight Zone" Between Election
Rights Under Title IVandthe Guaranteesof Titles I and V, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 1105 (1974);
Note, Union Electionsand the LMDA4: Thirteen Years of Use andAbuse, 81 YALE L.J. 409
(1972); James, Union Democracy and the LMDR4: Autocracy and Insurgency in National
Union Elections, 13 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rav. 247 (1978). Contra Driscoll v. IUOE Local
139, 484 F.2d 682 (7th Cir. 1973) (challenge to requirement that all candidates for union
office execute non-Communist affidavit actionable under Title IV but not Title I), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960 (1974); McDonough v. Local 825, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 470
F.2d 261, 264 (3d Cir. 1972) (Title IV exclusive remedy when election already conducted);
but c. Depew v. Edmiston, 386 F.2d 710 (3d Cir. 1967) (Title I remedy permissible when
injunction sought prior to election).
834. 622 F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 1980).
835. Id. at 455 (citing Depew v. Edmiston, 386 F.2d 710 (3d Cir. 1967)).
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the officers refused to seat him.8 36
The plaintiff filed a complaint in district court under Title I and
won a preliminary injunction ordering his installation. The incumbent
then fied a complaint with the Secretary of Labor under Title IV. The
Secretary found the incumbent's allegation that the plaintiff's installation would violate Title IV meritorious and filed an independent action
in district court. The plaintiff was not allowed by the district court to
intervene.83 7

The cases were consolidated for appeal. The plaintiff appealed the
district court's refusal to allow his intervention in the Title IV suit while
the defendant appealed on two grounds: (1) that the plaintiff's Title I
remedies were preempted by the existence of Title IV claims the plaintiff failed to pursue, 838 and (2) that the record did not support the granting of the preliminary injunction. 3 9
The court affirmed the injunction and held that preemption was
not applicable to the case because the plaintiff alleged discrimination
against himself as an individual, in violation of his Title I rights.84
The court also dismissed the Secretary of Labor's Title IV complaint
because the incumbent had obtained the relief requested in the union
proceedings. Since there was no real dispute between the incumbent
and the union, both of whom had sought to invalidate Kupau's election, use of Title IV by the Secretary was inappropriate. Title IV could
union, but not to overlegitimately be utilized to coerce a recalcitrant
8 41
turn a valid decision of a district court.
1.

8 42

Union Security: Union HringHallS and Union Discrimination
VII.

OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT

The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1920 (OSHA)8 43 was
enacted by Congress "to assure so far as possible every working man
and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions and to
836. Id. at 452.
837. Id. at 452-53.
838. Note that the preemption issue revolved around Title IV claims the plaintiff might
have brought and not the Title IV claim that the incumbent brought.
839. 622 F.2d at 453.
840. See supra notes 833-35 and accompanying text.
841. 622 F.2d at 458.
842. See supra notes 416-39 and accompanying text in Part H: UNFAIR LABOR
Pa~crAcEs.
843. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976).
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preserve our human resources."'
Among other requirements, each
employer must comply with two key provisions of the Act. First, the
employer must furnish a place of employment "free from recognized
hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical
harm" to the employees (general duty clause). 84" Second, the employer
must comply with OSHA standards promulgated by the Secretary of
Labor (Secretary).' 4
A.

GeneralDuty Clause

The general duty clause was enacted to cover serious hazards at
the workplace to which no specific standard applied.8 47 During the initial years of the Act's existence, the general duty clause was used as an
interim measure to prohibit hazardous conduct either while specific
standards were being considered for promulgation or before a recently
enacted standard had become effective. 4s Recently, however, the general duty clause has been employed in cases of unusual violations not
covered by specific promulgated standards. 849
A significant and distinctive element of general duty clause violations is that they are limited to recognized hazards. A hazard is considered recognized if it is: (1) preventable;850 (2) of common knowledge
in the employer's industry;851 (3) detectable either through the senses or
instrumentation; 85 2 or, (4) if the employer had knowledge of the hazardous condition. 85 3 It was this final feature that was at the heart of the
844. Id. § 651(b).
845. Id. § 654(a)(1).
846. Id. § 654(a)(2).
847. See S. REP. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 9, 10, reprintedin 1970 U.S. CODE CONG.

& AD. NEws 5177, 5186 [hereinafter cited as Senate Report].
848. See American Smelting & Ref. Co. v. OSHRC, 501 F.2d 504, 512 (8th Cir. 1974)
(use of general duty clause proper where specific standard not yet effective); Hidden Valley
Corp., 1 O.S.A.H.R.C. 62, 71 (1972) (respondent employer subject to general duty clause
where violation occurred prior to effective date of specific standard).
849. See Usery v. Marquette Cement Mfg. Co., 568 F.2d 902, 909-10 (2d Cir. 1977) (employee crushed by falling bricks); Richmond Block, Inc., 6 O.S.A.H.R.C. 180, 201 (1974)
(employee killed while cleaning the inside of cement mixer).
850. National Realty & Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(hazard not recognized if informed safety experts would concur that methods to eliminate
condition were not feasible).
851. Brennan v. OSHRC (Vy Lactos Laboratories, Inc.), 494 F.2d 460,464 (8th Cir. 1974)
(a recognized hazard includes hazards generally recognized in the industry).
852. American Smelting & Ref. Co. v. OSHRC, 501 F.2d 504, 511 (8th Cir. 1974) (recognized hazards are not limited to those conditions which can be recognized directly by human
senses without the assistance of technical instruments).
853. Brennan v. OSHRC (Vy Lactos Laboratories, Inc.), 494 F.2d 460,464 (8th Cir. 1974)
(a hazard is recognized under the general duty clause where an employer has actual knowl-
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8 4
controversy in Magma Copper Co. v. Marshall.1

In Magma, the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commisfound Magma Copper Co. (Magma) guilty of a
sion (Commission)"'
8' 6
"serious violation "

of the general duty clause. The citation for vio-

lating the general duty clause was issued after an investigation of an
explosion in Magma's plant. The explosion took place when an em-

ployee mistakenly connected a pneumatic tool hose to a pure oxygen
supply instead of to the compressed air supply. When the tool was

activated, the residual hydrocarbons in the hose came into contact with
the pure oxygen and exploded. The accident occurred despite extensive safety precautions taken by Magma.85 7 The citation proceeded on

the assumption that despite the existing safety precautions, the lack of
noninterchangeable fittings on the power supply hoses created an explosion hazard. 5 8
The Secretary sought to prove, by expert testimony, that the lack
edge of the hazard); accord Usery v. Marquette Cement Mfg. Co., 568 F.2d 902, 910 (2d Cir.
1977) (to constitute a recognized hazard, the dangerous potential of a condition or activity
must actually be known to the employer or known generally in the industry). But see Titanium Metals Corp. v. Usery, 579 F.2d 536, 541 (9th Cir. 1978) (a recognizedhazard may be
found to exist even if the employer is completely ignorant of potential for harm).
854. 608 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1979).
855. The Commission was established under § 12(a) of OSHA. 29 U.S.C. § 661(a)
(1976). The Commission was created to adjudicate contested matters resulting from the
Secretary's issuance of citations and proposed penalties. The establishment of an independent adjudicatory panel differed significantly from other traditional administrative organizations as represented by the FTC, NLRB, ICC, and other agencies. For an exposition on the
differences between these administrative agencies, see Moran, A Court in the Executive
Branch of Government: The Strange Case of the Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission, 20 WAYNE L. Rnv. 999 (1974).
856. 608 F.2d at 374. The company was found to be in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1)
(1976) which provides in part: "Each employer... shall furnish... a place of employment ... free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or
serious physical harm to his employees." "[A] serious violation [of § 654(a)(1)] shall be
deemed to exist in a place of employment if there is a substantial probability that death or
serious physical harm could result.. . ." 29 U.S.C. § 666G) (1976); see Dorey Elec. Co. v.
OSHRC, 553 F.2d 357, 358 (4th Cir. 1977) (absence of guardrails on the edges of fourth
floor uncompleted apartment building held to be a serious violation); Shaw Constr., Inc. v.
OSHRC, 534 F.2d 1183, 1184 (5th Cir. 1976) (construction company committed a serious
violation of trenching regulations where three-foot high soil banks and large chunks of
asphalt were placed within two feet of construction trench where vibrations caused by passing traffic and construction equipment might cause debris to fall into trench in which workers may be present).
857. 608 F.2d at 375. The oxygen supply system was installed some 25 to 30 feet from the
air compressor system. The two systems were color coded, and a warning sign was posted
close to the oxygen outlet in a well lit area. Additionally, the employees were wearing prescribed safety apparel at the time of the accident. Id.
858. Id.
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of noninterchangeable hose fittings in the oxygen system was a recognized hazard. 5 9 The Secretary's expert testified only as to the use of
the portable oxygen units in hospitals and in welding work. The court
held, in accordance with Brennan v. Smoke-Craft Inc., 60 that such testimony was not testimony based on expertise in a relevant industry,
and as a consequence, the testimony was insufficient to carry the Secretary's burden to show a serious violation.8 61
The Secretary also argued that proof of an employer's actual
knowledge of a hazard is sufficient to prove that the hazard was recognized. The Secretary contended that by implementing the safety precautions that it did, Magma had actual knowledge of the hazard and
thus the hazard was recognized. 62 The court rejected this argument,
holding that "[w]here evidence of [an] employer's actual knowledge is
relied on as proof that a hazard is 'recognized,' under the general duty
provision of the Act, the Secretary has the burden of demonstrating
...that the employer's safety precautions were unacceptable in his
industry, or a relevant industry."8' 63 The standard adopted by the court
was what "a reasonably conscientious safety expert familiar with the
pertinent industry" would believe was unacceptable in the industry. 8 "4
The court's reasoning paralleled that of the First Circuit in Cape &
Vineyard Division v. OSHRC.8 65 In Cape, the court considered a specific OSHA standard 66 dealing with protective equipment and found
the wording of the regulation to be too general to afford an employer
adequate notice. 67 The First Circuit demonstrated its concern over the
859. Id.
860. 530 F.2d 843 (9th Cir. 1976).
861. Id. at 845. The court in Smoke-Craft pointed out that in determining whether a
condition would result in a violation of OSHA provisions, a determination would have to be
made with reference to the customs in a relevant industry. In the absence of a relevant
industry custom or practice, the determination that must be made is whether the evidence
supports a conclusion "that a reasonably prudent man familiar with the industry would find
necessary to protect against [the hazard complained of]." Id.
862. 608 F.2d at 376.
863. Id. at 377.
864. Id. (footnote omitted).
865. 512 F.2d 1148 (1st Cir. 1975).
866. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.132(a) (1980).
867. The regulation states:
Protective equipment, including personal protective equipment for eyes, face,
head, and extremities, protective clothing, respiratory devices and protective
shields and barriers, shall be provided, used and maintained in a sanitary and reliable condition wherever it isnecessary by reason of hazards or processes or environment, chemical hazards, radiological hazards, or mechanical irritants
encountered in a manner capable of causing injury or impairment in the function

of any part of the body through absorption, inhalation or physical contact.

Id. (emphasis added).
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lack of adequate notice to the employer by stating that "[a] regulation

without ascertainable standards, like this one, does not provide constitutionally adequate warning to an employer unless read to penalize

only conduct unacceptable in light of the common understanding and

experience of those working in the industry."8'6 8 The Ninth Circuit

found that adequate notice, as outlined in Cape, must exist before an
employer may be charged with violating the general duty clause of the
Act based on the employer's actual knowledge.8 69 Thus, the court imstandard to ensure that adequate notice would be
posed the objective
870
provided.
B. OSHA Standards

In addition to conforming to the requirements of the general duty
clause, OSHA also requires that employers comply with standards
promulgated by the Secretary.8 7 1 The standards may be divided into
three classes based on the method in which they were promulgated:
87
(1) existing standards 72 adopted under section 6(a) of the Act; 1
868. 512 F.2d at 1152 (citing Ryder Truck Lines v. Brennan, 497 F.2d 230, 233 (5th Cir.
1974)).
869. 608 F.2d at 377.
870. Id. It would seem patently unfair and counterproductive to allow the Secretary to
use the employer's safety precautions to show actual knowledge and thus a recognized hazard without requiring some judicial assessment of the existing safety measures. Employers
would tend not to implement safety precautions for fear that such measures would be used
to show their knowledge of a hazard and thus violations of the general duty clause.
871. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(2) (1976). Section 654(a) provides in part: "Each employer.
(2) shall comply with occupational safety and health standards promulgated under this
chapter."
872. Existing standards were of two categories: national consensus standards or established federal standards existing under other federal acts. 29 U.S.C. § 652(9) (1976) defines
a national consensus standard as:
any occupational safety and health standard or modification thereof which (1) has
been adopted and promulgated by a nationally recognized standards-producing
organization under procedures whereby it can be determined by the Secretary that
persons interested and affected by the scope or provisions of the standard have
reached substantial agreement on its adoption, (2) was formulated in a manner
which afforded an opportunity for diverse views to be considered and (3) has been
designated as such a standard by the Secretary, after consultation with other appropriate Federal agencies.
29 U.S.C. § 652(10) (1976) states: "The term 'established Federal standard' means any operative occupational safety and health standard established by any agency of the United States
and presently in effect, or contained in any Act of Congress in force on December 29, 1970."
873. 29 U.S.C. § 655(a) (1976) authorizes the Secretary to adopt existing federal standards and national consensus standards without resort to lengthy rulemaking procedures,
for two years after the effective date of the Act. It appears that Congress reasoned that
existing federal standards had already been exposed to procedural scrutiny by other government agencies, and that national consensus standards were developed after obtaining diverse
views from interested parties. Thus, Congress was of the belief that the adoption of these

[
[Vol.
14

LOYOLA OFLOS ANGELES LAW .REVIEW

(2) new standards promulgated pursuant to section

6(b);8 74

(3) emergency temporary standards adopted under section 6(c).

875

and

1. Judicial review
The Secretary's rulemaking authority may be reviewed in two
ways. First, any party that may be adversely affected by a standard
may obtain pre-enforcement review by filing a petition, within sixty
days of promulgation, with the United States Court of Appeals for the
circuit in which the party resides or has his or her principal place of
business.876 The second method of review, available to "[a]ny person
87
adversely affected or aggrieved by" a final order of the Commission,
is to file a petition pursuant to section 11(a) of OSHA.a~a Petitions for
11(a) must also be filed within sixty days in the
review under section
8 79
relevant circuit.
In.4tlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. OSHRC,8 8 0 the Third Circuit

held that the scope of review of a Commission order in an enforcement
proceeding was coextensive with the review available for a pre-enforcement petition challenging the procedural and substantive validity of the
standards would afford employees immediate protection without infringing on the procedural rights of employers. Senate Report, supra note 847, at 5182.
874. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b) (1976) requires that to promulgate new standards or modify or
revoke an existing OSHA standard, the Secretary must comply with the detailed rulemaking
procedures specified in the body of the section. These procedures contemplate the use of an
advisory committee to make recommendations to the Secretary and also require publication
of proposed rules in the Federal Register for public comment.
875. 29 U.S.C. § 655(c) (1976) allows the Secretary to adopt emergency standards if he or
she determines that employees are exposed to "grave danger from exposure to substances or
agents determined to be toxic or physically harmful or from new hazards." Because of the
grave danger involved, an emergency temporary standard is not subject to the specific requirements embodied in 29 U.S.C. § 655(b) (1976). For a contrast between the promulgation requirements of permanent versus emergency temporary standards, see Florida Peach
Growers Ass'n v. United States Dep't of Labor, 489 F.2d 120, 124 (5th Cir. 1974).
876. 29 U.S.C. § 655(0 (1976) provides in part:
Any person who may be adversely affected by a standard issued under this section
may at any time prior to the sixtieth day after such standard is promulgated file a
petition challenging the validity of such standard with the United States court of
appeals for the circuit wherein such person resides or has his principal place of
business, for a judicial review of such standard ....
877. 29 U.S.C. § 660(a) (1976).
878. Id. Section l1(a) provides in part:
Any person adversely affected. . . by an order of the Commission... may obtain
review of such an order in any United States court of appeals for the circuit in
which the violation is alleged to have occurred or where the employer has its principal office, or in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, by
filing in such court within sixty days following the issuance of such order a written
petition praying that the order be modified or set aside. ...
879. Id.
880. 534 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1976).
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allegedly violated standard.8"8 ' Thus, the validity of the standard could

be reviewed in an enforcement proceeding.
In the 1980 case of Noblecraft Industries,Inc. v. Secretary of La88 2
bor,

the Ninth Circuit adopted the view, outlined in Atlantic & Gulf

Stevedores, that the validity of a standard may be challenged in an
enforcement proceeding. In Noblecraft, the Secretary argued that judi-

cial review of the validity of a promulgated national consensus standard is barred if the sixty day statutory time period expires before a

cited employer challenges the standard.883 The Ninth Circuit rejected
this argument, citing explicit language in the legislative history of the
section which applied the sixty day limitation only to pre-enforcement
review of standards.8 84

The Secretary advanced a similar argument a short time later in
Marshallv. Union Oil Co.,885 relying on the Eighth Circuit's decision in
NationalIndustrialConstructors,Inc. v. OSHRC.8 86 The Ninth Circuit

declined to follow the position adopted by the Eighth Circuit,8 87 holding instead that an employer may challenge the procedural validity or
the substantive validity of the promulgated standards during an enforcement proceeding.888 Quoting from the Supreme Court's decision
881. Id. at 550-51.
882. 614 F.2d 199 (9th Cir. 1980).
883. Id. at 201. The Secretary relied on 29 U.S.C § 655() (1976) as support for his argument. For the pertinent language of this section, see supra note 876.
884. 614 F.2d at 201. The legislative history relied on by the court reads as follows:
"While [§ 655(f)] would be the exclusive method for obtaining pre-enforcement judicial review of a standard, the provision does not foreclose an employer from challenging the validity of a standard during an enforcement proceeding." Senate Report, supra note 847, at
5184.
885. 616 F.2d 1113, 1116-17 (9th Cir. 1979).
886. 583 F.2d 1048 (8th Cir. 1978). National challenged a regulation for which it had
been cited on the ground that the regulation was not promulgated in accordance with the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 533 (1976), and consequently was not an "established federal standard." See supra note 872. The Eighth Circuit rejected National's attack
on the ground that it was a procedural attack precluded by 29 U.S.C. § 655(f) (1976). See
supra note 876 and accompanying text. The Eighth Circuit in effect read Senate Report No.
1282, see supra note 847, to allow a substantive challenge to a regulation in an enforcement
proceeding, but held that a procedural attack is different. The Eighth Circuit held that a
procedural attack may only be raised in a pre-enforcement proceeding, subject to the challenge being raised within sixty days from promulgation. 583 F.2d at 1051-53. The court
based its holding on policy grounds, stating that "Itlhe agency's interest in finality, coupled
with the burden of continuous procedural challenges raised whenever an agency attempts to
enforce a regulation, dictates against providing a perpetual forum in which the Secretary's
procedural irregularities may be raised." Id. at 1052.
887. 616 F.2d at 1117.
888. Id. at 1118.
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inAssociation of DataProcessingService Organizationsv. Camp,889 the
court stated: "'There is no presumption against judicial review and in
favor of administrative absolutism... unless that purpose is fairly discernible in the statutory scheme.' "890 The court could find no congressional authorization to distinguish between procedural challenges and

substantive challenges and therefore upheld Union Oil's right to challenge the validity of the procedure used by the Secretary to promulgate
the standard in question. 9 '

2. Promulgation
Under OSHA, the Secretary is required to adopt, as occupational
safety and health standards, any existing standard,

92

unless he or she

determines that a particular standard or standards would not result in
improved safety and health for employees. 893 Existing standards may
be partially or fully adopted. Partial adoptions may be effected by
modifications made by the Secretary in changing advisory language to

mandatory language or by omissions, deletions, or any combination
thereof. These promulgation procedures have been the basis of recent
litigation. 894 Two of the above mentioned cases decided by the Ninth
Circuit during the survey period, Union Oil and Noblecraft, provide

examples of changes from advisory language to mandatory language
and modifications of standards by omissions.
Union Oil involved changing the word "should," as contained in

an adopted
American National Standards Institute (ANSI) standard, to
8 '95
"shall."

The Ninth Circuit held that the change from an advisory

889. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
890. 616 F.2d at 1117 (quoting Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp,
397 U.S. 150, 157 (1970)).
891. 616 F.2d at 1118.
892. For a description of the types of existing standards, see supra note 872.
893. 29 U.S.C. § 655(a) (1976) provides: "the Secretary shall ... by rule promulgate as
an occupational safety or health standard any national consensus standard, and any established Federal standard, unless he determines that the promulgation of such a standard
would not result in improved safety or health for specifically designated employees."
894. See, e.g., Marshall v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 584 F.2d 638 (3d Cir. 1978)
(Secretary could not alter meaning of ANSI standard); usery v. Kennecott Copper Corp.,
577 F.2d 1113 (10th Cir. 1977) (Secretary's change of wording of ANSI standard from an
advisory "should" to a mandatory "shall" rendered the regulation unenforceable because
the appropriate rulemaking procedures were not followed).
895. 616 F.2d at 1115. Union Oil contended that the Secretary had improperly promulgated a standard when he adopted an ANSI standard, qualifying it as an OSHA standard.
The standard in question was the occupational safety and health regulation, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1910.28(a)(3) (1980). As formulated by ANSI, the standard provided that "[g]uardrails
and toeboards should be installed .... ." NationalStandardsInstitute, American National
StandardSafe, Requirementsfor Scaffolding 3.3 (1969) (emphasis added). The Secretary,
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enough to render the
standard to a mandatory one 96 was substantial 97
standard unenforceable as an existing standard.

Union Oil and other similar decisions appear to overlook the dilemma faced by the Secretary. On the one hand, changing "should" to
"shall" is impermissible in adopting national consensus standards; on
the other hand, retaining the word "should" makes compliance op-

tional and thus renders enforcement powers useless. This means that to
adopt any of the existing standards couched in advisory language, the
Secretary would have to resort to stricter and more burdensome

rulemaking procedures,898 a result that appears to be directly contrary
to the purposes of the section allowing the adoption of existing
standards. 899

In Noblecraft, the court was required to determine the significance
of omissions in the adoption of an ANSI standard. 9°° In reversing the

Commission's ruling that an omitted headnote was merely explanatory
and thus not a material change in the meaning and application of the

adopted standard, the Ninth Circuit held that the omissions did materihowever, changed the wording of the regulation to read "[g]uardrails and toeboards shall be
installed.. . ...
" 29 C.F.R. § 1910.28(a)(3) (1980) (emphasis added); 616 F.2d at 1115.
896. The court pointed out that "ANSI's 1969 standards have the following definitions:
* . . Mandatory rules of this standard are characterized by the word shall. If a rule is of an
advisory nature it is indicated by the word should, or is stated as a recommendation. [Emphasis in original.]" Id. at 1115 n.3.
897. Id. at 1116. The standard invalidated in Union Oil was precisely the same standard
invalidated in Usery v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 577 F.2d 1113, 1116 (10th Cir. 1977). With
respect to changing the wording of an adopted standard to make the standard mandatory,
the Ninth, Third, and Tenth Circuits are in accord in holding such standards invalid as
national consensus standards. See supra note 894 and the cases cited therein.
898. See supra note 874 and accompanying text.
899. In dissent, Commissioner Cleary, in Pan Am. Airways, 4 O.S.H.C. 1203 (1976), argued that because ANSI is a private organization, all of the ANSI standards were originally
only recommendations. Thus, in granting the Secretary power to adopt ANSI standards as
national consensus standards, Congress authorized that optional standards be made
mandatory.
900. 614 F.2d at 203. Noblecraft contended that the consensus nature of an ANSI standard was destroyed because the Secretary omitted portions of the source standard in adopting 29 C.F.R. § 1910.213(h)(1) (1980). Noblecraft emphasized two omitted portions. The
first read: "Scope. This code is intended as a guide for the safe installation, operation, and
maintenance of wood-working machinery, including cooperage operations and the making
" 614 F.2d at 203.
of veneer, but excluding the manufacture of structural plywood ...
The second omitted portion emphasized by the petitioners read:
NOTE: It is recognized that the standards for saw guards in 4.1 are not perfectly
applicable to all operations for which saws are used. The standards given are those
which woodworkers have agreed are most generally useful. Since there are a considerable number of cases not satisfactorily met by these standards, the enforcing
authority should exercise rather wide latitude in allowing the use of other devices
which give promise of affording adequate protection ....
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ally change the character of the existing standard." Thus, the validity
of the standard as it read could not be upheld unless it was promulgated in accordance with the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act. 90 2 In addition, the court pointed out that the omitted
portions of the source standards made it clear that the standards were
intended to apply only to some uses to which radial arm saws were put
and not to all uses. Thus, the court remanded the question of whether
the standard as originally drafted by ANSI applied to the particular
radial arm saws at issue.90 3
3.

Degree of violation

OSHA provides a number of penalties that may be assessed by the
Commission for varying degrees of violations. 904 Violations are gener90 8
90 7
9 6
ally classified as de miniMis, 90 5 non-serious, 0 serious, repeated,
901. Id. at 204.
902. Id.
903. Id.
904. The penalty ranges provided by OSHA for each of the degrees of violations are as
follows: de minimi notice-$0.00; non-serious violation-0.00 to $1,000.00; serious violation-$0.00 to $1,000.00; repeated violation-0.00 to $10,000.00; willful violation-0.00 to
$10,000.00; and a failure to abate notice-$0.00 to $1,000.00 per day. 29 U.S.C. § 666

(1976).
905. 29 U.S.C. § 658(a) (1976) refers to de minimis violations as those violations "which
have no direct or immediate relationship to safety or health." In Lee Way Motor Freight,
Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 511 F.2d 864, 869 (10th Cir. 1975), the court held that a de
minimis notice is not proper where there is a direct and immediate relationship to employee
safety and health; 29 U.S.C. § 658(a) (1976) allows the Secretary to issue a notice in lieu of a
citation "with respect to de minimis violations." In such cases, there are no penalties when
no citations have been issued. See OSHA FIELD OPERATIONS MANUAL Ch. VII (B) 2b(3)
(1977).
906. OSHA does not specifically define a non-serious violation, but because there are

express definitions for both de minimis and serious violations, a non-serious violation is
somewhere between the two. 29 U.S.C. § 666(c) (1976) provides that "[a]ny employer who
has received a citation for a violation ... . and such violation is specifically determined not
to be of a serious nature, may be assessed a civil penalty of up to $1,000 for each such
violation." This language would seem to require that the Secretary make a specific determination that a violation is non-serious.
907. See supra note 856 and cases cited therein.

908. 29 U.S.C. § 666(a) provides that "[a]ny employer who willfully or repeatedly violates
the requirements of section 654 of this title, any standard, rule, or order promulgated pursuant to section 655 of this title, or regulations prescribed pursuant to this chapter, may be
assessed a civil penalty of not more than $10,000 for each violation."
There appears to be a split among the circuits as to the minimum number of prior
violations that would serve as a basis for supporting a citation for a "repeated" violation.
The Ninth Circuit, in Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Secretary of Labor, 566 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir.
1977) (per curiam), has held that one prior violation will support a repeated violation citation where a subsequent violation of the same character has occurred. Id. at 1331. This is to
be contrasted with the position taken by the Third Circuit in Bethlehem Steel Corp. v.
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or willful.9 09 Decisions of the courts and the Commission have established three elements of a willful violation. The Secretary must establish that the employer (1) had knowledge of the standard or other
requirement of the Act,9 10 (2) committed a subsequent violation, and

(3) committed the violation voluntarily with either intentional disregard of the standard or plain indifference to the Act's requirements. 91 1

During the survey period, the Ninth Circuit decided NationalSteel
and Sh~ybuilding Co. v. OSHRC,9 12 in which the court was -required to
define willful as used in the Act. National Steel had petitioned the

court to review an order of the Commission which had found that National Steel had willfully violated a safety standard contrary to section

5(a)(2) of OSHA.9 3 National Steel argued that the Third Circuit's definition of willfulness, as enunciated in Frank Irey Jr., Inc. v.
OSHRC, 9 14 should apply. In Irey, the Third Circuit adopted a defini-

tion of willfulness much more stringent than that used in other circuits
which have addressed the issue. 915 The Third Circuit requires that the

of the Act in order to sustain a finding of
Secretary show a "flaunting"
91 6
a willful violation.
Rejecting the Third Circuit's view, the Ninth Circuit held that the

Commission is not required to find that an employer had an evil motive
before it can find a willful violation. 91 7 The National Steel court
pointed out that the majority of the circuits do not follow the Irey defiOSHRC, 540 F.2d 157 (3d Cir. 1976). In Bethlehem Steel, the court held that two violations
of the same character without more could not be the basis for a repeated violation citation.
Id. at 162; see also George Hyman Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 582 F.2d 834, 839 (4th Cir. 1978)
(Fourth Circuit specifically rejects Third Circuit definition of repeated violation and aligns
itself with the Ninth Circuit view).
909. 29 U.S.C. § 666(a) (1976); see supra note 908. OSHA does not define what acts
constitute a willful violation.
910. Intercounty Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 522 F.2d 777, 779 (4th Cir. 1975), cert denied,
423 U.S. 1072 (1976).
911. Id.; accord Georgia Elec. Co. v. Marshall, 595 F.2d 309, 319 (5th Cir. 1979).
912. 607 F.2d 311 (9th Cir. 1979).
913. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(2) (1976).
914. 519 F.2d 1200 (3d Cir. 1975), a f'don other groundssub nor. Atlas Roofing Co. v.
OSHRC, 430 U.S. 442 (1977).
915. The Irey court stated that "[w]illfilness connotes defiance or such reckless disregard
of consequences as to be equivalent to a knowing, conscious, and deliberate flaunting of the
Act. Willful means more than merely voluntary action or omission-it involves an element
of obstinate refusal to comply." 519 F.2d at 1207. Other circuits have not followed this
definition, see, ag., F.X. Messina Constr. Corp. v. OSHRC, 505 F.2d 701,702 (1st Cir. 1974)
(bad purpose not required to sustain citation for willful violation).
916. 519 F.2d 1207; see supra note 909.
917. 607 F.2d at 315-16.
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nition of willful."' The court reasoned that the Third Circuit's concern
that a less restrictive definition would not preserve the distinction between willful and serious violations was more apparent than real. The

court pointed out that:
"To prove a willful violation, the Secretary must show that

the employer acted voluntarily, with either intentional disregard of or plain indifference to OSHA requirements [whereas]
. . . [t]he gravamen of a serious violation is the presence of a
'substantial probability' that a particular violation could result in death or serious physical harm." 9 19

920
It is therefore clear that in the Ninth Circuit, as in the majority

of the circuits, a showing of evil motive is not required to sustain a
finding of a willful violation.92 1 On that basis, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the Commission's finding that National Steel willfully violated
922
the OSHA safety standard in question.
918. Id. at 314-15.
919. Id. at 315 (quoting Georgia Elec. Co. v. Marshall, 595 F.2d 309, 318-19 (5th Cir.
1979) (footnote omitted)).
920. The other circuits which share this view are the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth,
and Tenth Circuits. See, e.g., Georgia Elec. Co. v. Marshall, 595 F.2d 309, 317-19 (5th Cir.
1979); Empire-Detroit Steel Div. v. OSHRC, 579 F.2d 378, 385 (6th Cir. 1978); Western
Waterproofing Co. v. Marshall, 576 F.2d 139, 142-43 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
965 (1979); Intercounty Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 522 F.2d 777, 779-81 (4th Cir. 1975), cer.
denied,423 U.S. 1072 (1976); United States v. Dye Constr. Co., 510 F.2d 78, 81-82 (10th Cir.
1975); F.X. Messina Constr. Corp. v. OSHRC, 505 F.2d 701, 702 (1st Cir. 1974).
921. In Cedar Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 587 F.2d 1303 (D.C. Cir. 1978), the D.C. Circuit
refused to be drawn into the definitional controversy. The court suggested that the Irey
definition represented only a "difference in emphasis." "[I]ntentional disregard of, or plain
indifference to, OSHA regulations could well be considered an 'obstinate' refusal to comply." Id. at 1305.
922. 607 F.2d at 317. Moreover, the court indicated in the instant case that, based on the
findings of the administrative law judge in the lower proceedings, it was the court's belief
that the Commission would have found willfuiness even if the Irey standard had been applied. Id. at 316 n.7.

